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Abstract 
 
The intertemporal risk-return tradeoff is the cornerstone of modern empirical finance and 
has been the focus of much debate over the years. The reason for this is because extant 
literature cannot agree as to the very nature of this important relation. This is troublesome 
in terms of academic theory given that it challenges the notion that investors are risk-
averse agents and is furthermore troublesome in practice given that market participants 
expect to be rewarded with higher expected returns in order to take on higher risks. 
 The motivation for this thesis stems from the conflicting and inconclusive 
empirical evidence regarding the risk-return tradeoff. Through each of the chapters, it 
sheds new light on possible reasons as to why extant studies offer conflicting evidence 
and, given the enhancements and innovative approaches proposed here, it provides 
empirical evidence in support of a positive intertemporal risk-return tradeoff when 
examining several international stock markets. 
 The research questions this thesis addresses are as follow. Firstly, is it possible 
that extant conflicting evidence is manifested in the use of historical realized returns to 
proxy for investors’ forward-looking expected returns? Secondly, can accounting for 
shifts in investment opportunities (i.e. intertemporal risk) better explain investors’ risk 
aversion and changes in the dynamic risk premium? Thirdly, is it possible that conflicting 
findings are the result of neglecting to account for the possibility that there exist 
heterogeneous investors in the stock market with divergent expectations? 
 The empirical findings can be summarized as follows; firstly, there is a strong 
possibility that many existing studies cannot find a positive risk-return relation because 
they are relying on ex post historical realized returns as a proxy for investors’ forward-
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looking expected returns. Secondly, there is evidence in favor of the Merton (1973) 
notion that there exists intertemporal risk which impacts investors and that this type of 
risk should be considered. This has been also another reason why extant literature cannot 
agree on the nature of the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. Finally, even after 
accounting for investor heterogeneity, the findings provide support for the Merton (1973) 
theoretical Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model. Namely, in contrast to existing 
studies on the matter, there is evidence of fundamental traders over longer horizons and 
no evidence of feedback traders at such horizons. Although this sheds new light on some 
of the driving forces behind stock prices, the nature of investors’ degree of risk aversion 
seems to be best supported by the Merton (1973) theoretical Intertemporal Capital Asset 
Pricing Model. 
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- Chapter One - 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Focus of the Thesis 
The intent of this thesis is to investigate empirically the nature of the intertemporal 
tradeoff between risk and return on the market portfolio. Historically, the risk-return 
relationship retains a prominent position in the field of asset pricing and is the foundation 
for much of modern empirical finance. Interestingly, this relationship has inspired much 
innovative advancement in econometrics such as the autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model of Engle (1982) and the generalized ARCH (GARCH) 
of Bollerslev (1986) and Taylor (1986), which, as is explained later on, enables 
researchers to model market risk and to see how it varies through time. It also allows 
researchers to explicitly see its relation with market returns and to observe whether there 
is a positive risk-return tradeoff.  
Despite advancements in econometric sophistication as well as the development 
of new technology and economic databases which now allow more accessibility to 
financial data, this field of research is still in a state of flux. In particular, academic 
research has reached no clear consensus as to the nature of the intertemporal risk-return 
tradeoff and literature often reports conflicting findings which change with the 
econometric technique used or with the nature of the data. 
The risk-return tradeoff has been such an important issue which motivates much 
of the work that is related to asset pricing because, from this very relationship, we seek to 
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answer important questions relating to market efficiency, the predictability of stock 
returns, and the behavior of market participants. However, in order to empirically test 
many of these propositions, it is important to examine the tradeoff between risk and 
return in the stock market because, from understanding this relationship, then we can be 
at a better position to determine what the driving forces behind stock prices are and 
whether risk plays a role in investors’ decision-making and their portfolio selection 
criterion. Therefore, given the paramount importance of this relation, it is rather 
troublesome that literature which empirically examines the nature of the risk-return 
tradeoff reports mixed findings as to its nature. 
 Traditionally, theory dictates that the risk-return tradeoff is positive and that 
rational risk-averse investors demand higher returns in order to take on more risk (see 
Markowitz, 1952). This proposition has then been developed further and used in order to 
develop the paradigm that investors are mean-variance optimizers and seek investments 
which have the highest possible mean returns at the lowest possible variance. In other 
words, investors are looking for assets that have the highest possible expected returns at 
the lowest level of risk. Should risk increase, we would also expect investors’ expected 
return to rise commensurate to this risk. 
 Much of asset pricing has evolved on the basis that risk and return are positively 
related. In particular, Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) introduce the highly acclaimed 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which seeks to explain assets’ expected returns on 
the basis of their risk. Although this model was introduced many years ago, it is still 
explored by researchers today and even used among practitioners as a valuation tool for 
cost of capital approximations (see Graham and Harvey, 2001). 
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 From the perspective of an investor, it is important to understand the nature of the 
risk-return relation because it directly impacts their decision-making and their willingness 
to bear more risk. For example, why would an investor take on more risk if it appears that 
there is no evidence of a positive risk-return tradeoff? Therefore, this thesis not only 
attempts to provide some insights into strictly the theory of asset pricing literature, but 
also raises some practical questions and how they directly influence investors. If we have 
a better understanding of the nature of the risk-return tradeoff, then this will help 
investors make better decisions and we can better understand whether the volatility of an 
asset plays a role in the expected returns of this very asset. 
 Despite the risk-return tradeoff being the foundation for much of modern 
empirical finance and a key ingredient in investors’ decision-making, the motivation for 
this thesis also stems from the fact that many studies which investigate this important 
relation tend to report mixed findings that are oftentimes counterintuitive and inconsistent 
with the predictions of theory. In particular, since the introduction of the CAPM, other 
researchers have introduced multi-period models which suggest investors’ risk aversion 
shifts through time in accordance to shifts in market risks and investment opportunities. 
One such prominent and classical model is the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(ICAPM) of Merton (1973). This model, unlike the CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner 
(1965), attempts to find the link between risk and return in a multi-period continuous 
framework where investment opportunities shift stochastically through time. In other 
words, the ICAPM postulates that risk is time-varying in nature and so is investors’ 
expectations and degree of risk aversion. From the perspective of investors, such a 
model may be a more accurate description of reality since, as observation of markets 
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suggests, market events and investors’ perceptions and degree of risk tolerance shift 
rapidly through time and are never “static” as the CAPM suggest. If the ICAPM is indeed 
an accurate portrayal of reality, then such a model can prove useful in determining what 
are the factors which influence stock prices and which drive investors’ risk aversion. 
 Despite the significant theoretical advancements of the Merton (1973) ICAPM, 
there are still many gaps in the literature which merit attention. More specifically, the 
literature still cannot agree on the nature of the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff despite 
the so many advancements that have been made in econometric and time-series 
modelling. In particular, the proposition that intertemporal risk and return should be 
positively linked has been explored extensively, as is explained later on, using variations 
of the GARCH methodology. The evidence is mixed and oftentimes counterintuitive. 
In light of extant conflicting findings, this thesis seeks to make a novel 
contribution by addressing the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff from three different 
angles. Each of these different angles not only explores the intertemporal risk-return 
tradeoff but also examines of what relevance the findings are for market participants. 
Each of these findings and arguments are discussed in turn in the remaining chapters of 
this thesis. 
  
1.2. Objectives of the Thesis 
In particular, the following chapters look at the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff from 
different angles and try to provide explanations as to why existing findings are mixed. 
For example, the second chapter provides arguments which highlight the limitations with 
using ex post historical realized returns as a proxy for investors’ forward-looking 
 17
expectation of returns. It contributes to existing literature by providing a forward-looking 
proxy of expected returns which is derived theoretically from the Gordon (1962) dividend 
constant growth model, something which, to my knowledge, has not been considered 
before. In an additional contribution to literature, this chapter finds a positive tradeoff 
between risk and return in both the short- and long-run. It thus emphasizes that extant 
conflicting findings may not be the artifact of econometric (miss-)specification of the 
conditional volatility process but may instead be rooted in the use of realized historical 
returns as a proxy for investors’ forward-looking expected returns. 
 The third chapter takes on a different approach. It considers a two-factor variant 
of the seminal Merton (1973) ICAPM and considers why two-factor empirical 
implementation of this model has been so limited when compared to literature which 
implements a one-factor variant of the ICAPM whereby conditional volatility is the only 
explanatory variable that should be able to describe variations in expected returns. In 
particular, the two-factor ICAPM posits that expected returns are a linear function of their 
conditional volatility and their conditional covariance with investment opportunities 
which shift stochastically through time. The empirical challenge, however, with this two-
factor model is that it is difficult to identify variables, known as “state factors,” which 
serve as a proxy for investors’ opportunity set. 
 In a contribution to existing literature, the third chapter raises arguments as to 
why this is the case and why the long-term government bond interest rate may not be an 
appropriate proxy for the investment opportunity set, despite it being advocated by 
Merton (1973). This is because this interest rate is, to a large extent, influenced by the 
activities of Central Banks and may not reflect real economic activity as, say, the 
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industrial production index. It thus proposes to use a set of macroeconomic factors which 
have proved to be instrumental in literature in detecting shifts in macroeconomic 
conditions and in explaining stock market returns. It furthermore implements an 
econometric technique which allows each of the proposed state factors to be time-varying 
in nature and evolve as investment conditions in the market shift through time.  
 Finally, the fourth chapter takes yet a different approach and argues that perhaps 
we need to incorporate the behaviors of different types of investors since there is ample 
evidence to suggest that investors do not conform to ‘rational expectations’ and do not 
invest on the basis of mean-variance considerations as is advocated by Markowitz (1952). 
In particular, it incorporates the behavior of three different types of investors; 
fundamental traders, feedback traders and rational investors who make investment 
decisions on the basis of mean-variance considerations. 
Despite the different approaches each of the following three chapters takes in 
trying to resolve the intertemporal risk-return puzzle, they are all linked in the sense that 
they touch on many contemporary issues related to asset pricing and, more specifically, 
to what the issues regarding the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff are. It is interesting to 
see how this tradeoff encompasses many other topics in finance theory; for example, the 
second chapter contains principles related to corporate finance when it derives from the 
Gordon (1962) dividend constant growth model the earnings-yield as a proxy for 
investors’ required rate of return in the stock market. The third chapter explores evidence 
from macroeconomic and financial regulatory literature which explores to what extent 
macroeconomic factors can explain shifts in economic market conditions. The fourth 
chapter draws on literature from the field of behavioral finance in order to motivate the 
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methodology used and to show perhaps it is necessary to incorporate the behavior of 
different investors when examining the risk-return tradeoff. 
Overall, the objective of this thesis, through each of the chapters, is to shed light 
onto why existing studies still cannot agree on the nature of this very important relation. 
This thesis takes on an international perspective and evaluates the risk-return tradeoff, 
using the various aforementioned advancements and innovations, in several industrialized 
markets. The findings lend credible support for a positive intertemporal risk-return 
tradeoff and that perhaps extant shortcomings in the literature do not stem from empirical 
irregularities. Therefore, consistent with theory, we are risk-averse investors and demand 
higher returns per unit of risk that we take in the stock market. 
 
1.3. The Main Issues 
What are some of the underlying reasons why extant literature cannot agree on the risk-
return tradeoff? Perhaps the most widely accepted theory is known as the so-called 
‘volatility feedback effect (hypothesis)’ which was mentioned originally by French, 
Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) and discussed more elaborately by Campbell and 
Hentschel (1992). Its arguments are very intuitive and are the core reason why existing 
studies find a negative or statistically negligible risk-return tradeoff. More specifically, 
this hypothesis states that negative shocks in stock returns lead to higher future volatility 
than positive shocks of equal magnitude. This proposition is consistent with the empirical 
observation that volatility is persistent and, as is described in Mandelbrot (1963) and 
Fama (1965), an increase in current volatility leads to more volatility in the future. The 
reason for this is, as Campbell and Hentschel (1992) argue, is because the negative 
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effects associated with bad news in the stock market are more pronounced than good 
news and have a larger bearing on investors’ investment decisions. 
 The volatility feedback argument can be used to explain why extant studies find a 
negative or statistically insignificant risk-return relation; in particular, as Mandelbrot 
(1963) describes, since volatility is persistent, an increase in volatility today ‘signals’ that 
volatility will be higher in the future. This raises investors’ required rate of return and the 
discount factor they use to discount expected future streams of income. If we assume that 
corporate earnings and dividends are not rising while volatility rises, prices will 
obviously fall since investors sell off their positions and wait until expected returns rise 
again to the appropriate level. As investors sell their positions, this will produce declining 
prices and produce a lower historical mean return leading one to erroneously believe that 
the expected ex ante required rate of return is falling. However, the required rate of return 
is actually rising commensurate to higher perceived risk (as theory predicts) and hence 
this is what produces lower prices. 
 Despite the arguments made by the volatility feedback hypothesis, it seems that 
extant studies continuously rely on historical realized returns as an unbiased proxy of 
investors’ future expected returns and their required rate of return. The reason they do so 
is because expected returns, just like expected market risk, are unobservable factors and 
therefore they rely on various proxies which can describe them. Furthermore, it is 
convenient to use historical realized returns given that this data is widely available and 
can easily be derived from stock prices.  
However, it is important to note that there are at least three intrinsic shortcomings 
to using historical realized returns; firstly, current research indicates that the risk 
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premium is time-varying and, therefore, any inferences drawn concerning expected 
returns using ex post returns may be highly sensitive to the sampling period under 
consideration (see Merton, 1973; Lundblad, 2007). Secondly, we as investors are 
forward-looking and thus form expectations of the required rate of return on the basis of 
current volatility, as well as news regarding future volatility in the stock market. This is 
consistent with the arguments made by Campbell and Hentschel (1992) that future 
volatility is a function of past news as well as any future news that may disseminate to 
investors. Finally, as Lundblad (2007) duly indicates, the belief that a long enough 
sample of historical returns will ‘converge,’ eventually, to expected returns is misplaced 
and inaccurate. More specifically, his study finds that nearly two hundred years worth of 
data is needed in order for us to see historical realized returns converge to investors’ 
expected rate of return.  
Another likely reason as to why extant literature documents conflicting findings is 
because the majority of studies limit their empirical methodology to one-factor GARCH-
type models whereby the conditional mean of returns is solely a function of their 
conditional variance. As is proposed by Merton (1973), perhaps it would be beneficial for 
researchers to look at what factors may accurately serve as a proxy of the investment 
opportunity set and consider integrating these factors into their analysis. Such factors, as 
is described by Merton (1973) and Gerard and Wu (2006), proxy for what is known as 
‘intertemporal risk.’ Such risk reflects the fact that investment opportunities are 
constantly shifting through time and are constantly affecting investors’ portfolios and 
marginal utility of wealth. As such, expected returns in the stock market may not only be 
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a function of market volatility but also a function of intertemporal risk, as is suggested by 
Scruggs (1998) and Scuggs and Glabadanidis (2003). 
 Finally, another issue which merits attention is that existing studies have not taken 
into account the possibility that there are heterogeneous types of investors in the stock 
market. So far, most studies empirically test the Merton (1973) model assuming that all 
investors have similar expectations and trading behaviors. This, however, may not be the 
case; in particular, there is a distinguished body of empirical finance literature which has 
found that there are different types of investors which exhibit different trading patterns. 
For example, apart from making investment decisions on the basis of mean-variance 
considerations, there is evidence to suggest that investors engage in trading patterns such 
as positive feedback trading and trading on the basis of fundamentals (see De Long, 
Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1990b; Shiller, 2000). 
Given that these investors play a significant role in the market, it may be useful to 
integrate their behavior in econometric models in order to more accurately describe the 
nature of the risk-return relation. By examining these issues across international markets, 
we can establish a more global perspective about the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff as 
well as check the qualitative robustness of the findings. 
 
1.4. Contribution of the Thesis 
The empirical nature of the risk-return tradeoff is so important in finance that it has even 
been described as the “first fundamental law in finance...” (see Ghysels, Santa-Clara and 
Valkanov, 2005). Despite the importance of this relation in finance, the existing literature 
still cannot provide a concerted description as to its nature. Despite the volatility 
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feedback hypothesis being cited as a reason why existing studies cannot find a consistent 
positive risk-return tradeoff, there is still continuous reliance on using ex post historical 
returns as an unbiased estimate of investors’ forward-looking expected returns. 
 Thus far, the literature has not been able to provide a coherent view as to why we 
cannot find a positive link between expected returns and their conditional variance. Many 
studies report a statistically non-existent risk-return relation (see French, Schwert and 
Stambaugh, 1987; Baillie and DeGennaro, 1990; Chan, Karolyi and Stulz, 1992; Harrison 
and Zhang, 1999; Koulakiotis, Papasyriopoulos and Molyneux, 2006, to name only a 
few), while others find it to be negative (see Pindyck, 1984; Nelson, 1991; Glosten, 
Jaganathan and Runkle, 1993; Bekaert and Wu, 2000). Lundblad (2007) finds it to be 
positive yet does so only when using nearly two centuries worth of data. Only then, after 
using a long sample, does he find convergence between historical realized returns and 
investors’ expected returns.  
In a contribution to existing literature, the second chapter of this thesis argues that 
the conflicting findings may not stem from empirical methodologies but instead is rooted 
in the use of historical realized returns as an unbiased estimate of investors’ forward-
looking risk premium. Sharpe (1978) and Elton (1999) also warn of the problems 
associated with using ex post realized returns to test asset pricing theories and to estimate 
expected returns. More specifically, Elton (1999) argues that future work in asset pricing 
should strive to consider alternative ways to measure expected returns instead of focusing 
on the development of new statistical procedures that continue to rely on ex post realized 
returns. 
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In light of these arguments and conflicting extant findings, the second chapter 
explores a variant of the Merton (1973) and provides an innovative proxy for investors’ 
forward-looking risk premium that is derived theoretically from the Gordon (1962) 
dividend constant growth model. This proxy is the earnings-yield and reflects the 
required rate of return in the stock market. In terms of forecasting capabilities, the 
earnings-yield, which is the reciprocal of the familiar P/E ratio that is used by 
practitioners, has proved to be a good predictor of future returns and economic conditions 
(see Campbell and Shiller, 1998, 2001). Shiller (2000) argues that the P/E ratio is a strong 
proxy for future expected returns and finds that when it rises above its long-run average, 
it signals ‘irrational exuberance’ in the stock market and a probable likelihood of an 
imminent correction in stock prices. 
Now, in order to form an estimate of the risk premium, traditionally, asset pricing 
studies compute the spread between ex post average stock market returns and the yield on 
treasuries. The proposed ex ante proxy set forth in this chapter consists of the market 
earnings-yield and the long government bond yield since this reflects the possibility that 
investors can either invest their money in the stock market or in a risk-free asset. Whereas 
the earnings-yield reflects the stock market yield, the risk-free yield can be represented 
by the long-term government yield. In the long-run, there is a positive equilibrium 
relation between these two yields and any deviations from this signal changes in 
economic conditions. Such a relation, therefore, serves as a forward-looking measure of 
investors’ risk premium. 
 The reason why the long-term government yield is used is because this yield may 
more accurately reflect investors’ and households’ opportunity costs given that they have 
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longer trading and investment horizons. As is argued by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986), 
because investors’ discount factor varies with expected dividends, earnings and firms’ 
long-term prospects, the long-term government bond yield more closely reflects this 
discount factor. As a result, this yield contains a broader range of information regarding 
macroeconomic conditions which directly impact investors’ relative risk aversion and 
utility of wealth. Finally, as mentioned, there is a growing body of literature that finds a 
long-run positive relation between the earnings-yield and the long-term government bond 
yield whereby deviations from this relation may exist in the short-run and serve to signal 
shifts in economic conditions and market returns (see Lander, Orphanides and 
Douvogiannis, 1997; Thomas and Zhang, 2008). 
This literature has been motivated by what practitioners have called the so-called 
‘Fed Model,’ whereby they use the long-run relation between the market earnings-yield 
and the long-term government bond yield to estimate future returns and economic 
conditions. Practitioners dubbed this relation the ‘Fed Model’ on the basis of a 
Humphrey-Hawkins report that the Federal Reserve released which talked about the 
relation between the market earnings-yield and the long-term government bond yield. 
Although the Federal Reserve does not endorse any trading strategy nor does it try to take 
any stance in order to avoid speculation among investors, there has been academic 
research which shows that there is a long-run relation between the market earnings-yield 
and the long-term government bond yield and that any short-run deviations may be useful 
in identifying shifts in macroeconomic conditions (see Lander, Orphanides and 
Douvogiannis, 1997; Thomas and Zhang, 2008). 
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 In a contribution to extant literature, and in a step in the right direction in 
exposing some of the intrinsic deficiencies with using ex post historical returns as a proxy 
for investors’ forward-looking expected returns, the second chapter makes use of the 
literature which examines the Fed Model and also of classical literature that has been the 
backbone of financial theory, such as the Gordon (1962) dividend constant growth model. 
It derives theoretically and from this model how the market earnings-yield can be used as 
a proxy for the required rate of return in the stock market. Thus, this contribution is 
unique because it is firstly emphasizing the limitations to using historical returns and 
how, according to the volatility feedback hypothesis of Campbell and Hentschel (1992), 
we are likely to find a negative or statistically insignificant risk-return relation. 
Furthermore, it illustrates why backward-looking historical returns are an unjustifiable 
proxy for investors’ forward-looking expectations. It thus provides a forward-looking 
measure and argues that future research, as Elton (1999) maintains, investigating the 
intertemporal risk-return tradeoff should focus on trying to find methods to test asset 
pricing theories which do not rely on using historical returns as a proxy for expected 
returns. The research here is a step in the right direction in trying to accomplish this. 
It is important to emphasize that the findings herein are of interest to academics 
and practitioners alike. From the perspective of academic research, the research herein 
lends credible support to the notion that we as investors are risk averse and therefore 
demand higher returns in order to take on higher risks. More specifically, the market 
earnings-yield, which serves as a proxy for investors’ required rate of return in the stock 
market, varies positively with market volatility both in the short- and long-run when 
looking at international stock markets. There is also evidence of a positive long-run 
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relation between the earnings-yield and the long-term government bond yield. This 
relationship can be justified on grounds that as interest rates rise, the cost of firms’ debt 
also rises and their ability to raise capital is impinged. Thus, the future prospects of the 
firm become relatively riskier and investors may assign a higher discount rate to its future 
cash flows (i.e. their required rate of return rises). Secondly, the stock market may simply 
become a less attractive investment as investors’ opportunity cost rises and they move 
into more “risk-free” investments such as Treasury bills and bonds. Therefore, their 
required rate of return in the stock market rises commensurate to this risk. Such a relation 
is also consistent with extant literature which also documents a positive association 
between the market earnings-yield and the long-term government bond yield (see 
Gordon, 1962; Bleiberg, 1989; Fairfield, 1994; Greenspan, 1997; White, 2000). 
From the perspective of practitioners, the research here provides information 
about the market earnings-yield and shows how this can shift as market volatility varies 
through time. In particular, periods of heightened stock market volatility are associated 
with higher market earnings-yields. This empirical observation is consistent with the 
findings of Campbell and Shiller (1998, 2001) and Shiller (2000). Namely, the market 
earnings-yield, as well as its reciprocal – the price-earnings ratio – can serve as an 
indicator of future market conditions. In particular, when the market earnings-yield is 
relatively high, it generally corresponds to higher market volatility and that investors’ 
required rate of return has risen. As a result, and consistent with the volatility feedback 
hypothesis of Campbel and Hentschel (1992), this will lead to a drop in stock prices as 
investors sell of their positions in the stock market and wait for expected returns to rise to 
the appropriate level (see Koutmos, 2010; Koutmos, 2011). Thus, a relatively high 
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earnings-yield serves to signal that returns will be higher in the future because investors’ 
required rate of return has risen and thus future returns must rise to compensate them for 
increases in market volatility. 
These findings are also consistent with the arguments made by Shiller (2000), 
who argues that a high price-earnings ratio (i.e. low earnings-yield) may be a signal of 
“irrational exuberance” in the stock market whereby investors are heavily invested in the 
stock market with an expectation that stock prices will continue to rise in the future. 
Under a scenario such as this one, investors do not foresee any imminent risks and feel 
comfortable with their investing and, thus, their required rate of return is low. In a 
scenario where the market price-earnings ratio is low (i.e. the earnings-yield is high), this 
may signal that many investors avoid investing in the stock market and stock prices are 
undervalued (see Shiller, 2000), possibly because of increased risks and market volatility. 
In such a scenario, their required rate of return (i.e. the market earnings-yield) is high and 
they demand higher returns to compensate them and in order to invest in the stock 
market. 
Whereas the second chapter considers a single-factor variant of the Merton (1973) 
ICAPM, which posits that expected returns are solely a function of conditional volatility, 
the third chapter introduces the two-factor ICAPM. This model posits that expected 
returns are, in addition to volatility, a function of their conditional covariance with 
investment opportunities that shift stochastically through time (see Scruggs, 1998; 
Scruggs and Glabadanidis, 2003). Despite its intuitive predictions and empirical 
tractability, the two-factor ICAPM has not received as much attention relative to the 
single-factor ICAPM. This may be due to the fact that, up until now, there has not been 
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sufficient data which enables researchers to find a link between returns and other 
macroeconomic or financial factors (see Cochrane, 2001). This may also be attributable 
to the fact that researchers have not yet chosen factors which may serve as accurate 
proxies for the investment opportunity set available to market participants. 
Merton (1973) suggests using the interest rate as a proxy for the investment 
opportunity set and, following this guidance, Scruggs (1998) empirically applies a two-
factor variant of the Merton (1973) ICAPM using the long-term government bond yield 
as a proxy for the investment opportunity set, since this yield may accurately reflect the 
information content of other interest rates as well. In this study, Scruggs (1998) finds a 
positive intertemporal risk-return tradeoff and attributes extant conflicting findings on the 
basis that they do not integrate ‘intertemporal risk’ into their models. This type of risk, as 
is discussed in greater length in the thesis, is the risk and uncertainty associated with 
changes in the investment opportunity set (see Merton, 1973; Turtle, Buse and Korkie, 
1994; Scruggs, 1998; Gerard and Wu, 2006). Given the importance of proxying for 
intertemporal risk, there is a body of literature, which is relatively much smaller in size 
relative to literature that explores the single-factor ICAPM, and argues that the future 
direction of research needs to concentrate on investigating the importance of 
intertemporal risk and how this may influence the risk-return tradeoff. 
Although the study by Scruggs (1998) finds empirical evidence in support of the 
theoretical postulation that investors are indeed risk averse and demand higher expected 
returns to take on more risk, this study’s shortcomings become evident by Scruggs and 
Glabadanidis (2003). In particular, the latter implement an econometric model, as is 
discussed in greater depth, which allows for the covariation between the long-term 
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government bond yield and investors’ expected risk premium to be time-varying. In other 
words, the investment opportunity set is “dynamic” in the sense that it shifts as market 
and macroeconomic conditions shift for investors. In fact, such an econometric approach 
is a closer depiction of economic reality as opposed to the assumption embedded in the 
methodology by  Scruggs (1998), which assumes a constant covariation between 
investors’ market risk premium and investment opportunities.  In fact, literature in 
this regard has found that, for several international markets, the correlation between stock 
returns and bond returns is time-varying (see Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard, 2006). 
When Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) allow for the conditional covariance between the 
long-term bond yield and the market risk premium to be time-varying, they find no 
evidence of a positive risk-return tradeoff. This therefore raises questions about the 
methodology implemented by Scruggs (1998) and calls for more research into trying and 
resolve this issue. 
 In a contribution to extant literature, the third chapter of this thesis considers a 
two-factor variant of the Merton (1973) ICAPM and discusses some of the limitations 
behind using the long-term government bond yield to proxy for investment opportunities 
in the market. More specifically, it argues that researchers need to consider additional 
economically meaningful factors which can proxy for shifts in the investment opportunity 
set and the macroeconomy at large. One of the reasons for this is because the interest rate 
is, to a large extent, a financial variable that is controlled by the actions of Central Banks 
around the world which conduct monetary and fiscal policies to adjust interest rates and 
regulate economic activity (see Mishkin, 2005). The argument of considering additional 
factors that can accurately proxy for the investment opportunity set is also made in the 
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study by Guo and Whitelaw (2006); in particular, when they discuss why Scruggs (1998) 
and Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) find conflicting results, they state that this result 
“Does not imply a rejection of… (Merton’s ICAPM); rather, it challenges the assumption 
that bond returns are perfectly correlated with investment opportunities” (p. 1435). 
Furthermore, the third chapter seeks to make methodological improvements in the 
context of modeling the dynamic risk premium and allowing the interaction between the 
risk premium and the investment opportunity set to be time-varying in nature, as is 
expected given that investors’ risk aversion and risk premium shift with changes in the 
macroeconomy. 
In a contribution to extant literature, the third chapter therefore argues that it will 
perhaps be of economic value to look at other real economic variables that may 
accurately describe market and economic conditions and are not as influenced by the 
decisions of policymakers. In particular, it uses, in addition to the long-term government 
bond yield, industrial production and slopes in the yield curve given that there is a 
distinguished body of literature which finds that these factors can describe economic 
conditions and explain stock market returns. 
For example, Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) use industrial production as one of the 
factors in their empirical Arbitrage Pricing Model in order to explain stock market 
returns. Other studies also provide support for industrial production as a natural candidate 
for an economic state factor for its ability to identify cyclical movements in 
macroeconomic conditions which impact investors’ consumption and, ultimately, their 
utility of wealth function. More specifically, fluctuations in stock market levels are 
directly linked with shifts in industrial production, evidence suggesting that it may be a 
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systematic source of risk and can serve as a factor to proxy for the investment 
opportunity set (see for example Fama, 1981; James, Koreisha and Partch, 1985; 
Schwert, 1990; Fama, 1990, to name only a few). In addition to this, Artis, Kontolemis 
and Osborn (1997) actually uses fluctuations in industrial production as a key variable to 
determine shifts in business cycle regimes for the United States and 11 other 
industrialized countries. In their study, they find that their chronology of business cycles 
is strikingly similar to the chronology established by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER). 
Likewise, the slope of the yield curve has been found to predict with high 
accuracy impending recessions (see Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Campbell, 1995; 
Estrella and Mishkin, 1998; Hamilton and Kim, 2002, to name only a few studies). This 
empirical observation has even become popular among practitioners who frequently 
reference where we are on the yield curve in order to make inferences about our current 
economic state as well as future economic activity. 
 The findings from this chapter are of interest to academics and practitioners alike. 
From the perspective of academic theory, the findings herein lend credible support to a 
positive intertemporal risk-return tradeoff in the context of the Merton (1973) ICAPM. 
These findings hold in international markets and suggest that perhaps conflicting extant 
findings are an artifact of omitting the second factor in the ICAPM which serves as a 
proxy for the investment opportunity set. In particular, the following important findings 
emerge from this empirical chapter: Firstly, as is indicated in the third chapter, there is 
international evidence of asymmetry in volatility as well as volatility persistence. This is 
consistent with previous findings (see Mandelbrot, 1963; Fama, 1965; French, Schwert 
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and Stambaugh, 1987) and is also consistent with the volatility feedback hypothesis of 
Campbell and Hentschel (1992). 
 Secondly, when examining the time-series dynamics of each of the proposed 
proxies for the investment opportunity set, it is interesting to see that their respective 
conditional variance estimates are a function of past volatility and innovations. In 
particular, for the long-term government bond yield, its conditional mean is positively 
linked with its conditional variance. This suggests a positive relation between its returns 
and its volatility. Furthermore, when examining the time-series properties of industrial 
production, it is interesting to see that, alike the other two proposed factors, it appears to 
respond asymmetrically to innovations across many of the market indices in the sample. 
In other words, negative shocks (declines in industrial production) lead to more volatility 
than positive shocks (increases in industrial production) of equal magnitude. Such an 
empirical observation can be supported by existing studies which examine the economic 
behavior of markets and what implications policy-making has on output and economic 
performance. In this regard, Neftci (1984), Hamilton (1989) and Artis, Kontolemis and 
Osborn (1997) argue that industrial production reflects states in the business cycle and, 
namely, economic ups and downs exhibit asymmetry; whereby industrial production 
declines more in absolute terms during recessions than it rises during periods of 
economic prosperity. Such a finding is of interest to academics and practitioners and 
suggests that there is something similar to the so-called ‘volatility feedback hypothesis’ 
present in economic cycles in our market. 
 A third major finding from this chapter is the observation that intertemporal risk 
is important and this can consistently be seen to play a significant role across most of the 
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G-7 markets here in the sample. This finding sheds new light on existing studies. 
Namely, up until now, studies have not made it clear whether conflicting findings are the 
result of econometric (miss-)specifications or because of omission of the second factor 
which serves to proxy for the investment opportunity state. Whereas Scruggs (1998) 
argues in favor of the two-factor ICAPM, Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) report 
empirical evidence to the contrary. The findings in this chapter, however, provide strong 
evidence in favor of the notion that intertemporal risk is an important ingredient in 
determining investors’ risk premium in the stock market and may be a possibly strong 
reason for extant conflicting findings in the literature. It is important to mention here that, 
given that industrial production shifts asymmetrically through time and, although 
relatively less pronounced, there is some evidence of the other proxies exhibiting 
asymmetric behavior, the model used to test the two-factor ICAPM is the BEKK model 
of Engle and Kroner (1995). This model is advantageous in that it allows the conditional 
variance and the covariance within the context of the ICAPM to respond asymmetrically 
to past innovations. Such a model, therefore, can accommodate the asymmetric time-
series movements in factors, such as industrial production, and may provide a better 
description of investors’ risk premium in the stock market. 
A fourth major finding, consistent with the tests conducted in this chapter, is that 
the empirical evidence here supports the Merton (1973) theoretical view of the ICAPM 
without a constant term. This is conducted in this chapter via a likelihood ratio test to see 
whether restricting the constant to zero is supported. The findings here lend support to the 
theoretical ICAPM of Merton (1973) and to the second assumption in his seminal paper 
regarding capital market structure which is the foundation for intertemporal asset pricing; 
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namely, transactions costs do not exist and there are no taxes or other constraints (see 
Merton, 1973, p.868). This theoretical proposition has enabled motivation of the ICAPM, 
although Scruggs (1998) mentions perhaps it will be useful to include a constant term to 
account for these very market imperfections. Before this thesis chapter, the literature does 
not give a clear distinction as to whether the Merton (1973) theoretical two-factor model 
holds with or without a constant. The findings here support the notion of the theoretical 
ICAPM and the empirical findings show that if we accept the assumptions that Merton 
(1973) establishes, the proposed state factors do a comparatively better job in explaining 
variations in investors’ intertemporal risk premium relative to the model if we account for 
a constant term which attempts to capture such market inefficiencies. 
 Finally, a fifth major finding in this chapter is that it appears that the long-term 
government bond yield may not be an appropriate proxy for investment opportunities, 
given that it does not exhibit consistently reliable empirical significance in terms of 
explaining intertemporal variations in investors’ risk premium. This provides support to 
the argument made in this thesis that the long-term bond yield is a financial variable that 
is, to a large extent, controlled by the actions of central banks (see Mishkin, 2005) and 
may not accurately reflect investment opportunities. This may be a contributing reason 
why Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) do not find a positive risk-return relation when 
focusing on the U.S. market. However, the international evidence here corroborates the 
view of Guo and Whitelaw (2006, p.1435) that this does not “imply a rejection...” of the 
ICAPM, and contributes to literature by empirically showing the behavior of the 
intertemporal risk premium using proposed factors rooted in theory. 
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From the perspective of practitioners, this chapter of the thesis, apart from 
investigating the intertemporal risk-return relation, sheds light on what kind of factors 
investors ought to consider when assessing economic conditions and when trying to 
explain variations in expected stock market returns. In particular, the empirical findings 
reported here show strongest evidence for suggesting that shifts in the yield curve 
describe states in the economy. This finding provides some basis for using the yield curve 
in order to track market and economic performance and predict future states of the 
economy. These empirical findings thus provide further support to studies which argue of 
the economic information content embodied in the yield curve (see Estrella and 
Hardouvelis, 1991; Campbell, 1995; Estrella and Mishkin, 1998; Hamilton and Kim, 
2002, to name only a few). 
  Finally, the fourth chapter contributes to literature by examining the 
intertemporal risk-return tradeoff but takes an innovative approach relative to existing 
studies in the sense that it integrates the trading behavior of heterogeneous types of 
traders; namely, the behavior of positive feedback traders and fundamental traders. The 
motivation for this chapter stems from the fact that, until now, empirical literature applies 
variations of the Merton (1973) ICAPM assuming that investors make decisions on the 
basis of mean-variance considerations in the context of Markowitz (1952) and that there 
is no mispricing of assets. A relatively new body of research however finds that, contrary 
to the equilibrium notion that mispricing is transitory and that markets are efficient (see 
Malkiel, 2003), there is evidence that identifies many constraints which arbitrageurs face 
which limit their ability to attack mispricing and, therefore, stock market prices may 
deviate for some time from their equilibrium value (see De Long et al., 1990a; Shleifer 
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and Summers, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Shiller, 2000; Abreu and Brunnermeier, 
2002 and 2003). 
Further to this, the literature cites that there are heterogeneous groups of investors 
who may drive stock prices away from their equilibrium values. For example, De Long et 
al. (1990b) and Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) cite that positive feedback traders and 
fundamental traders exist and that their actions, to some extent, drive stock prices. 
Positive feedback traders are essentially trend chasers (i.e. ‘herding investors’) and buy 
(sell) when prices move upwards (downwards). This type of trading may be the result of 
irrationality, fads, word-of-mouth enthusiasm, overly zealous extrapolative expectations, 
portfolio insurance strategies such as stop-loss orders, or margin call forced liquidations. 
Investment behavior or strategies that manifest into this type of trading exert a self-
reinforcing influence on prices; fluctuations in price are augmented and independent of 
any rational valuations placed on fundamentals or other mean-variance considerations 
regarding the asset’s characteristics. This may exacerbate mispricing and allows it to 
persist. In contrast to positive feedback traders, fundamental investors trade on the basis 
of fundamentals or some kind of fundamental indicator. It is worth mentioning that the 
underlying distinction between “rational investors,” in the context of Markowitz (1952) 
and Merton (1973) and fundamental traders is that rational investors make investment 
decisions on the basis of mean-variance considerations. 
 In an innovation to extant literature, this fourth chapter, given the extant findings 
which suggest the presence of heterogeneous investors, explores whether we should 
integrate this behavior in our models when estimating the intertemporal risk-return 
tradeoff. So far in the literature, existing studies only have only looked at variants of the 
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Merton (1973) ICAPM using predominantly GARCH-type frameworks. There has not 
been an attempt yet to see whether we can better explain the risk-return tradeoff by 
incorporating the behavior of these heterogeneous investors in our model. 
 Therefore, this fourth chapter cites a wealth of instances throughout history where 
investors and market participants can make decisions on the basis of emotions or 
irrationality and may engage in positive feedback trading in the stock market. It 
contributes to literature by modelling the trading patterns of three types of investors in 
several industrialized markets and to see to what extent their behavior is manifested in the 
time-varying dynamics of stock market returns. Namely, it extends the work of Sentana 
and Wadhwani (1992) and Cutler et al. (1990) and contributes to extant studies by 
producing a feedback trading framework that models the actions of rational risk-averse 
expected utility maximizers (i.e. ‘smart money’ investors, positive feedback traders, and 
fundamental traders. Thus far, the literature has not tried to see whether conflicting 
evidence in the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff is the result of neglecting to incorporate 
these heterogeneous investors’ trading behavior. 
Fundamental traders believe in mean reversion of stock prices toward a long-run 
average, or fundamental, value. These traders decrease (increase) their demand for risky 
assets when prices are high (low) relative to fundamentals. Given some of the findings 
mentioned in the second chapter regarding fundamental factors, the fourth chapter will 
consider the spread between the market dividend-yield (D/P) and long-term government 
bond yield (see Jagannathan et al., 2000), as well as the spread between the market earnings-
yield (E/P) and long-term government bond yield (see Lander et al., 1997; Thomas and 
Zhang, 2008) as measures of fundamental value. Consistent with these studies, these spreads 
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are useful in estimating the equity premium and predicting future economic conditions. 
Other authors also find that the market E/P and D/P ratios are useful valuation measures of 
real stock market performance (see Shiller, 2000; Campbell and Shiller, 2001). 
The findings are of interest to practitioners and academics and pave the way for 
future research into this field. Namely, in terms of explaining the intertemporal risk-return 
tradeoff, the empirical evidence provided here corroborates the arguments made in the 
second and third chapters; namely, it provides support for the Merton (1973) theoretical 
notion that the conditional variance and intertemporal risk are the sole determining factors of 
investors’ risk premium. The evidence from the fourth chapter suggests that integrating the 
behavior of heterogeneous investors does not help to better explain variations in the 
intertemporal risk premium. Instead, the findings shed new light which has not been 
identified before and raises additional insights which merit further exploration. These 
findings are of interest to practitioners who seek valuation methods for the stock market and 
for academics who further want to explore into this field. 
Firstly, there is empirical evidence here that fundamental traders drive, to some 
extent, movements in stock prices. This shows that valuation ratios, such as the earnings-
yield and dividend-yield, may prove useful to practitioners who want to measure stock 
market performance and predict future market movements. In particular, the evidence here 
shows that fundamental traders increase their demand for stock shares when prices are low 
relative to their fundamental value and vice versa. In terms of gauging fundamental value, 
the ratios proposed here seem to be good indicators of whether stock prices as over- or 
under-valued. These results confirm the arguments made in the second chapter and the 
arguments of other researchers (see Shiller, 1996; Lander, Orphanides and Douvogiannis, 
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1997; Shiller, 2000; Campbell and Shiller, 1998, 2001; Thomas and Zhang, 2008,  to 
name a few). 
A second major empirical finding which merits future research is that it appears 
positive feedback trading is not statistically evident when exploring monthly frequency data. 
This result does not imply a rejection of the notion that there exist heterogeneous groups of 
investors in the stock market, it instead suggests that feedback traders are present but only in 
the short run. These results are in contrast to those by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), 
Koutmos (1997), and Antoniou, Koutmos and Pericli (2005). This of course may be due to 
the fact that these studies are using daily data. In this case an argument can be made in favor 
of the notion that positive feedback trading is present in the short run, but it becomes 
insignificant in the longer run. It is also possible that there are also negative feedback traders 
so that the net result becomes insignificant over the longer-run and when looking at lower 
frequency data such as monthly stock market returns. This suggests that high-frequency 
traders and institutions may drive prices in the short-run but in the longer-run, negative 
feedback traders and fundamental traders push the prices back to their equilibrium values. 
Overall, this thesis explores the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff from different 
angles and provides plausible explanations as to why existing findings are mixed in the 
literature. It provides unique contributions and reasons as to why extant studies document 
conflicting findings. The second, third and fourth chapters, respectively, provide unique 
contributions and valuable information that have not been explicated before and pave the 
way for future research into this field. The intertemporal risk-return tradeoff will surely 
be a contemporary topic for years to come in finance literature. However, now with the 
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findings of this thesis, there is new evidence and a new approach to explaining why 
extant findings cannot agree on the nature of the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. 
 
1.5. Limitations of the Thesis 
Despite the advancements and contributions in this thesis, there are still issues which 
merit attention and which will be addressed undoubtedly by more authors to come in the 
future. Namely, in a recent paper, I investigate the time-varying nature of volatility in 
various industries within the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX, and find that some industries 
exhibit higher systematic risk for investors relative to others (see Koutmos, 2011). 
Instead of focusing strictly on the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff in the stock market, 
future research should also investigate the nature of this important relation across various 
industries. This is something that I am undertaking in future research projects. The reason 
why this is important is because different industries have unique risk characteristics given 
that they produce respective goods and services and consumers exhibit varying degrees of 
elasticity in terms of their demands towards these goods and services. Thus, investors 
considering to invest in various industry sectors need to be aware of the risk-return 
characteristics and how they shift relative to shocks in the aggregate stock market. 
 Another possible extension of this thesis that can be addressed in a separate study 
is that it is more difficult, using the innovation outlined in the second chapter, to examine 
the risk-return relation in a high-frequency setting. For example, suppose we wanted to 
estimate the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff using minute-by-minute stock price trades. 
Such a task will not be feasible given that the earnings-yield, which serves as a proxy for 
the required rate of return in the stock market, is unavailable at such high frequencies. 
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Traditionally, macroeconomic factors, such as the market earnings-yield, are available on 
a monthly basis and, as such, the frequency of the data investigated here is also monthly. 
Future research, therefore, can look into ways of adopting the framework herein to be 
applied to higher frequency data. This is something that is being undertaken in a separate 
study and will almost certainly receive attention by other authors as well. 
 However, it does not go without saying that using higher frequency data is free of 
theoretical problems; as is argued by Officer (1973) and Cochrane (2001), investors’ 
degree of risk aversion probably shifts along with shifts in other macroeconomic factors 
as well as shifts in the business cycle. In fact, Cochrane (2001, p.26) maintains that “It is 
not plausible that risk or risk aversion change at daily frequencies... It is much more 
plausible that risk and risk aversion change over the business cycle...” In addition to this, 
higher frequency stock prices are known to be too noisy. Thus, these are some of the 
challenges which need to be overcome when motivating investigation into the risk-return 
tradeoff in high-frequency settings and which will undoubtedly be explored in future 
research. 
Finally, the proposed intertemporal risk factors motivated in the third chapter are 
in no way inclusive of all the risk factors which investors face in this world. Instead, the 
contribution of this thesis argues that intertemporal risk is indeed time-varying, as is 
indicated by the empirical tests herein, and that future research ought to focus on 
indentifying factors which can accurately proxy for shifts in this risk. Given the empirical 
and theoretical contributions made herein, the findings support the notion that investors 
are risk averse agents and thus demand higher expected returns to take on higher risks. In 
some respects, the important contributions herein corroborate the view of Chen, Roll and 
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Ross (1986, p.384) that “A rather embarrassing gap exists between the theoretically 
exclusive importance of systematic ‘state variables’ and our complete ignorance of their 
identity.” With these contributions, there will be more future research into intertemporal 
asset pricing and, namely, modelling the risk-return tradeoff and measuring investors’ 
risk aversion across various markets, industries, and assets. 
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- Chapter Two - 
Risk-Return Tradeoff: A Forward-Looking Approach to Measuring the 
Equity Premium 
 
2.1. Introduction 
A fundamental challenge in modern empirical finance is quantifying the intertemporal 
tradeoff between risk and return on the aggregate stock market portfolio. Although 
intuition dictates that investors demand higher compensation in order to take on higher 
risks, the empirical evidence provides mixed conclusions despite recent advancements in 
the sophistication of modeling techniques (see French, Schwert and Stambaugh, 1987; 
Chou, 1988; Baillie and DeGennaro, 1990; Harvey, 1991 and 2001; Nelson, 1991; 
Campbell and Hentschel, 1992; Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle, 1993; Bekaert and 
Wu, 2000; Lundblad, 2007). This is problematic from a theoretical standpoint since it 
defies the predictions of general equilibrium asset pricing models which postulate a 
positive and linear relation between expected market returns and market risk (see Sharpe, 
1964; Lintner, 1965; Merton, 1973). It is furthermore troublesome in practice given that 
the risk-return tradeoff is an important ingredient in cost of capital estimations and 
optimal portfolio allocation and risk management decisions (see Graham and Harvey, 
2001). 
 To circumvent the problem that expected returns are not readily observable, the 
convention in literature has been to use historical realized mean returns as a proxy for 
investors’ risk premium. Dozens of papers utilize this approach to explore the time-series 
nature of the risk-return tradeoff yet the evidence remains inconclusive, with inferences 
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that are highly sensitive to econometric specifications or sampling periods (see Harvey, 
1991 and 2001; Nelson, 1991; Campbell and Hentschel, 1992; Bekaert and Wu, 2000; 
Lundblad, 2007).  They justify the practice of using ex post mean returns on grounds that, 
for long enough time horizons, realized mean returns ‘converge’ to ex ante expected 
returns. Thus, ex post mean returns provide an empirically tractable alternative to 
motivating asset pricing models. 
 Despite its widespread use however, there are at least two fundamental limitations 
to using ex post realized returns as an estimate of investors’ ex ante risk premium; firstly, 
since the risk premium is time-varying and linked to fluctuations in the business cycle, 
any inference drawn concerning ex ante expected returns is naturally determined by the 
sampling period considered (see Lundblad, 2007). Secondly, investors are forward-
looking and estimate future risks on the basis of current volatility and news regarding 
future volatility. Their resultant discount factor (required rate of return) which they apply 
to future streams of income therefore adjusts accordingly and may not be reflected in ex 
post realized mean returns (see Paudyal and Saldanha, 1997). 
 The prevailing hypothesis which attempts to reconcile much of the conflicting 
aforementioned findings is known as the ‘volatility feedback effect,’ originally proposed 
by French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) and formalized by Campbell and Hentschel 
(1992). It states that a negative shock in returns (unexpected drop in price) leads to higher 
future volatility than a positive shock (unexpected increase in price) which is of equal 
magnitude. The reason for this is straightforward; since volatility is persistent (see 
Mandelbrot, 1963), an increase in volatility today ‘signals’ that volatility will be higher in 
the future. This raises investors’ required rate of return and the discount factor they use to 
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discount future streams of income. Assuming that corporate earnings and dividends are 
not rising, prices will obviously fall since investors sell off their positions and wait until 
expected returns rise again to the appropriate level. The declining prices produce a lower 
historical mean return leading one to erroneously believe that the expected ex ante 
required rate of return is falling when, on the contrary, the required rate of return is rising 
commensurate to higher perceived risk (as theory predicts) and hence to lower prices.1 
  In this chapter I show that the fundamental problem in estimating the time-series 
relation between risk and return may not be the result of econometric (miss-)specification 
of the variance, but is rooted in the use of ex post realized returns as an appropriate proxy 
of investors’ ex ante risk premium. Sharpe (1978) and Elton (1999) also warn of the 
pitfalls associated with using ex post realized returns to test asset pricing theories and to 
estimate expected returns. In particular, Elton (1999) maintains that future work in asset 
pricing should strive to consider alternative ways to measure expected returns instead of 
focusing on the development of new statistical procedures that continue to rely on ex post 
realized returns. More recently, Lundblad (2007) illustrates that an extremely large time-
series of historical market returns is required – nearly two centuries worth of data – in 
order to see ‘convergence’ between ex post returns and expected returns. 
 To address the problem more directly, I empirically explore the risk-return 
tradeoff using a variant of the Merton (1973) intertemporal capital asset pricing model in 
conjunction with a proxy for expected returns that is ‘forward-looking’ and can be 
derived theoretically from the classic Gordon (1962) dividend constant growth model. 
This proxy is the earnings yield which is the inverse of the price-to-earnings ratio, a time 
                                                 
1
 This argument can be expressed in the context of a cost-of-capital problem; if a rise in volatility raises investors’ required rate of 
return for bearing systematic risk, this will lead to a higher cost of equity capital for firms and may result in a reduction in investment 
and output and possibly a rise in future volatility and uncertainty. Thus, realized stock market returns tend to be historically low 
during recessionary periods since investors’ required rate of return (discount rate) rises commensurate to the rise in systematic risks. 
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honored market valuation measure.  The earnings-yield can be thought of in the same 
way as the yield to maturity on bonds. Consider, for example, why the expected returns 
on bonds are computed as yields as opposed to the logarithmic first-difference of their 
price, as is the case when computing returns on stocks. It is because the yield reflects 
investors’ required rate of return and reveals insights about their forward-looking 
expectations about the state of the economy as well as the prospects for other 
investments. It is no surprise, therefore, that while historical mean returns in the stock 
market may slump during recessions and periods of increased uncertainty, the yields on 
bonds (and their spreads with other bond classes) rises (see Campello, Chen and Zhang, 
2008). Bond yields are computed on the basis of forward-looking internal rates of return 
and their yields rise along with increases in investors’ required rate of return (discount 
factor) and, thus, bonds of firms with higher systematic risk have higher yield spreads in 
relation to ‘safer’ bonds. As Campello, Chen and Zhang (2008) argue, averaging ex post 
realized returns only seems to hide investors’ conditional forward-looking expectations 
about future returns and states of the economy. 
 In terms of forecasting capabilities, the earnings-yield, which is the reciprocal of 
the familiar P/E ratio that is used by practitioners, has proved to be a sound predictor of 
future returns and economic conditions (see Campbell and Shiller, 1998 and 2001). In 
particular, Shiller (2000) identifies that the P/E ratio is a strong proxy for future expected 
returns and finds that when it rises above its long-run average, it signals ‘irrational 
exuberance’ in the stock market and a probable likelihood of an imminent correction in 
stock prices. Lamont (1998) argues the earnings-yield contains useful information about 
the future and is a good forecaster of expected returns. Consistent with this argument, 
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earnings reflect the current state of the economy and, since risk premia on equities covary 
negatively with current economic activity, investors will demand higher (lower) expected 
returns during recessionary (expansionary) economic periods. Therefore, since earnings 
vary with economic activity, current earnings can predict market future returns.  
To put things into perspective, conventionally, when asset pricing literature talks 
about the risk premium, it is referring to the spread between ex post average stock market 
returns and the yield on treasuries. The proposed ex ante proxy set forth in this chapter 
consists of the spread between the market earnings-yield and the long government bond 
yield since this reflects the possibility that investors can either invest their money in the 
stock market or in a risk-free asset. Whereas the earnings-yield reflects the stock market 
yield, the risk-free yield can be represented by the long-term government yield. The 
difference between these two yields forms a forward-looking measure of investors’ risk 
premium. 
A relevant question to ask is why this proposed ex ante risk premium uses the 
long-term government bond yield as opposed to a treasury yield with a shorter-term 
maturity. There are several reasons for this; firstly, the average investor (household) has a 
longer holding period horizon and therefore this yield more accurately reflects their 
opportunity cost of investing their money in the stock market. Secondly, because 
investors’ discount factor varies with expected dividends, earnings and firms’ long-term 
prospects, the long-term government bond yield more closely reflects this discount factor. 
Thirdly, this yield encompasses a broader range of information regarding macroeconomic 
conditions which directly impact investors’ relative risk aversion and utility of wealth 
(see Chen, Roll and Ross, 1986). Finally, there is a long-run positive relation between the 
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earnings-yield and the long-term government bond yield whereby deviations from this 
relation are transitory and serve to signal shifts in economic conditions and market 
returns (see Lander, Orphanides and Douvogiannis, 1997; Thomas and Zhang, 2008).2 
 This chapter sheds new light on the time-series relation between risk and return 
on the market portfolio. In sharp contrast to most existing literature, I find this relation to 
be both positive and significant for several major international markets both in short- and 
long-run representations in the context of Engle and Granger (1987). These findings 
confirm theoretical predictions that investors demand higher compensation in order to 
hold higher market risk. They also confirm the findings of Lundblad (2007), who finds a 
positive risk-return tradeoff, yet demonstrates that an extremely large sample – nearly 
two centuries worth of data – is needed in order for historical realized returns to 
‘converge’ to investors’ expected returns.  
 Market risk is estimated via the asymmetric GJR-GARCH model (see Glosten, 
Jagannathan, and Runkle, 1993) given its proven ability to capture many of the ‘stylized 
facts’ in stock return dynamics such as volatility clustering and the volatility feedback 
effect which argues that negative market shocks (i.e. bad news) leads to more volatility 
than positive shocks (i.e. good news) of equal magnitude (see Mandelbrot, 1963; 
Campbell and Hentschel, 1992). 
 This chapter further argues that inconsistencies in existing studies are driven by 
the inability of ex post returns to properly estimate investors’ expected ex ante required 
rate of return and therefore the problem in existing studies is more fundamental than 
possible miss-specifications of the conditional variance. Thus, when most studies 
                                                 
2
 The spread between the market earnings-yield and long-term government bond yield has unofficially been coined as the ‘Fed model’ 
by practitioners as a valuation tool for gauging whether the stock market is over- or under-valued and for predicting future returns. Its 
name originates from a July 1997 Humphrey-Hawkins report which made reference to this spread as an indicator of future market 
performance. This report can be accessed on-line at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/1997/july/fullreport.htm. 
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estimate a GARCH-in-mean model using stock returns (see Engle, Lilien, and Robins, 
1987) they find a weak or negative relation between risk and returns. 
The remainder of this second chapter is organized into four main sections: Section 
2.2 provides a review of the relevant literature along with the theories and principles 
leading up to the Merton (1973) ICAPM and why this model is so important. It analyzes 
the modeling methodologies that have been traditionally used and what others find and 
why. Section 2.3 introduces a forward-looking approach to measuring investors’ required 
rate of return and the equity premium in the stock market. It does this for several 
industrialized markets and presents strong evidence of a positive time-series relation 
between risk and return, as is further explained in Section 2.4. Finally, Section 2.5 
concludes the second chapter. 
 
2.2. Review of Literature 
This section provides readers with an overview of the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and how it led to the development of the ICAPM. It discusses what the major 
underlying theories behind the model are and the empirical findings and limitations of 
existing research.  
 
2.2.1. Birth of the Capital Asset Pricing Model: Theory and Evidence 
Markowitz (1952) established the groundwork for modern asset pricing. He formalizes 
the notion that investors are risk-averse and require higher expected returns to take on 
additional units of risk. As such, investors select portfolios that maximize expected 
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returns and minimize the variance of returns (risk). This is referred to as the optimal or 
“efficient” mean-variance portfolio.   
 Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) extend the work of Markowitz (1952) to 
include the key assumption that investors have the ability to lend and borrow at a risk-
free rate. Having established the premise that all investors are risk averse and seek to 
maximize expected returns and minimize variance, Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) 
make fundamental assumptions regarding investors’ preferences and the risk-free asset.  
Firstly, all investors seek the most efficient investment opportunity (i.e they seek assets 
with minimal variance and highest possible mean returns).  Secondly, there is unrestricted 
borrowing and lending at the risk-free rate.  With these assumptions in place, they 
mathematically illustrate how to calculate the expected returns of an asset, given its 
variance.  Thus, the expected return of any asset i is formularized as follows by the 
Sharpe-Lintner CAPM: 
E(Ri) = Rf + βiM[E(RM) – Rf]        (2.1) 
The market beta of asset i, βiM, is derived by first computing the covariance of returns 
between asset i and the returns of the market, then dividing this product by the variance 
of market returns: 
βiM = Cov[Ri, RM] / σ2 (RM)        (2.2) 
 
As equations (2.1) and (2.2) indicate, the market beta of asset i influences its expected 
returns. From a mathematical perspective, beta can rightly be interpreted as a slope 
because it describes the returns of asset i relative to the returns on the market. Another 
interpretation is that it measures the sensitivity of the returns of asset i to variations in 
market returns. 
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Black (1972) modifies the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM by removing the 
unrealistic assumption of borrowing and lending at a risk-free. Instead, he assumes 
investors have the unlimited ability to short sell risky assets. More specifically, the 
expected return of hypothetical asset i, E(Ri), is derived as follows: 
E(Ri) = E(R0m) + βiM[E(RM) – E(R0m)]           (2.3) 
In the Black version of the CAPM, beta is calculated as in equation (2.2).  E(RM) denotes 
the expected return on the market and E(R0m) represents the expected return of a portfolio 
with zero beta (i.e. no association with returns on the market, RM).  R0m has the minimum 
variance of all portfolios with no sensitivity to returns in m. As in the Sharpe-Lintner 
CAPM, the Black (1972) version is also a static model and does not account for changes 
in risk or investment opportunities. 
 The Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) (henceforth SLB) versions of 
the CAPM reflect the need for economists and investors to effectively quantify the 
tradeoff between risk and expected returns.  This tradeoff is, after all, the building blocks 
for modern financial theory.  The CAPM provides an intuitively straightforward way for 
calculating expected returns, E(Ri), given a security’s or portfolio’s risk, βiM.  In plain 
language, the CAPM posits that the expected return of an underlying asset is linearly 
associated to the covariance between its returns and returns on the market. A keen 
observer may question where investor’s idiosyncratic investment preferences and risk 
tolerance comes into play. Although in reality we know that market participants carry 
dissimilar expectations about the future prospects of markets and have unique degrees of 
risk aversion, the CAPM assumes market participants to be entirely homogeneous agents.  
In other words, they all agree on the choice of optimal proportions of risky assets to hold 
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in relation to risk-free assets. Furthermore, this model is explicitly stating that the 
expected returns of an asset of interest are only related to its covariance of returns with 
respect to returns on the market. Therefore, investors only look at this covariance 
coefficient and do not utilize any other subjective measures for risk. 
 Since the CAPM assumes investor homogeneity, it means that all market 
participants agree on how to proportionately allocate their wealth between risky and risk-
free assets.  In other words, all investors will hold 1/50 of ‘α shares,’ 1/30 of ‘β shares,’ 
and so on.  It is a well-established tradition in finance that investors are always faced with 
the decision of how to allocate their wealth. They can either put their money in a 
portfolio of risky assets or they can invest all their money in the risk-free asset. Since 
most investors do some combination of both, we have what is coined in finance as the 
“two-fund separation theorem.” This principle was first discussed by Tobin (1958) and 
maintains that an investor’s decision-making process can be broken down into two 
elements:  The first step involves deciding on the optimal proportions of risky assets to 
hold independent of an investor’s unique preferences and expectations. The second step 
then accounts for their individual risk preferences and expectations. Given their unique 
risk preferences, an investor can decide how much to borrow (lend) at the risk-fee rate in 
order to magnify (reduce) their exposure to risk.  In other words, an investor who is risk 
hungry can borrow funds at the risk-free rate and use the funds (in addition to their 
current wealth) to invest in risky assets. A risk-averse individual, however, will prefer to 
invest the majority of their wealth and earn a risk-free rate (essentially becoming a 
lender) and maybe put a small proportion of their funds in a risky portfolio. 
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Given however the assumption of investor homogeneity, the CAPM assumes that 
all investors (i.e. the aggregate market) agree on the proportion of their wealth that they 
will invest in each respective risky asset which constitutes a risky portfolio of assets. In 
other words, all investors will, for argument’s sake, put 1/50 of their wealth in ‘α 
shares,’ 1/30 in ‘β shares,’ and so forth). It is therefore important to note that, when the 
market is in equilibrium, which has to hold in order for the CAPM to work, individuals’ 
unique risk preferences do not influence the relative quantity demanded of risky assets 
(i.e. proportions of ‘α shares’ to ‘β shares’). Therefore, the equilibrium expected returns 
for an asset are uninfluenced by the subjective preferences of individuals. Instead, only 
objective measures matter such as variances and covariances. 
In the real-world however treating investors as homogenous agents is 
incompatible with observations of how markets function.3 One can argue that even the 
assumption of zero transactions costs or a frictionless market void of inefficiencies is 
merely a fictitious scenario.  Although the assumption that markets are in equilibrium and 
are frictionless may be unrealistic when you look at markets day-to-day, this is an 
important assumption economists make when developing models (such as the CAPM).  It 
is perhaps the only way to come to grips with complex economic and financial data, 
which is influenced by an immeasurable quantity of factors, and to draw meaningful 
conclusions that can help us to assess risk and return, economic conditions, et cetera.  For 
example, there is no currently available model that can capture the impact weather 
conditions have on stock returns. In particular, Saunders (1993) and Hirshleifer and 
Shumway (2003) find evidence that perhaps bad weather influences stock returns.  Nor 
                                                 
3
 The issue of addressing and modeling investor heterogeneity is explored in the fourth chapter of this thesis. 
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there exists a model that can account for investor behaviors, such as their emotional state 
(see Ackert, Church and Deaves, 2003) for a review of literature that finds evidence on 
how investors’ emotions drive markets.4  If there was such a model, it would be most 
useful to apply when the Dow dropped a record 777 points on September 29, 2008 after 
the House of Representatives rejected a proposed bailout bill that hoped to remedy the 
U.S.’ financial troubles. But such a model that takes into account all factors which can 
possibly influence the value of a variable of interest simply does not exist. 
That is why we have more generalized models that include specifically detectable 
and testable variables which should theoretically have an impact on whatever it is we are 
testing for. These models oftentimes assume market equilibrium and zero transactions 
costs. For example, the Black and Scholes option pricing formula makes certain 
assumptions such as, among others, no transaction costs or taxes, no arbitrage 
opportunities (i.e. markets are in equilibrium and there are no mispriced assets), all 
investors are rational and all market participants have the ability to borrow and lend at a 
constant risk-free rate (see Black and Scholes, 1973). 
Although no model is perfect in an absolute sense, these models do serve as a 
starting point and allow us to accurately see the relationship one variable has (such as 
volatility) on another variable (such as the price of an option), ceteris paribus.  If one can 
stomach the assumptions that form the underpinnings for the CAPM, our next question 
becomes whether this model can successfully and consistently provide an accurate 
picture of assets’ expected returns. 
                                                 
4
 Dr. Ackert is a visiting scholar at the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank. This paper can be accessed from the Fed’s website at 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/ 
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Early evidence provided support for the CAPM and the notion of mean-variance 
efficiency (see Black, Jensen and Scholes, 1972; Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Blume and 
Friend, 1973).  There were some concerns that the Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) 
version of the CAPM calculated an expected return for zero beta portfolios that were 
greater than the risk-free rate. However, these concerns were mitigated by the Black 
(1972) version of the CAPM which removed the risk-free asset from the right-hand side 
of the equation. 
By the late 1970s unfavorable evidence started to emerge. In particular, evidence 
suggests that firm/portfolio-specific factors (such as size or its price-earnings (P/E) ratio) 
lead to different expected returns than predicted by the CAPM. These so-called 
“anomalies” in the literature are well-documented and suggest one cannot consistently 
and accurately predict an asset’s expected returns exclusively relying on its beta.  For 
example, Basu (1977) finds a P/E effect whereby returns on stocks with low P/E ratios 
yield higher returns than the CAPM predicts.  Banz (1981) documents a size effect; when 
firms’ stocks are arranged based on market capitalization (i.e. price per share multiplied 
by the number of shares outstanding) the smaller firms’ stocks yielded a higher average 
return than predicted by the CAPM (if the market portfolio truly was mean-variance 
efficient).  Others find that if a portfolio is constructed by buying losing stocks (stocks 
that have experienced price depreciations in the past) and selling winners (stocks that 
have experienced appreciations) it yields mean returns higher than the CAPM predicts.  
Perhaps the most controversial extension of the CAPM is the Fama and French 
(1993, 1995, 1996) three-factor model which hypothesizes that the expected return on 
asset i, E(Ri), is a linear function of a market factor (βiM from the SLB CAPM), a size 
 57
factor (Return on small-firm stocks less the return on large firm stocks) and a book-to-
market (B/M) factor (Return on high B/M stocks less the return on low B/M stocks).   
Though the SLB CAPM provides a sound theoretical framework for its 
arguments, it makes rather facile assumptions which do not hold in reality.  For example, 
claiming that markets are “frictionless” and void of inefficiencies is as realistic as saying 
all investors are the same.  Despite these shortcomings however the SLB CAPM is taught 
to business and economics students in universities throughout the world.  It is even used 
by financial managers in order to calculate the cost of capital of a particular project.  
Perhaps the CAPM remains such a popular model because it is intuitively 
straightforward to understand and easy to apply. Furthermore, from a theoretical 
perspective, it makes sense to assume that higher beta (riskier) stocks are expected to 
yield higher returns.  The lively debate surrounding the CAPM will likely grow in years 
to come.  But any future application of the CAPM in today’s hectic financial markets is 
unlikely to yield fruitful results.  Perhaps the biggest blow to the CAPM is its inability to 
capture shifts in the investment opportunity set. Oftentimes, it is referred to as being a 
“static” or “single-period” model since it does not have any time dimension.  
Furthermore, as we know, risk and investment opportunities are changing constantly.  
The SLB CAPM (as well as the Fama and French three-factor model) cannot capture 
such changes in risk and changes in the investment opportunities available to investors.  
Such static models are instead used to capture the cross-sectional relation between certain 
factors (such as βiM or the Fama and French factors) and expected returns. Since the 
investment environment is constantly changing, we want to use a model that is 
“dynamic” in nature and can capture the time-varying link between risk and returns.  
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Such a model should be capable of capturing the changes in risk from period to period.  
There is evidence to suggest that the risk associated with an asset (when measured using 
variances and covariances) changes from period to period (see Mandelbrot, 1963; Fama, 
1965). It therefore seems appropriate to use a model that can measure these changes. The 
next section introduces readers to an alternative capital asset pricing model that has such 
time-varying properties. 
 
2.2.2. Modeling the Conditional Mean and Variance in the ICAPM Framework 
As is described in Koutmos (2010, 2011 and references therein), market volatility is time-
varying as well as investors’ expectations and their required rate of return. Therefore, this 
presents a serious limitation in the sense that the CAPM is a single-period model and 
does not capture the time-varying moments of stock returns. 
 Empirical shortcomings in the CAPM prompted efforts to produce a replacement 
model. Merton (1973) recognized that in an ever-changing investment landscape, 
investment opportunities and risks are constantly shifting. He formalized this notion and 
proposed an intertemporal CAPM with time-varying variances and returns. This model is 
oftentimes referred to as the “conditional,” “dynamic” or “intertemporal” capital asset 
pricing model (ICAPM):5 
Et[Rt+1] = α  + θ σt2 ,    (2.4) 
where Et[Rt+1] is the conditional expected excess returns and σt2 is the conditional 
variance of the stock market. The parameter θ denotes the degree of risk aversion and 
                                                 
5
 The third chapter explores a variant of the ICAPM which includes a second factor that accounts for changes in the investment 
opportunity set. The specification in Eq. (2.4) depicts the simple relation between risk and return while the third chapter estimates a 
two-factor version that accounts for changes in the investment opportunity set, as is argued by Merton (1973). However, the 
specification in Eq. (2.4) serves as an approximation (see Merton, 1980). 
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should have a positive sign (i.e. as conditional risk increases so should conditional mean 
returns). α is a constant and in a perfect world with no transaction costs or deviations 
from market equilibrium should be zero. 
 Measuring and quantifying uncertainty has always been a central theme in 
finance. Traditional asset pricing models, for example, suggest that expected returns on 
an asset are a function of the covariance of the asset’s returns and the returns of some 
benchmark portfolio (such as the market index).  In option pricing literature, uncertainty 
(measured as volatility) is a significant determinant in the pricing of the option.  
Conditional variances and covariances play yet another important role in the 
construction of hedge portfolios.  From portfolio managers and institutional investors to 
the average tax-payer saving for retirement, uncertainty is a risk that plays a major role in 
their decision-making process.  
 History teaches us that when we downplay, misestimate, or outright ignore risk, it 
can be disastrous. Take for example the October 1987 stock market crash that impacted 
not only the U.S. but the rest of the global economy. There are also many facts before the 
crash that most researchers can agree on.6 Firstly, it is clear that asset prices in the years 
preceding the crash were experiencing exorbitant appreciations that were unjustified 
given those assets’ fundamental values (see Anders and Garcia, 1987).  Appreciations in 
price were also instigated by the surges of new large investors (such as pension funds and 
other institutional investors) who wanted a piece of the action (see Katzenbach, 1987).  
Yet, although this irrational exuberance was driving up prices, there were other 
macroeconomic factors at play which many investors at large ignored. This leads to the 
                                                 
6
 The fourth chapter examines such events in detail and what implications they have for the Efficient Market Hypotheis (EMH) and in 
asset pricing. 
 60
second turning point. There were many macroeconomic factors that, during the months 
preceding the crash, signaled investors that the economy was going awry.  Interest rates 
were rising on a global level and the trade deficit had increased higher than expected.  
These factors mixed with fears of high future inflation and put downward pressure on the 
dollar. To add to these troubles, the House of Representatives decided to eliminate 
existing tax benefits associated with companies’ use of debt to finance mergers 
[Securities and Exchange Commission Report (1988, p. 3-10)].  Consequently, by 
eliminating these benefits, investors therefore reduced the probability that certain 
“undervalued” companies would be considered as takeover targets. 
The end result was disastrous.  On Monday, October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average (DJIA) plummeted 508 points, an approximately 22% drop in a single 
day.  The U.S.’ financial woes also spread globally to other countries. Investors and 
savers saw their wealth diminish right before their eyes. Unfortunately however, it is 
usually too late when people start asking questions after a crisis. 
Although these are rather infrequent examples they serve to illustrate the 
importance of effectively evaluating risk and perceiving adverse events before they 
occur.  Of course, no model exists which can capture all possible risks such as changes in 
impending legislation or changes in investors’ emotions.  They can, however, compare 
assets’ prices with fundamentals – such as earnings – to decipher whether there is  
“irrational exuberance” in the marketplace or whether assets are fairly priced. Section 2.3 
of this chapter discusses the E/P ratio and the Fed Model (i.e. the difference between the 
E/P ratio and the long-term government bond yield) and whether such measures can 
capture investors’ required rate of return.  
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 Another common way to measure an asset’s risk is to compute the variance of its 
returns (i.e. the dispersion of an asset’s returns about its mean returns).  Linear asset 
pricing models, such as the CAPM, estimate an asset’s expected returns based on its 
variance.  Calculating an asset’s variance is easy to do and tells us a quick story about 
how volatile the asset’s price is. The higher the asset’s return variance (i.e. the more 
dispersed its returns are about its historical mean), ceteris paribus, the riskier that asset 
tends to be.  However, since the ICAPM is time-varying and takes into account changes 
in risk, how then do we calculate the conditional variance, σt2 and what types of models 
can we use to achieve this? 
 
2.2.3. Using Time-Series Techniques to Capture Stock Return Dynamics 
When examining some of the properties of stock returns, there are several ‘stylized facts’ 
which appear time and time again. In particular, there is evidence that supports the notion 
of volatility “clustering” or “pooling” whereby large changes in volatility tend to be 
followed by more large changes and small changes tend to be followed by small changes 
(see Mandelbrot, 1963; Fama, 1965).  This is oftentimes referred to as “volatility 
persistence” and is discussed in greater detail in section 2.2.4 of this chapter. Since 
volatility is not constant (i.e. it is time-varying) an appropriate model needs to be used.  A 
linear model, such as the CAPM, in the form 
yt = β1  +  β2 x2 + β3 x3 + ut 
where ut ~ N(0, σ2)        (2.5) 
is not appropriate to use when attempting to model the time-varying behavior of 
volatility.  Volatility, like many other financial time-series data, is heteroskedastic (i.e. 
the disturbance terms are not constant) whereas linear regression models assume them to 
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be constant and normally distributed.  However, empirical evidence shows that financial 
assets’ returns are not normally distributed but are leptokurtic (i.e. exhibit fat tails and 
excess peakedness about the mean). 
It is a stylized fact in the literature that investors’ perceptions in the marketplace 
and their willingness to trade off between returns and risk are non-linear. This is why 
some of the input variables in options pricing formulas are also non-linear (see Campbell, 
Lo and MacKinlay, 1997). Historical volatility is the simplest form of modeling volatility 
and basically involves calculating the variance (or standard deviation) of returns over 
some specified historical period. This then becomes an estimate for future volatility and 
is oftentimes used as an input for options pricing formulas. Evidence suggests, however, 
that more sophisticated time-series models should be used to improve the accuracy of our 
volatility estimates (see Akgiray, 1989; Chu and Freund, 1996). 
Figure 2.1 graphs the daily percentage of stock returns of the S&P 500 index from 
January 1993 through January 2007 and illustrates the concept of volatility “clustering.”  
As can be seen, large (small) changes in assets’ prices of either sign, positive or negative, 
tend to be followed by subsequent periods of large (small) changes.  Put another way, 
tranquil periods tend to be followed by more tranquil periods and periods of economic 
disarray tend to be followed by more periods of economic volatility. 
Figure 2.1: Evidence of Volatility Clustering 
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For example, from 1993 through the end of 1996 and from 2003 through the 
beginning of 2007, the market appears to experience a prolonged period of tranquility as 
opposed to the volatility it experienced in 1997 through 2002. In between volatile times, 
one can easily note that volatility appears to happen in small bursts. The technical term 
for this is “autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.” That is why we see small 
outbursts of volatility over a short time interval. This is the very notion of volatility 
clustering. If therefore the volatility today is a function of (i.e. is conditional on) past 
volatility, it is also clear that a linear model is inappropriate to use in order to model 
volatility since linear models assume homoskedasticity. 
Engle (1982) thus proposes an Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(ARCH) model which defines the conditional variance today as a function of past 
squared errors. It is important to interject at this point and explain the role of the error 
term, ut. Oftentimes in the literature, ut is also referred to as “news” or “innovations.”  
We know that the error term can essentially take negative or positive values, but what 
does this mean in the context of financial markets? To answer this question we need to 
understand the fundamental driving forces behind assets’ price movements. Economists 
approach this question by assuming that any expected variations in assets’ returns simply 
reflects fundamental risks whereas unexpected movements reflects the arrival of news 
(see Engle and Ng, 1993). Therefore, although ut may represent the error term (i.e. the 
degree to which a predictive model’s output differs from an actual realized value) from a 
strictly econometric sense, it represents the impact news has on the conditional variance.  
This is explained more in section 2.2.4 and offers interested readers an illustration using a 
hypothetical firm. 
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Engle’s seminal ARCH model formularizes the impact news has on volatility and 
defines the conditional variance, σt, at time t, as depends on q lags of squared residuals 
(or innovations). This is known as the ARCH(q) model: 
στ
2
 = α0 + α1u
2
t-1 + α2u
2
t-2 + αqu
2
t-q    (2.6A) 
 
Or, equivalently, this can be rewritten as follows: 
 
     στ
2
 = α0 + ∑
=
q
i 1
αιu
2
t-i      (2.6B) 
The ARCH model of Engle in equations 2.6A and 2.6B provides a clear formula for 
computing the conditional variance using past squared residuals. However, this model 
does have its limitations. Since the conditional variance, στ2, must be positive, the 
coefficients within the model should also be positive. For example, all the coefficients in 
equation 2.6A (α0, α1, α2,…,αq) need to be non-negative in order for the conditional 
variance estimate to be positive. A negative conditional variance calculation at any time 
would be nonsensical. More generally, the non-negatively constraint for the ARCH(q) 
model in equation 2.6A can be expressed as follows: αι ≥ 0  ι = 0, 1, 2,…,q.  The 
reason for this non-negativity constraint is because if, for example, one or more of the 
coefficients is negative, then for a relatively large lagged squared innovation, the 
conditional variance output may also take a negative value. 
 Another problem with the ARCH(q) model is specifying the value of q (i.e. how 
many lagged squared innovations should our model have?). To answer this question 
researchers typically tend to exploit the likelihood ratio test, among other tests (see 
Gourieroux, Holly and Monfort, 1982). It does not go without saying however that these 
tests do have their pitfalls and there is no precise approach to determining the value of q. 
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Engle (1982) attempts to elude this problem by subjectively specifying an 
ARCH(4) process. However, in this model, each successive lagged squared innovation 
contributes a declining weight on the conditional variance computation: 
στ
2
 = γ0 + γ1(0.4u2t-1 + 0.3u2t-2 + 0.2u2t-3 + 0.1u2t-4)       (2.7) 
If equation 2.6A or 2.6B were an unrestricted ARCH(4), then there would be five 
parameters that need to be estimated. However, in the case of Eq. (2.7), only γ0 and γ1 
need to be estimated. Engle (1982) recognized the problem that if q is too large (i.e. there 
are too many lagged squared innovations in a model) then the specified model may not be 
parsimonious. Furthermore, the more parameters there are that need to be estimated, the 
more likely it is that the non-negativity constraint will be breached. 
 To overcome these problems, Bollerslev (1986) and Taylor (1986) independently 
formulated a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model.  
Under such a model, the estimated conditional variance is dependent on its own previous 
squared lags and lagged squared innovations: 
στ
2
 = α0 + α1u
2
t-1 + βσ2t-1       (2.8) 
This equation is a GARCH(1,1) model and represents the simplest form of the GARCH 
class family of models. In this case, στ2 is known as a one-period ahead estimate since it 
reflects all relevant past information. As is explained further on in this chapter, any 
volatility at time t-1 will have an impact on volatility at time t (i.e. any volatility 
yesterday will influence investors’ perceptions of volatility today. Likewise, any 
volatility at time t+1 is conditional on volatility at time t (i.e. volatility that investors 
perceive tomorrow is conditional on the volatility today). This is precisely what the 
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GARCH methodology attempts to capture and, since it takes into account lagged squared 
innovations, it also considers the impact news has on volatility. 
 The GARCH(1,1) model can be expanded into a GARCH(p,q) whereby the 
conditional variance is dependant on q lags of squared innovations and p lags of the 
conditional variance: 
 
στ
2
 = α0 + α1u
2
t-1 + α2u
2
t-2 + ... + αqu
2
t-q + β1σ2t-1 +  
β2σ2t-2 + ... + βpσ2t-p      (2.9A) 
στ
2
 = α0 + ∑
=
q
i 1
αιu
2
t-i + ∑
=
p
j 1
βjσ2t-j    (2.9B) 
GARCH models have several important advantages over their ARCH counterparts.  
Firstly, they capture the premise that volatility tends to cluster together and any volatility 
tomorrow is conditional on volatility today.  Secondly, GARCH models are also more 
parsimonious and are less likely to breach non-negativity constraints.  Evidence suggests 
that GARCH-type models consistently outperform their ARCH counterparts and offer 
more accurate measures of volatility. Akgiray (1989) finds that GARCH models 
outperform ARCH models, exponentially-weighted moving average models, and 
historical variance models in out-of-sample forecasting. Therefore, researchers tend to 
use these models instead of ARCH models when estimating the conditional volatility.   
GARCH(1,1) models are typically used since they are parsimonious and effective in 
capturing the volatility clustering that asset returns exhibit. It is therefore uncommon for 
studies to compute conditional variances using higher order models that include more 
lagged terms of the conditional variance. 
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 Having determined how to compute the conditional variance given past 
innovations and volatility, let us now turn our attention to how we calculate conditional 
returns. The notion that expected returns are positively associated with risk is the 
foundation of modern finance. One way to formularize this concept is by allowing the 
return on an asset to be partially linked to the conditional variance. Engle, Lilien and 
Robins (1987) propose an ARCH-in-mean specification whereby the conditional variance 
enters directly into the conditional mean equation. However, since GARCH models are 
more widely used than their ARCH counterparts, researchers typically utilize GARCH-
in-mean models: 
rt = α0 + θσt-1 + ut , ut ~ N(0,σ2t) 
σ2t = α0 + α1u
2
t-1 + βσ2t-1       (2.10) 
In Eq. (2.10) the coefficient of risk aversion is represented as θ and, consistent with 
theory, should be positive. Therefore as risk, σt-1, increases we would also expect 
conditional returns, rt, to increase accordingly. Instead of using the square root form of 
the conditional variance, σt-1, many studies just enter the conditional variance term,  
σ2t-1, directly into the conditional mean equation. In addition, other studies calculate the 
conditional mean using a contemporaneous conditional variance term, σ2t, instead of the 
lagged term, σ2t-1.  
The GARCH(1,1)-in-mean models are typically used because they provide a 
parsimonious framework for capturing volatility clustering and for examining the 
conditional risk-return tradeoff.  However, as this chapter explains later on, negative and 
positive innovations appear to have an asymmetric impact on the conditional variance 
computation.  In plain language, a negative piece of news about a company or the market 
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will lead to more volatility than a positive piece of news.  In order to operationalize this 
observation, researchers have proposed asymmetric GARCH models which can respond 
asymmetrically to positive and negative innovations. 
 It is a stylized fact in the literature that negative innovations lead to more 
volatility than positive innovations. This is discussed in greater depth in section 2.2.4 of 
this chapter.  But consider a hypothetical economy where the Federal Reserve is 
considering to either (a) cut interest rates by half a percent or, conversely, (b) increase 
interest rates by half a percent. These are both big decisions and their impact on markets 
needs to be addressed.  In the former scenario, this would be perceived as good news for 
households, businesses and financial intermediaries (such as banks) seeking loans and 
wishing to make investments. Although it is good news, it will lead to volatility in the 
market as different investors react differently to this news. Some market participants may 
even perceive this with caution, since it may lead to an expansion of credit to credit 
“unworthy” persons and malinvestments by large organizations. If the Fed decides to 
raise interest rates unexpectedly, this will immediately be perceived as bad news and may 
amplify the effects of volatility. If the Fed does nothing, then volatility should decrease 
because there are no surprises. Of course, this is a basic and realistic scenario of good and 
bad news and how the market may react. The key point to note is that a large piece of 
news will inevitably lead to volatility. If it happens to be bad news, it will even amplify 
the effects of volatility. So now the question is, how can GARCH-type models capture 
this? 
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Nelson (1991) proposes an exponential generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (EGARCH) model which responds asymmetrically to positive and 
negative innovations:7 
log(σt2) = α0 + α1|zt-1| + α2 zt-1 + βlog(σt-12),    (2.11) 
 
where, zt = εt / σt and is the standardized residual. The conditional variance, σt2, is 
described as a non-linear function of past residuals and its own past value (i.e. σt-12). The 
EGARCH specification is log-linear in nature, whereby the term α2zt-1 serves to capture 
asymmetric shocks to the volatility process in the sense that if α2 is negative and 
significant, then negative shocks in the market (i.e. negative innovations) are responsible 
for intensifying volatility more than positive shocks (i.e. positive innovations). The 
converse is true if α2 were positive and statistically significant. Finally, a statistically 
negligible value for α2 implies that negative and positive shocks exert the same impact on 
the conditional volatility process. 
The EGARCH specification is advantageous in the sense that estimates for σt2 are 
always positive values, regardless of the values for the coefficients. Therefore it is not 
necessary to impose non-negativity constraints, as may typically be required when 
working with the conventional ARCH and GARCH models discussed earlier. 
Although the proposed EGARCH specification is relatively more complex, it 
appears to enhance some shortcomings in the pure GARCH specification. For example, 
pure GARCH models are incapable of capturing asymmetries and impose parameter 
restrictions in order to avoid a negative conditional variance (thereby restricting random 
                                                 
7
 The third chapter of this thesis considers the two-factor EGARCH specification and describes in more detail how it applies and what 
inferences can be drawn from it. Koutmos (2011) considers the EGARCH specification described in Eq. (2.11) and how it applies to 
U.S. industry portfolios and what economic benefit can be drawn from applying this model. 
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oscillations in σt2 for all t periods) (see Nelson, 1990). The proposed EGARCH appears 
to respond to some of these shortcomings. It is important to note that in his original 
proposal of the model, Nelson (1991) assumed that the errors are structured in terms of a 
Generalized Error Distribution (GED). Most empirical applications of the EGARCH 
however use conditionally normal errors, as is indicated by most studies cited in section 
2.2.4 in this chapter. 
Whereas the EGARCH redefines the variance process, Glosten, Jagannathan and 
Runkle (1993) introduce an asymmetric GARCH that extends the pure GARCH 
specification expressed in equations 2.9A and 2.9B by adding an indicator variable. 
Oftentimes, their model is referred to as a “GJR-GARCH” and can be expressed as 
follows: 
σ2t = α0 + α1u
2
t-1 + βσ2t-1 + γ(u2t-1 It-1) 
where It-1 = 1 if ut-1 < 0 
        = 0 otherwise      (2.12) 
 
The γ coefficient represents the indicator variable and increases conditional volatility in 
the presence of negative innovations. Evidence suggests that the GJR-GARCH 
specification adequately reflects asymmetric innovations in the conditional variance 
estimate and provides for a good estimation technique in comparison to other models (see 
Brailsford and Faff, 1996). Therefore, the GJR-GARCH is widely employed by 
researchers and is also used in this chapter. 
Despite there has been much work in the area of volatility modeling, this still 
remains a growing field in finance and is a hotly debated topic in terms of which models 
work best for which applications. As access and availability to new data increases, we 
expect to see more results in the future and new innovations in the range of volatility 
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estimation techniques. As Cuthbertson and Nitzsche (2004, p. 664) jokingly put it, there 
are more variations of the GARCH process “than there are varieties of breakfast 
cereals...” This is certainly true over the last few years as more and more data became 
available and new ideas started to receive empirical investigation. According to the study 
by Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992), they find that over two hundred papers utilize 
such models to make empirical inferences. Given that their study was published almost 
two decades ago, this figure has surely grown since then.  But what it does show is how 
important these models are in finance literature and in asset pricing at large. They are 
considered a breakthrough in econometrics since they have been so successful in 
capturing many properties which show up in financial data such as, for example, stock 
and bond returns and even exchange rates. 
As is discussed in Koutmos (2011), these models can also be used to find which 
industries (and perhaps various assets) are sensitive to shifts in aggregate stock market 
volatility and what implications this has for the industry. It is also important to know the 
volatility persistence of assets in order to see how they behave as stock market conditions 
change. Finally, GARCH-type volatility models can be used to estimate risk and to 
perhaps gain insights as to future expected volatility. Therefore, instead of being used 
solely by academics for research, these models are also very useful for practitioners and 
other researchers who wish to examine financial data. 
 
2.2.4. Evidence on the Intertemporal Risk-Return Tradeoff 
This section examines the ICAPM of Merton (1973), what other researchers find when 
they apply this model, and what some of the established hypotheses are regarding the 
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nature of the risk-return tradeoff. It examines each of the competing hypotheses in turn 
and their strengths and limitations. 
 
2.2.4.1. The ICAPM and Existing Hypotheses 
The Merton (1973) ICAPM in Equation (2.4) hypothesizes a positive time-series 
relationship between conditional risk and return: 
Et[Rt+1] = α  + θ σt2    
where Et[Rt+1] is the conditional expected excess returns and σt2 is the conditional 
variance of the stock market. The parameter θ denotes investors’ degree of risk aversion 
and should have a positive sign, consistent with theory. α is a constant and in a perfect 
world with no transaction costs or deviations from market equilibrium should be zero. 
Yet, empirical findings investigating this dynamic tradeoff are inconclusive.  
Many studies document a negative or statistically insignificant risk-return relation. These 
findings are at odds with our notion that we are rational risk-averse individuals and 
require higher returns to take on an additional unit of risk. Few papers document a 
positive and significant relationship. 
It seemingly appears as though different econometric methodologies and different 
sets of data (i.e. samples from different countries, different ranges and frequencies of 
data), yield different outcomes in our risk-return tradeoff calculations. GARCH modeling 
is the standard workhorse in literature for deriving conditional mean-variance estimates.  
Yet researchers ascertain different results when they change their data samples or the size 
and frequency of those samples. This striking piece of evidence leads us to question the 
validity of past results. 
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In light of these findings, there are three widely accepted explanations as to why 
studies find a negative or weak intertemporal risk-return relationship. The first theory, 
dubbed as the “volatility feedback effect,” offers us a plausible explanation of the culprit 
(see Campbell and Hentschel, 1992).  Consistent with this hypothesis, a rise in volatility 
leads to an increase the required rate of return.  This results in a decline in the price of 
assets.  Thus, a researcher interested in modeling the conditional mean-variance relation 
needs to proceed with caution.  Irrespective of the methodology they select to model this 
relationship using historical returns can misrepresent the true relationship between risk 
and return.  In other words, as volatility increases (i.e. our conditional variance forecast is 
rising), historical average returns are falling because the required rate of return is 
increasing.  GARCH models will therefore capture a negative or non-existent risk-return 
tradeoff when, in fact, the required rate of return is rising. 
The notion of volatility feedback is contingent on the observation that volatility is 
persistent, as is graphically illustrated in Figure 2.1).  As Mandelbrot (1963, p. 418) 
observes: 
 
“…large changes tend to be followed by large changes – of either sign – and 
small changes tend to be followed by small changes…” 
 
In other words, a large piece of news about a company or the market will lead to more 
pieces of news.  This will increase volatility as well as the required rate of return.  For 
sake of argument, let us consider a large piece of good news concerning a hypothetical 
company. Suppose that it announces a substantial increase in next period’s dividends.  
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This will increase expected future volatility and raise the required rate of return.  
Although this is good news concerning the company, it will lead to reductions in its stock 
price. This reduction in stock price stems from the increases in expected volatility. In 
effect, the rise in volatility diminishes the impact of the good news. A large negative 
piece of news regarding the market or a particular company will only magnify the 
volatility feedback mechanism and lead to more severe downward movements in price.  
In the case of small pieces of news, expected future volatility will decline and prices will 
tend to rise.  In the unlikely case where no news arrives, prices will rise.  This is because, 
as Campbell and Hentschel (1992) indicate, “no news is good news.”  
The seminal study by Campbell and Hentschel (1992) also offers an explanation 
to why studies produce conflicting results. In particular, they find that stock price 
movements are directly linked to future expected volatility. As expected volatility rises, 
so will the required rate of return.  This in turn leads to a decline in price leading one to 
believe that the required rate of return is falling.  The problem with existing studies is 
clearly expressed in their paper.  More specifically, they caution researchers of the 
limited power GARCH models have and their inability to capture volatility feedback.  
For example, asymmetric GARCH models can very well be used to capture the statistical 
description of asymmetric volatility in the presence of good or bad news. Yet, these 
models do not provide an economic explanation of volatility feedback. More specifically, 
GARCH modeling is incapable of describing movements in the required rate of return.  
Instead, volatility feedback is discussed passively when interpreting estimates from 
GARCH models. This leaves much room for improvement in the literature. The tendency 
to relate historical returns with volatility forecasts will produce spurious conclusions 
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about the true risk-return tradeoff. Effort needs to be directed to examining how the 
required rate of return responds to changes in volatility from model estimates.  By doing 
so, we can effectively address the volatility feedback argument and determine why 
existing studies cannot agree on the nature of the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. 
The so-called “leverage hypothesis (effect)” is a second explanation that attempts 
to rationalize why there exists a negative or insignificant risk-return tradeoff. The 
leverage effect, first discussed by Black (1976) and Christie (1982), differs from the 
volatility feedback hypothesis largely in the causality of volatility. The volatility 
feedback argument claims that changes in conditional volatility create return shocks. The 
leverage effect, however, argues that return shocks bring about changes in conditional 
volatility.  For instance, let us suppose that a hypothetical firm experiences a reduction in 
its stock price. This entails a reduction in its equity value and an increase in its financial 
leverage.  Investors’ uncertainty surrounding the future prospects of the firm’s equity also 
rises, thereby leading to increased volatility. Thus, changes in leverage (resulting from 
declines in a stock’s price) impacts conditional volatility estimates. At this point I 
interject and clarify the meaning of the leverage effect and how its meaning is used in 
other studies.  It is not uncommon in the literature for authors to ascribe any asymmetric 
relation between an underlying asset’s returns and volatility as a “leverage effect.”  This 
term has become loosely synonymous for this asymmetry even if the underlying asset has 
nothing to do with leverage, such as an exchange rate.  For purposes of this thesis, 
however, the leverage effect applies only to changes in a firm’s financial leverage.   
The underpinnings for the so-called leverage hypothesis originate from early 
studies that examine firms’ capital structure. Modigliani and Miller (1958) argue that the 
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total asset of the firm is the entire firm. If the firm has both equity and leverage in its 
capital structure, then its value is the equivalent of the sum of these two components.  
Any securities issued simply represent different methods of separating ownership of the 
firm’s total asset. Miller (1991) explains this proposition and analogizes a firm’s decision 
of issuing debt relative to equity with that of a farmer who has a giant tub of whole milk 
they want to sell.  The farmer can either sell the whole milk as is, or, they can separate 
the cream from the whole milk and sell it for a higher price. The Modigliani-Miller 
proposition asserts that, if there was no cost for separation, then the cream plus the skim 
milk is equivalent to the price of the whole milk.  The dilemma facing the farmer is 
analogous to a firm’s decision of whether it should issue debt or equity.  By increasing 
the proportion of debt (cream), there is a proportionate reduction in outstanding equity 
(milk).  Consider a firm has both debt and equity in its capital structure.  Bondholders’ 
claim on the firm is limited to the face value of the bonds.  Therefore, any volatility 
associated with the firm is absorbed by the stockholders.  If the firm decides to increase 
its leverage (decrease outstanding equity), this will entail more risk for each individual 
shareholder and lead to increased volatility in share price. 
The leverage hypothesis offers a possible explanation to why returns and 
volatility are systematically and asymmetrically linked.  Since equity is less than the total 
value of the firm, while bondholders’ claims are limited to the face value of the bonds, 
any ups or downs that the firm experiences are absorbed by the stockholders.  If the total 
value of the firm increases (decreases), the returns on the stock will be proportionally 
higher (lower) than the returns of the whole firm.  Thus, the stock of a levered firm is 
more volatile than the rest of the firm.  Now consider if the levered firm experiences a 
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considerable drop in return. Since debt is fixed, the firm’s leverage will increase as equity 
volatility increases. Conversely, there should be an opposite effect if there is a rise in 
return of a firm. 
 Although an intuitively compelling hypothesis, it is exposed to criticism. In 
particular, it has no practical application to firms with little or no financial leverage.  
Naturally, any study examining the so-called leverage hypothesis and its impact on 
volatility requires debt valuation measures.  These are oftentimes problematic to obtain in 
practice, especially at higher frequencies. Black (1976) and Christie (1982) find that 
financial leverage partly explains the asymmetric relation between returns and volatility.  
Schwert (1989) finds that financial leverage inadequately captures movements in market 
volatility. Cheung and Ng (1992) find that the leverage effect is stronger for small firms 
than it is for relatively larger firms (i.e. the asymmetric link between volatility and returns 
is stronger for small firms than it is for larger firms). Nonparametric tests in their study 
show that the strength of the leverage effect changes over time. This suggests that 
parameter estimates may vary depending on sample period selection. Duffee (1995) 
corroborates the findings of Cheung and Ng (1992) that smaller firms exhibit a much 
stronger positive contemporaneous relationship between returns and volatility than do 
relatively larger firms. His study further finds that this contemporaneous relationship is 
even stronger for firms that are ultimately delisted from the stock exchange. Therefore, 
there is a survivorship bias in favor of the leverage hypothesis. 
Figlewski and Wang (2000) characterize the leverage effect as merely a “down 
market effect.” More precisely, they find that when leverage changes as a result of 
changes in a firm’s outstanding debt or shares, then volatility remains unaffected.  If, 
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however, leverage changes as a result of negative stock price movements, then we begin 
to see movements in volatility.  On the flip side, the leverage hypothesis does not hold 
when there is a positive change in stock price.  Hence, they characterize the so-called 
leverage effect as being nothing more than a “down market effect” because we only begin 
to see a link between volatility and leverage during market downturns.  Furthermore, any 
changes in volatility as a result of stock price declines are transitory.  These findings 
present three fundamental weaknesses in the leverage hypothesis:  Firstly, if the leverage 
hypothesis were to be true, then the sources for the leverage changes should be irrelevant.  
Secondly, the leverage hypothesis is associated with falling stock prices rather than just 
leverage in isolation.  The leverage hypothesis is nearly non-existent when stock prices 
rise.  Thirdly, changes in volatility supposedly instigated from the leverage hypothesis are 
transitory.  However, a change in the level of a firm’s leverage should, supposedly, result 
in a permanent shift in volatility.  Empirical tests show that this is not the case and that 
changes to volatility are short-lived.  These findings show that leverage may have little or 
no direct connection with changes in volatility. 
  Finally, some studies offer a trading-based explanation for the negative 
conditional mean-variance tradeoff (see Avramov, Chordia and Goyal, 2006).  They 
contend that the leverage hypothesis and the volatility feedback argument may not hold 
when examining data with higher frequencies.  For example, when considering a data 
sample at the daily frequency, the volatility feedback argument and leverage hypothesis 
may not be manifest since asset prices should follow a martingale at shorter time horizons 
(see Sims, 1984; Lehmann, 1990).  In other words, any price deviations from the asset’s 
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fundamental value will be transitory since the flow of information is random (i.e. markets 
are efficient). 
Trading-based explanations have examined the impact trades have on conditional 
volatility.  Empirical investigation reveals that there is a relationship between level of 
trades and the conditional variance of assets’ prices (French and Roll, 1986). Avramov, 
Chordia and Goyal (2006) extend this research to show that there is indeed a relationship 
and that, depending on the type of trade, conditional volatility increases or decreases.  
More specifically, there exist two types of investors: Contrarian (also known as 
informed) traders and herding (also known as non-informed or liquidity-driven) traders.  
Contrarian investors sell their positions when returns are positive (i.e. traders who buy 
low and sell high).  Herding investors, on the other hand, sell their positions when returns 
are negative (i.e. they buy high and sell low).  Herding investors are irrational traders that 
cause increased volatility and move prices away from their fundamental values.  
Contrarian traders decrease conditional volatility and move prices closer to their 
fundamental values. Thus, depending on the type of trading, conditional variance 
increases or decreases accordingly.   
Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) argue that the trading activity of these two 
types of agents causes the asymmetric link between realized returns and volatility.  
Consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis, market participants’ forecasts for 
the future outlook of the market are contingent on all currently available information.  
Thus, following periods of unexpected negative stock returns, herding investors sell their 
positions (for fear of negative future returns) and induce market volatility. Contrarian 
traders buy during market downturns and reduce market volatility by pushing prices back 
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to their fundamental values (see Friedman, 1953; Hellwig, 1980; Wang, 1993).  Trading 
activity is defined as the number of sell transactions that occur each day.  In their study, 
they find that when the lagged unexpected return is negative, selling activity from 
herding traders is responsible for next period’s increase in volatility. When the lagged 
unexpected return is positive, selling activity from contrarian traders leads to a reduction 
in next period’s volatility. To differentiate between rational (contrarian) and irrational 
(herding) investors, they employ a methodology implemented by Campbell, Grossman 
and Wang (henceforth CGW) (1993).  In their model CGW (1993) show that informed 
(uninformed) trades are unrelated (related) to changes in future price. Therefore, 
contrarian investors have no bearing on the autocorrelation in stock returns while 
uninformed sell trades lead to downward pressure on prices.  The results of Avramov, 
Chordia and Goyal (2006) are robust to different measures of the conditional variance at 
the daily frequency. 
The trading-based hypothesis delivers empirically powerful results and provides 
evidence that trades are a source of volatility.  However, the usefulness of this 
proposition is called into question.  Whereas most research tends to explore the 
asymmetric relation between volatility and returns using lower frequencies (i.e. such as 
monthly data), Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006) derive their hypothesis using daily 
data.  However, it may be implausible to make the argument that an investor’s perceived 
risk aversion changes from day-to-day.  Perhaps risk changes along with changes in other 
macroeconomic variables (see Officer, 1973) or is contingent upon an investor’s unique 
expectations.  Research shows that investors have dissimilar expectations and one cannot 
safely assume that they share identical estimates of future outcomes (see Miller, 1977).  
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Perhaps changes in risk aversion are attributable to a combination of these factors.  Thus, 
it may be unfeasible to see movements in risk aversion at such high frequencies as those 
used in the study by Avramov, Chordia and Goyal (2006). In fact, Cochrane (2001, p. 
26) maintains that 
 
“It is not plausible that risk or risk aversion change at daily frequencies, but 
fortunately returns are not predictable at daily frequencies. It is much more 
plausible that risk and risk aversion change over the business cycle, and this is 
exactly the horizon at which we see predictable excess returns.” 
 
To counter these arguments, this study makes use of monthly data (see section 2.4).  
Nonetheless, trading-based hypotheses have received attention in the literature.  Some 
researchers extend these trading-based theories to see how futures trading impacts 
volatility.  Empirical tests show that changes in stock market volatility are not statistically 
attributable to the level of futures trading (see Santoni, 1987; Davis and White, 1987; 
Edwards, 1988a  and 1988b; Antoniou, Holmes and Priestley, 1998, to name only a few). 
In fact, Antoniou, Holmes and Priestley (1998) further report that the observed 
asymmetry between volatility and returns cannot be the result of solely the so-called 
leverage hypothesis.  There are yet other factors responsible such as noise and feedback 
trading. 
 The volatility feedback, leverage, and trading-based hypotheses, have all spawned 
much research interest in the conditional risk-return tradeoff. Efforts examining this 
relationship predominantly use historical realized rates of return to produce conditional 
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mean-variance estimates. Oftentimes, results regarding the dynamic risk-return tradeoff 
are idiosyncratic to particular methodologies or data sets. These observed outcomes vary 
as researchers change the specifications in their models or the range and frequency in 
their data sets, casting doubt on their conclusions. 
This chapter focuses on addressing the volatility feedback argument. The leverage 
hypothesis runs into empirical and theoretical roadblocks when examining leveraged 
firms. Furthermore, it has no way of explaining the asymmetric risk-return link in firms 
with little or no leverage. The trading-based hypothesis may be a significant 
improvement over the leverage hypothesis but also has shortcomings. Namely, it may be 
unjustified to use high frequency data (such as daily returns) since investors’ risk 
aversion does not change from day-to-day. It is more reasonable to assume that investors’ 
degrees of risk aversion changes together with shifts in macroeconomic factors. Despite 
their shortcomings, the leverage- and trading-based hypotheses are a step in the right 
direction and a basis for future research.  However, testing these hypotheses is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. Instead, this chapter addresses the notion of volatility feedback and 
the importance of trying to capture the required rate of return.  Existing literature 
addresses the notion of volatility feedback passively when interpreting results.  For 
example, studies that document a weak or negative intertemporal risk-return relation 
allude to volatility feedback as the likely culprit. As the required rate of return is 
increasing, prices will fall leading to lower historical average returns. Section 2.3 of this 
chapter stresses the importance of capturing movements in the required rate of return to 
address the intertemporal risk-return puzzle.  In any event, there exists much literature 
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devoted to this topic and, although conflicting at times, it is a good starting point for 
discussion and merits consideration for future research endeavors. 
 
2.2.4.2. An Investigation of Extant Findings 
Studies usually examine the intertemporal risk-return link by means of univariate 
or multivariate GARCH-in-mean models, where the conditional mean is linearly related 
to the conditional variance.  Findings are mixed, with some studies reporting a negative 
or weak intertemporal mean-variance tradeoff while others find it to be positive.  Many 
of these studies are at odds with our notion that we are risk-averse investors and require 
higher returns to take on additional units of risk. 
French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) find an insignificant risk-return relation 
when they use past daily returns to compute the conditional monthly variance.  They 
conclude that “Future work in this area is called for,” and that “Other variables that could 
affect expected risk premiums should be integrated into this analysis” (p. 27).  Baillie and 
DeGennaro (1990) use GARCH-in-mean models to test the relationship between mean 
returns on a portfolio and its conditional variance. They replace the normal distribution 
assumption in their model specification with a fatter-tailed t-distribution. They find no 
evidence of a conditional risk-return relationship. Chan, Karolyi, and Stulz (1992) 
implement a bivariate GARCH-in-mean model to estimate the conditional relationship 
between excess returns of U.S. equities with their conditional variance. They find that 
expected returns on the U.S. market have no link to its conditional variance, but have 
some relation to the conditional volatility of the foreign index. 
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Harrison and Zhang (1999) argue that conflicting evidence on the dynamic risk-
return tradeoff may be due to model misspecification. Instead of using a GARCH-in-
mean model the way most studies use, they use Monte Carlo integration to form the 
conditional mean and conditional variance of the returns. It has been argued that 
parametric models, such as the GARCH model, may lead to specification error and 
produce spurious results (see Galant, Rossi and Tauchen, 1992).  However, in their study 
they find a statistically significant and positive relation at long holding horizons, such as 
one or two years, but an insignificant relation at shorter holding horizons, such as one 
month. 
Goyal and Santa-Clara (henceforth GS) (2003) take a different approach to 
examining the intertemporal risk-return puzzle.  They use a much larger sample size and 
they try to identify the link between average stock variance (idiosyncratic risk) and 
returns on the market.  Consistent with traditional financial models, however, we should 
be focusing on market risk and not idiosyncratic risk.  Nonetheless, they base their 
decision on the fact that investors and households do not necessarily hold diversified 
portfolios (see Barber and Odean, 2000; Goetzmann and Kumar, 2001).  In fact, research 
shows that the median household invests in 2.61 stocks.  Some investors simply include 
stocks in their portfolio that they are familiar or “comfortable” with and downplay the 
important benefits associated with diversification (see Huberman, 2001).  Others prefer to 
invest in stocks of companies that they work for (see Benartzi and Thaler, 2001).  Apart 
from holding undiversified portfolios, GS (2003) base their decision on other market 
factors and inefficiencies such as transactions costs, taxes and privileged information, all 
of which influence investors’ selection criteria.  They further argue that investors hold 
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non-tradable assets which add “background risk” to their portfolio and, should those 
assets increase in risk, investors are less willing to hold a market portfolio of traded 
stocks (unless there is a rise in the expected return of the market).  So long as the risk of 
the non-tradable assets correlates with the individual stocks’ total risk, we begin to see a 
tradeoff between returns on the market and idiosyncratic risk.  To measure returns on the 
market, they use a value-weighted portfolio on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and Nasdaq stocks from 1963:08 to 1999:12.  Their 
findings indicate a positive link between average idiosyncratic risk and returns on the 
market.  They find no relationship between conditional risk and return in the market 
portfolio. 
Bali, Cakici, Yan and Zhang (2005) refute the findings of GS (2003), claiming 
that their results are not robust across different sample periods and portfolios.  For 
example, if one were to replicate their procedure and extend their data sample, originally 
from 1963:08 to 1999:12, to 1963:08 to 2001:12, the relation between idiosyncratic risk 
and market returns diminishes. In addition to different sample periods distorting their 
results, Bali, Cakici, Yan and Zhang (2005) argue that the conclusions of GS (2003) do 
not hold if they were to exclude Nasdaq stocks from their value-weighted portfolio to 
calculate idiosyncratic risks.  Thus, they argue, their results are not only nullified if one 
were to change sample periods, but also if you were to compare idiosyncratic risk across 
different portfolios.  Though they managed to find weaknesses in the study by GS (2003), 
they too could not find a positive risk-return tradeoff in the market. 
Other researchers look to international markets to explore the intertemporal risk-
return link.  Theodossiou and Lee (1995) use the GARCH-in-mean model to test the 
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conditional risk-return tradeoff in ten industrialized countries using three specifications 
for the conditional mean-variance relationship: The linear, the square-root, and the log-
linear specifications, yet cannot obtain positive results in any of the ten countries under 
consideration.  Koulakiotis, Papasyriopoulos and Molyneux (2006) study nearly all the 
same countries that Theodossiou and Lee (1995) examine, but instead use the asymmetric 
EGARCH of Nelson (1991) to capture the effects of positive and negative innovations.  
They too cannot find a statistically significant risk-return relation.  Other researchers 
investigating the Chinese market (see Lee, Chen and Rui, 2001), emerging markets (see 
De Santis and Imrohoroglu, 1997; Shin, 2005), and other international markets around 
the world (Balaban, Bayar and Kan, 2001), also find that the conditional risk-return 
relationship is not statistically different from zero. 
There exist yet other studies that document a negative, and at times statistically 
significant, conditional mean-variance tradeoff.  Pindyck (1984) documents a negative 
relation between market returns and volatility and finds support for the volatility 
feedback argument. As volatility increases, the required rate of return on equities 
increases and leads to an immediate drop in stock prices. Campbell (1987), Turner, Startz 
and Nelson (1989) and Nelson (1991) all use different methodologies and data sets, yet 
also find a negative intertemporal risk-return link.  In particular, Nelson (1991) uses the 
EGARCH-in-mean specification, which captures negative and positive innovations, yet 
finds a negative relation.  Glosten, Jaganathan and Runkle (1993) use their GJR-GARCH 
to capture the asymmetric impact positive and negative news has on the conditional 
variance.  Even after using dummy variables to control for the so-called “January effect,” 
they find a negative conditional risk-return link. 
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Whitelaw (1994) integrates four financial variables in order to estimate the 
conditional first and second moments of stock returns:  The spread between Baa and Aaa 
bonds, the commercial paper-Treasury spread, the one-year treasury yield and the 
dividend yield on the S&P 500. These variables were selected from a universe of 
regressors for their proven predictive abilities.  However, a natural concern with this 
method of selection is the possibility of data snooping biases. Whitelaw (1994) defends 
the use of these variables on theoretical grounds for their consistent empirical 
performance.  Research shows that these variables are good predictors of the mean and 
variance of market returns (see Breen, Glosten and Jagannathan, 1989; Fama and French, 
1989; Kandel and Stambaugh, 1989 and 1990; Keim and Stambaugh, 1986, to name only 
a few studies).  For example, the spread between commercial paper and the treasury yield 
is a good predictor of stock market volatility as well as real economic activity (see Stock 
and Watson, 1989; Bernanke, 1990).  The treasury yield curve, by itself, is used by 
economists and central banks as a method for predicting future economic activity (see 
Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Campbell, 1995; Estrella and Mishkin, 1998; Hamilton 
and Kim, 2002, to name only a few).  Whitelaw (1994) finds that, for shorter time 
horizons, expected returns are positively related to the default spread and the dividend 
yield but are negatively related to the one-year treasury yield.  Since the dividend yield 
and the default spread may very well proxy for variations in the risk premium, they are 
positively linked to expected returns. The fact that expected returns are negatively related 
to the one-year treasury yield is consistent with the theory of money demand outlined by 
Fama (1981) and Kaul (1987).  However, even with the inclusion of these variables as 
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predictors of the mean and variance of market returns, his study finds a negative 
intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. 
 Bekaert and Wu (2000) document a negative conditional mean-variance link 
when examining the Japanese stock market index.  To motivate their study, they cite the 
two competing hypotheses responsible for the asymmetric conditional mean-variance 
relation (i.e. the leverage hypothesis and volatility feedback argument).  They find that, 
although much work has been done examining each of these hypotheses in isolation, 
these hypotheses have not been examined and compared simultaneously. More 
specifically, no study examines volatility asymmetry at the market level and at the firm or 
portfolio level.  Most studies examining the leverage hypothesis typically use data from 
individual firms or a portfolio of firms and calculate their gross volatility. Gross volatility 
is typically applied in studies investigating individual firms whereby regression analysis 
is used to find a link between some measure of volatility and returns in the preceding 
month (see Black, 1976; Christie, 1982; Duffee, 1995).  Literature investigating the 
volatility feedback hypothesis tends to use market level data and produces conditional 
mean-variance forecasts using GARCH-type models.  Therefore, it appears there are two 
separate strands of literature which use distinct data sets and methodologies.  In order to 
unify these two strands of literature and to test which hypothesis perseveres, Bekaert and 
Wu (2000) test both these hypotheses simultaneously using the Japanese market index 
along with various levered portfolios of stocks.   
 Their sample ranges from January 1, 1985 to June 20, 1994 and includes firms 
from the Nikkei 225 index.  To avoid survivorship biases from skewing their results, they 
select firms that have been actively listed in the Nikkei 225 index over the entire sample 
 89
period.  These stocks must also have debt data available throughout the sample period.  
Stocks that do not fulfill these requirements are discarded from the study.  Bekaert and 
Wu (2000) create three portfolios of stocks with varying degrees of financial leverage; a 
high, medium and low levered portfolio.  Along with these levered portfolios, they also 
examine volatility asymmetry in the Nikkei 225 index.  Findings in their study indicate 
that leverage variables are significantly associated to changes in conditional volatility 
estimates. Nonetheless, their explanatory power on conditional volatility estimates 
appears to be dwarfed by the volatility feedback mechanism.  The conditional mean-
variance asymmetry is most pronounced as a result of market shocks (i.e. shocks in the 
GARCH specification).  These shocks best explain this asymmetry in the market and in 
the high and medium leverage portfolios.  Financial leverage, however, seems to play a 
slightly larger role for the low leverage portfolio. Bekaert and Wu (2000) take their 
analysis one step further and test the findings of Cheung and Ng (1992), who find that 
volatility asymmetry is much stronger for small U.S. stocks.  They extend this line of 
research and sort Japanese equities on the basis of their average market capitalization 
over the sample period. They find that the degree of volatility asymmetry is not 
necessarily contingent upon the size of a firm.  For example, larger firms may exhibit 
stronger volatility asymmetries than their smaller counterparts.  All in all, neither size nor 
leverage can solely be used to decipher the degree and direction in conditional volatility 
shifts. 
 Other studies change the methodologies or assumptions in their models, yet 
continue to find this relationship to be negative.  Harvey (2001) contrasts linear from 
non-parametric methods for estimating conditional expectations.  Results in his study 
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indicate that the conditional mean-variance relation depends on the specification that the 
researcher imposes on the conditional variance. The rationale behind using nonparametric 
techniques is to model the returns of securities which have complex embedded options.  
By doing so, it is not necessary to assume that the data fall into a class of parametric 
distributions.  This paper focuses on four applications where nonparametric regression 
techniques can be used:  Firstly, it may be able to model the behavior of a market timer.  
A market timer shifts funds into market sensitive stocks during market upturns (to 
magnify returns) and into market insensitive stocks during market downturns (to 
minimize losses).  Secondly, the use of nonparametric density estimation techniques may 
be a useful approach to model returns in the recreation industry portfolio.  The returns of 
this portfolio are nonlinearly related to the returns on the market.  By using the 
nonparametric density estimation technique, it may be possible to model these complex 
nonlinearities.  In the third scenario mentioned, the nonparametric density estimation 
technique may be used to model portfolios for hedging securities.  Many pass-through 
securities by the Federal National Mortgage Association contain embedded options which 
make them more complicated and nonlinear when compared to other securities.  The 
nonparametric method gives researchers some ability to model these nonlinearities. 
Empirical tests indicate that the use of nonparametric regression techniques does 
not lead to improved forecasts of market returns, suggesting that the use of linear 
techniques is well-grounded.  For example, when examining the conditional mean, a 
higher R2 coefficient is obtained when looking at the NYSE value-weighted portfolio.  
This means that the linear estimation technique may provide a better “fit” for the data.  In 
terms of the conditional mean-variance relationship, his results indicate that if the 
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conditional variance estimator uses the same information as the conditional mean, a 
negative relation between the two is likely to transpire.  Furthermore, market participants 
demand a large expected return per unit of risk during market downturns and a lower 
expected return per unit of risk during market upturns. 
Although intuitively straightforward, research examining the intertemporal risk-
return tradeoff produces these mixed results. This study finds that if the same information 
used to produce the conditional variance is used to estimate the conditional mean, it is 
likely that a negative conditional mean-variance relation will materialize.  Another 
argument of this paper is that, although we can produce accurate estimates of volatility 
using an asymmetric GARCH model, it is groundless to treat the conditional mean 
estimate as a proxy for the required rate of return. Harvey (2001) finds that investors 
demand more returns during market slumps (when volatility is higher).  Yet, the 
conditional risk-return tradeoff he finds is negative.  The use of nonparametric density 
estimation methods may very well be used to model the returns of securities with 
complex embedded options. Yet, as section 2.3 of this chapter argues, this may not 
resolve the theoretical shortcomings of using conditional mean estimates as proxies for 
investors’ required rate of return. 
Koopman and Uspensky (2002) use a stochastic volatility-in-mean model (SVM) 
derived from Monte Carlo simulation methods to examine the intertemporal relation 
between stock index returns and volatility.  They study this relationship in three major 
stock markets:  The U.K., the U.S. and the Japanese stock markets.  A fundamental 
difference between stochastic volatility (SV) models and GARCH models is in the way 
that the variance forecast is estimated.  GARCH models produce conditional variance 
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forecasts using all information available up until that of the previous period.  They are 
deterministic models whose forecast is based on past squared innovations and lags of the 
conditional variance.  SV models contain a second error term that impacts the direction of 
the conditional variance forecast. A simple SV model may define volatility as a 
logarithmic first-order autoregressive process: 
yt = µ + utσt , ut ~ N(0,1) 
log(σt2) = α0 + β1log(σt-12) + σηητ    (2.13) 
ητ is a stochastic variable that is independent of ut and has a distribution N(0,1).  Use of 
SV models has much useful application for option pricing studies.  They allow 
researchers to relax the assumption that volatility is constant throughout the life of an 
option (see Black and Scholes, 1973).  SV models are, however, disadvantageous in the 
sense that they are relatively more complex than their GARCH counterparts and require 
more work in order to estimate the model parameters (see Harvey, Ruiz and Shephard, 
1994). 
 Koopman and Uspensky (2002) defend their use of SV models on grounds that, 
although relatively more complex than GARCH models, many advances have been made 
to facilitate their use.  GARCH models are advantageous in the sense that, since the 
model is devised using the distribution of a one-step ahead prediction error, maximum 
likelihood estimation is easier to perform.  SV models are much more difficult to estimate 
by using maximum likelihood.  More specifically, there are generally two methods for 
estimating SV models:  A researcher can either attempt to create the entire likelihood 
function to estimate the SV model.  Doing so is a complex process and requires much 
effort.  Alternatively, they can simply approximate the likelihood function or just avoid 
 93
this matter altogether.  However, there has been a recent trend towards trying to develop 
techniques in order to calculate the entire likelihood function.  In their study, Koopman 
and Uspensky (2002) utilize a Monte Carlo likelihood estimation approach functionalized 
by Shephard and Pitt (1997) and Durbin and Koopman (1997).  Koopman and Uspensky 
(2002) estimate an SV model whereby volatility is one of the key variables that direct 
movements in the conditional mean.  This is strikingly similar to an ARCH-in-mean 
model, where the conditional mean is linked to the conditional variance.  However, 
whereas the ARCH-in-mean model attempts to decipher the relation between expected 
returns and expected volatility, the SVM model seeks to simultaneously predict the ex 
ante tradeoff between volatility and returns, as well as capture the volatility feedback 
effect. 
Findings using the SVM framework suggest a negative, albeit statistically 
insignificant, risk-return tradeoff for all stock index series. Koopman and Uspensky 
(2002) then compare these results with those obtained using GARCH-in-mean models, 
which happen to find a weak but positive relationship.  The GARCH-in-mean results in 
their study corroborated the weak conditional risk-return relation that other researchers 
have found.  The results from their SVM models again point to the theoretical pitfalls of 
using historical realized returns to address the volatility feedback argument.  SVM 
models may be more sophisticated than their GARCH-in-mean counterparts, but may not 
be a solution to the problem. 
Other more recent studies in the literature use a variety of methodologies and 
different data samples yet ascertain a negative conditional risk-return relation.  Brandt 
and Kang (2004) implement a latent vector autoregressive (VAR) process.  They defend 
 94
their decision to use this model on the basis that it provides a flexible statistical 
framework to examine the contemporaneous and intertemporal risk-return relation 
without the necessity of using exogenous variables.  In addition to not having to specify 
exogenous variables (since all are endogenous), there are several other advantages that 
make VAR models attractive to researchers.  First of all, they give researchers flexibility 
and allow a variable of interest to depend on more factors rather than just its own lags or 
some combination of stochastic terms.  VAR models received attention for their ability to 
provide better forecasts than other traditional large-scale structural models (see Sims, 
1980).  Other research has shown that VAR models are superior to other traditional 
models in terms of forecasting macroeconomic variables, such as the unemployment rate 
and gross national product (GNP) (see McNees, 1986).  Despite their flexibility and their 
empirical capabilities, VAR models also have their disadvantages.  Firstly, they are a-
theoretical and require no theoretical information about the nature of the variables in 
order to establish a specification of the model.  Another drawback to using VAR models 
is there may be too many parameters that have to be estimated.  For example, if there 
exist n equations, an equation for each of the n variables and with q lags for each variable 
in each equation, then (n + nq2) parameters need to be computed.  Hence, if n = 4 and q 
= 4, then 68 parameters need to be estimated.  If a researcher is to implement a VAR 
methodology using a small sample size they may find that degrees of freedom will 
rapidly be spent, meaning that standard errors will be large and confidence intervals may 
be wide. 
Brandt and Kang (2004) investigate the time-series relation between the 
conditional moments using a latent VAR methodology.  The first equation in their model 
 95
describes properties in the conditional mean.  The second equation in their model 
describes the conditional variance and nests the standard SV model that other researchers 
have used (see Wiggins, 1987; Andersen and Sorensen, 1994; Jacquier, Polson and Rossi, 
1994; Kim, Shephard and Chib, 1998, to name only a few].  Their study examines 
movements in the conditional mean and variance from business cycle to business cycle. 
They find that as the economy moves from a peak to a trough, conditional volatility 
increases immediately.  The conditional mean remains relatively flat, increasing only 
slightly at times.  In conclusion, Brandt and Kang (2004) find a negative and statistically 
significant conditional mean-variance relation. 
Perhaps one of the most recent studies that examine the conditional risk-return 
tradeoff on an international level is the study by Li, Yang, Hsiao and Chang (2005).  
They apply the GARCH-in mean and E-GARCH-in-mean methodology to the twelve 
largest stock markets.  Their sample period for all markets ranges from January 1980 to 
December 2001.  They motivate their study by discussing the two well-known 
hypotheses for why the conditional risk-return tradeoff may be negative: The volatility 
feedback hypothesis and leverage effect. Li, Yang, Hsiao and Chang (2005) acknowledge 
much work already exists which tries to capture the conditional mean-variance 
relationship.  However, they argue that perhaps researchers should consider the use of 
flexible semi-parametric specifications of the conditional variance in order to examine 
this relationship.  GARCH-in-mean models are sensitive to model misspecification and, 
in order for the model to be estimated properly, its parameters need to be correctly 
identified (see Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner, 1992).  Other researchers have expressed 
their reservations surrounding GARCH models and their ability to produce accurate 
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conditional mean-variance forecasts.  For example, Nelson (1991) warns that GARCH 
models impose parameter limitations which may be violated by coefficient estimates.  
Because GARCH models are restrictive, we are also restricting the nature of the 
conditional variance process.  Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine (1998) express a similar 
concern.  They argue that GARCH modeling may result in inferior estimates of volatility 
if a researcher does not correctly specify their model. 
Given these concerns, Li, Yang, Hsiao and Chang (2005) choose to take two 
approaches to study the conditional mean-variance tradeoff.  Firstly, the EGARCH-in-
mean method is utilized, since it has the ability to respond asymmetrically to positive and 
negative innovations.  Then, for sake of comparison, a flexible semi-parametric GARCH-
in-mean model is used.  Both of these approaches are utilized to study the same sample 
period for all twelve stock markets.  Findings in their study emphasize how sensitive 
estimated conditional risk-return relationships are to the different techniques in which 
volatility is forecasted.  More specifically, they find that, when a parametric EGARCH 
framework is employed, the conditional mean-variance tradeoff is more or less 
statistically negligible.  Ten of the twelve countries under scrutiny exhibit a positive 
relation, but its significance is not statistically different from zero.  When a flexible semi-
parametric specification for the conditional variance is used, the conditional risk-return 
tradeoff is negative in most of the sample markets.  In fact, for six of the twelve markets, 
a negative and statistically significant relation was estimated. 
This study made a strong point about the restrictive nature of GARCH models and 
a possibility that these restrictions may be a problem.  It also shows how sensitive 
conditional risk-return tradeoff estimates are to the presence (or absence) of parameter 
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restrictions.  However, as their results indicate, this is not the source of the problem.  The 
study by Li, Yang, Hsiao and Chang (2005), alike other studies, alluded to volatility 
feedback as the culprit for why so many researchers document different results.  For 
some countries, they even found this relationship to be negative and statistically 
significant.  Despite changing from a “rigid” to a more flexible statistical framework, the 
qualitative nature of their results did not change.  Even when using a more flexible semi-
parametric approach, Li, Yang, Hsiao and Chang (2005) did not find a positive 
conditional risk-return tradeoff as financial theory dictates.  Instead, shifting from a 
parametric to a semi-parametric method only seemed to change the significance of their 
test statistics.  The parametric approach yielded an insignificant conditional tradeoff 
while the semi-parametric approach estimates the relation to be negative and statistically 
significant. 
It seems implausible, therefore, to blame the properties of GARCH models on the 
reason for the insignificant or negative tradeoff that researchers find.  It is well-
recognized in the literature that deriving volatility forecasts is a difficult task.  Akgiray 
(1989) recognized that the time-series of market returns show signs of second-order 
dependence (i.e. the probability distribution of returns at time t, Rt, is not entirely 
independent of future period’s returns, Rt+n).  However, he contends that conditional 
heteroskedasticity models work best for capturing the properties of return series data 
since they allow for autocorrelation between the first and second moments of the return 
distribution.  In a comparison test, he finds that GARCH models accurately predict 
volatility and outperform their ARCH counterparts, exponentially-weighted moving 
averages and historical mean models for estimating monthly volatility in the U.S. market.  
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West and Cho (1995) approach a similar conclusion when working with dollar exchange 
rate volatility.  Pagan and Schwert (1990) consider a range of GARCH-type models and 
their ability to produce accurate estimates.  They compare the GARCH and EGARCH 
models to several non-parametric models in an effort to see which performs better.  Their 
findings show that parametric models fare better than their non-parametric counterparts 
during out-of-sample prediction experiments. More specifically, non-parametric 
techniques may result in too much variability in estimates of the conditional variance.  
Perhaps, a conclusion that all researchers can agree on is that estimating volatility 
is problematic and, whatever the econometric or theoretical model a researcher elects to 
use, it will certainly have its advantages and disadvantages.  This led Brailsford and Faff 
(1996) to characterize the forecasting of volatility as a “notoriously difficult task.”  Their 
study examined the daily returns of the Australian stock market index.  They find that the 
asymmetric GJR-GARCH model works best for forecasting volatility and for capturing 
positive and negative innovations.  However, overall, they find that simple ARCH-type 
models are most effective in capturing movements in volatility while relatively more 
sophisticated models, such as non-linear and non-parametric models, afford substandard 
forecasts.  Dimson and Marsh (1990, p.420) corroborate the findings of Brailsford and 
Faff (1996) that simpler models may be a superior alternative to complex models: “For 
those who are interested in forecasts with reasonable predictive accuracy, the best 
forecasting models may well be the simplest ones.” Furthermore, they urge fellow readers 
to take heed to results generated by volatility models, suggesting that a stipulated model 
may not capture the true dynamics of a particular data set. 
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For example, a researcher may very well select to use a particular model that, 
given the nature of their data sample, happens to provide support for the hypothesis under 
consideration.  Dimson and Marsh (1990) warn that such data snooping can misleadingly 
show a relationship between variables where one does not exist, or happens to exist only 
under certain conditions (which may be elusive to the researcher but are disregarded in 
their discussion).  Data snooping has long been a concern in the field of finance as well as 
other social sciences.  It is no surprise, therefore, that researchers may prefer one model 
over another simply because it provides a better fit for their data (see Leamer, 1978).  
Merton (1987) expresses concern that, although data snooping is recognized, it tends to 
go largely ignored. 
Given these concerns in the research profession, it is important for readers not to 
focus exclusively on the values of test statistics or R2 coefficients, but to evaluate a study 
based on its theoretical motivations and whether or not its arguments make fundamental 
sense.  To mitigate such concerns in this thesis, market return data is utilized going back 
as far as possible up until the current period.  Extraordinary events, such as wars or stock 
market bubbles, were not removed or filtered out of the sample.  This is because they 
offer valuable information concerning movements in the conditional mean and 
conditional variance forecasts. 
Apart from data snooping issues, the findings just presented also show that 
parametric restrictions are not necessarily to blame for the insignificant or negative 
conditional risk-return relation as Li, Yang, Hsiao and Chang (2005) hypothesized.  
Although use of semi-parametric methods may aid researchers in uncovering the 
properties of other time series, it is not a solution to the volatility feedback hypothesis.  
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Furthermore, there already exists much evidence that supports GARCH modeling as a 
technique for effectively and accurately estimating volatility. Oftentimes, use of 
parametric methods surpasses forecasts of semi-parametric or non-parametric techniques. 
Although the study by Li, Yang, Hsiao and Chang (2005) may encourage future 
use of semi-parametric methods to explore other topics concerned with the conditional 
mean-variance tradeoff, it is of no service to us in addressing the volatility feedback 
argument.  Especially when there is evidence that standard GARCH models sufficiently 
and efficiently predict volatility. 
It is important to note that up to now, this chapter has examined studies that have 
found either a negative or statistically negligible conditional risk-return relation.  
However, there exist yet other studies that actually find this relation to be positive.  Using 
different theoretical and econometric approaches, some researchers maintain that this 
tradeoff is indeed positive and statistically significant. 
Chou (1988) examines weekly data in the U.S. from 1962 to 1985 and, using the 
GARCH-in-mean model, finds the conditional risk-return relation to be positive.  
Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge (1988) implement a multivariate GARCH process to 
estimate the conditional mean and the conditional covariance of returns on T-bills, bonds 
and stocks with excess returns on the market.  They find the conditional mean-variance 
relation to be small, yet statistically significant.  Their study suggests that perhaps other 
factors should be included when estimating the conditional distribution of returns, such as 
innovations in consumption.  Sheikh (1993) incorporates implied volatility derived from 
call options into his research to examine the conditional risk-return tradeoff.  His study 
finds that implied volatility is positively and significantly related to movements in 
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forecasted return volatility and would serve as an appropriate forecast for conditional 
risk.  
Implied volatility estimates the volatility of an asset’s price based on a number of 
factors (i.e. interest rates, strike price of the underlying asset, number of days until 
expiration, to name only a few variables).  Implied volatility is thus distinguishable from 
historical volatility because the latter is calculated from realized historical prices.  
Implied volatility is advantageous in the sense that it is forward-looking (i.e. implied 
volatility increases when investors are bearish and declines when they are bullish).  When 
examining returns on individual stocks with their corresponding lagged implied 
volatilities, Sheikh (1993) finds them to be positively related.  However, when using the 
same procedure for the S&P 100 index, he does not find a statistical relationship between 
returns and lagged values of implied volatility. 
In an effort to resolve the intertemporal puzzle, Scruggs (1998) employs a 
conditional two-factor model.  To motivate the construction of his empirical model, 
Scruggs (1998) includes the return on long-term government bonds as a second factor in 
the ICAPM of Merton (1973).  When doing so, Scruggs finds a positive and significant 
intertemporal risk-return relation.  He justifies the inclusion of the long-term government 
bond rates on the basis that investors are always shifting their investment preferences and 
hedging against any possible undesirable changes in the markets.  Merton (1973, p. 879) 
supports the use of interest rates as an instrumental factor in determining the pulse of the 
economy: “One should interpret the effects of a changing interest rate in the forthcoming 
analysis in the way economists have generally done in the past: namely, as a single 
(instrumental) variable representation of shifts in the investment opportunity set.” 
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Scruggs (1998) defends use of the long-term bond yield on grounds that it 
accurately captures shifts in investment opportunities.  Furthermore, other studies are 
well aware of the forecasting properties of long-term and short-term government bond 
yields, the spreads between long- and short-term interest rates and the spread between 
high- and low-grade bonds as instrumental “indicators” of market performance and 
changes in risk.  Therefore, these factors have been incorporated in multifactor asset 
pricing models to examine the conditional risk-return relation (see Chen, Roll and Ross, 
1986; Shanken, 1990, to name only a few).  The properties of long-term government 
bond yields are covered in more depth in section 2.3 of this chapter. 
Deviating from the traditional ARCH approach, Ghysels, Santa-Clara and 
Valkanov (2005) implement a mixed data sampling (MIDAS) estimator to forecast the 
monthly variance using historical daily squared returns.  Their findings suggest a positive 
and significant conditional risk-return tradeoff.  They uphold that the risk-return tradeoff 
is the “first fundamental law of finance,” yet are perplexed as to why studies offer 
conflicting results.  Using daily aggregate stock market data from the U.S. market, from 
January 1928 through December 2000, they claim to find a positive conditional risk-
return relation that is robust in sub-samples and to asymmetric specifications in the 
variance process.   
They begin their study with the Merton (1973) ICAPM formula expressed in 
Equation (2.4): 
Et[Rt+1] = α  + θ σt2, 
where θ is the coefficient of risk aversion and α, in a ‘perfect’ economy absent of 
transactions costs and market inefficiencies, is zero.  To estimate returns on the left-hand 
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side they use monthly data, since daily returns may be too noisy.  On the right-hand side, 
they use daily lagged squared returns.  They also extend the MIDAS methodology to 
allow negative and positive innovations to asymmetrically impact the dynamics of the 
conational variance forecast (i.e. negative and positive daily squared returns have 
different weightings on the conditional variance). 
Their approach is comparable to that of French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987), 
previously discussed in this literature review, whereby the monthly variance is computed 
using a “rolling window” approach.  The rolling window approach calculates an 
estimator for the conditional variance by taking the sum of the daily squared returns of 
the previous month(s).  French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) used a one month rolling 
window, yet calculate an insignificant coefficient for the risk aversion parameter, θ.  
Ghysels, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2005) find that when they increase this rolling 
window from one month to three or four months, they calculate θ to be 2.6, which is 
consistent with theory that we are risk-averse.  To test their results, they also break their 
sample into two subparts of approximately equal size: 1928 through 1963 and 1964 
through 2000.  Their results indicate a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 
risk aversion for both of the sub-samples.  Leon, Nave and Rubio (2007) also extend the 
work of Ghysels, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2005) and implement the MIDAS 
forecasting technique to examine the conditional risk-return tradeoff in European equity 
indices.  They examine daily returns from the Eurostoxx50 (Europe’s Blue-chip index), 
CAC (French stock index), DAX (German stock index), Ibex-35 (Spanish stock index) 
and the FTSE100 (British stock index) from January 1988 through December 2003.  
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Their findings indicate a positive and significant coefficient of risk aversion for all their 
samples. 
Instead of focusing on econometric models to provide support for the 
intertemporal risk-return tradeoff, Lundblad (2007) approaches this issue from a 
theoretical perspective.  His study claims that the data samples of previous studies, which 
conclude a negative or insignificant relation, are plagued with small-selection biases and 
the problem in detecting a positive relation does not originate from volatility 
specification.  When using nearly two centuries of data from the U.S. stock market, he 
finds the risk-return tradeoff is indeed positive.  By using such an expansive data set, a 
researcher is able to capture the impacts of several pronounced macroeconomic 
occurrences which contain important information about equity prices during times of 
increased uncertainty.  This claim contrasts sharply with the arguments of most other 
researchers, who hypothesize that the problem may be in the specification of the model.  
To corroborate his findings, Lundblad (2007) uses a variety of specifications for the 
conditional variance and ascertains qualitatively similar results.  
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2.2.4.3. Some Final Thoughts on Intertemporal Risk-Return Literature 
The existing findings just presented show how fundamental the conditional risk-return 
tradeoff is in modern financial theory.  It is no surprise, therefore, that so much effort is 
devoted in order to decipher this relationship.  Despite the vast body of literature, 
however, not enough attention has been given to why researchers’ studies yield these 
mixed results.  The literature just examined attempts to resolve the puzzle using a variety 
of methodologies while ignoring the possible theoretical shortcomings for using historical 
realized returns as a measure for the required rate of return.  For example, using SV, 
VAR or MIDAS modeling techniques instead of GARCH models may prove useful in 
identifying trends and the dynamics of volatility through time, but such models may not 
provide an economically sound answer to the volatility feedback argument.  For example, 
Lundblad (2007) makes the argument that small samples are to blame and not 
specifications in the conditional variance process. Ghysels, Santa-Clara and Valkanov 
(2005) claim that, although MIDAS modeling has yielded a positive conditional tradeoff, 
this tradeoff changes as the rolling “window” length of previous months changes.  
French, Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) used a one month rolling window and found no 
evidence of a positive coefficient of risk aversion. Ghysels, Santa-Clara and Valkanov 
(2005) extended the window length from one month to three and four months, and find it 
to be significantly positive.   
The volatility feedback argument hinges on the observation that volatility is 
persistent.  In other words, a large piece of news about the market, good or bad, typically 
leads to more pieces of news and increases future volatility.  In cases of good news, 
volatility is, to some degree, relatively less pronounced. In the event of bad news, 
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volatility is more pronounced. Consistent with the volatility feedback argument, if future 
volatility increases as a result of the arrival of negative news, then the required rate of 
return investors demand should also increase. Prices will fall as perceived risk (volatility) 
increases. However, a researcher using realized returns as a benchmark for the required 
rate of return will observe that returns are falling. This is no surprise, since prices are 
falling.  However, it is theoretically unjustifiable to extend this observation and claim that 
the required rate of return is also falling. This is the very reason why so many studies 
happen to find a negative or weak intertemporal risk-return relation.  The central 
argument of the volatility feedback hypothesis is that the required rate of return should 
increase.  Thus, it is imperative that a proxy for the required rate of return is established 
and its movements are compared to movements in volatility estimates. 
As researchers change the frequency of their data or the range of their samples, 
results vary. Results also vary as they take on different econometric approaches.  
However, these approaches may not be an adequate solution.  Perhaps one thing most of 
the above studies have in common is that they use historical realized returns to compute 
and compare the conditional mean with the conditional variance.  Therefore, when the 
conditional mean of returns falls as conditional volatility rises, it is misconstrued as a 
negative relation between the required rate of return and risk.  
The volatility feedback, trading-based and leverage hypotheses are all a step in 
identifying reasons for changes in volatility.  Perhaps all three hypotheses play some role 
in the asymmetric link between conditional risk and returns.  This will undoubtedly be an 
interesting topic for future research.  For purposes of this chapter, the volatility feedback 
argument will be addressed.  As mentioned, the leverage hypothesis is rather difficult to 
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apply at times and may result in biased results. For example, there are many firms that 
have an insufficient, or non-existent, amount of financial leverage. Yet, these firms 
experience an asymmetric mean-volatility relation. 
In addition, it has been found that changes in leverage may not necessarily induce 
changes in volatility.  For example, there appears to be a link between volatility and 
leverage only when there is a decline in a firm’s stock price.  Conversely, the leverage 
effect does not seem to hold when a firm’s stock price appreciates.  The trading-based 
hypothesis makes the claim that trades, and depending on the type of trade (i.e. informed 
opposed to non-informed) are responsible for the asymmetric risk-return relation.  
However, in order to derive this claim, daily data needs to be used.  Typically, studies use 
monthly data to explore the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. By doing so, we are 
capturing fluctuations in the business cycle and other macroeconomic variables.  Making 
the claim that investors’ degree of risk aversion changes daily may be unrealistic. 
Given these findings and criticisms, the leverage and trading-based hypotheses 
are beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this chapter aims to offer a plausible solution 
to the volatility feedback hypothesis and to effectively capture the required rate of return.  
By doing so, we can then see how the required rate of return commoves with fluctuations 
in conditional volatility estimates. The stock indices of eight major international countries 
will be investigated in order to compare my results with that of other studies which look 
at international markets. 
It thus seeks to address the current gap in the literature of using ex post historical 
realized returns to make ex ante inferences regarding investors’ forward-looking 
expectations. Namely, is it possible that extant conflicting findings result from the use of 
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historical realized returns as a proxy for investors’ required rate of return? As it stands 
now in the literature, this gap has not been addressed and is a strong reason for why the 
findings are mixed and inconclusive. 
 
2.3. Modeling Risk and the Required Rate of Return 
Given the empirical results cited above, the main question is whether there exists a 
positive intertemporal link between risk and the required rate of return.  Extant studies 
examining this relationship should not be using historical returns to derive conditional 
mean-variance forecasts.  Volatility feedback will distort findings and lead to a negative 
or weak intertemporal risk-return tradeoff.  GARCH-type models are limited in the sense 
that they cannot capture the required rate of return and need to be used carefully.  This 
study explores the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff by focusing on how to effectively 
quantify risk and the required rate of return.  Previous studies are inclined to using multi-
factor models to examine variations in expected returns. For example, Fama and French 
(1996) use a three factor model that attempts to predict movements in the return of a 
portfolio in question using three variables: Returns on the market, the returns of small 
stocks subtracted by the returns on big stocks and the returns of high book/market stocks 
minus the returns on low book/market stocks. Other researchers have used 
macroeconomic variables in an effort to forecast returns in the market such as labor 
income (see Jagannathan and Wang, 1996). Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) use inflation and 
industrial activity as predictive variables, while Cochrane (1996) uses investment growth. 
Although macroeconomic variables are much easier to theoretically motivate, 
there use has drawn concerns.  As already mentioned, there are concerns of data mining 
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and data selection biases, whereby researchers simply select variables or models that 
yield empirically favorable results. This very practice led Fama (1991) to characterize the 
ICAPM as a “fishing license.”  The ICAPM, however, is not such an extensive model.  
Therefore we should not be “fishing” for variables that empirically yield desirable results. 
Instead, we need to include variables that are theoretically justifiable and can help us 
explain the cross-sectional and time-series link between conditional risk and returns.  
Cochrane (2001, p. 171) expresses a similar concern: 
 
“The CAPM and multiple factor models are obviously very artificial.  Their 
central place really comes from a long string of empirical successes rather than 
theoretical purity.” 
 
Instead, Cochrane (2001) argues that, when examining the ICAPM, researchers need to 
integrate variables that can help to explain variations in returns (p. 444): 
 
“Though Merton’s theory says that variables which predict market returns should 
show up as factors which explain cross-sectional variation in average returns, 
surprisingly few papers have tried to see whether this is true…” 
 
The seminal paper by Kane, Marcus and Noh (1996) makes a similar argument. It 
attempts to rationalize why historical realized returns present empirical difficulties in 
deciphering the intertemporal relation between risk and return. They argue that existing 
findings are inconclusive and offer conflicting evidence because historical realized 
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returns are backward-looking. We should instead be focusing on a forward-looking 
measure for returns, such as the E/P ratio. 
These very issues are a motivation for the construction of this chapter and an 
attempt to tackle the volatility feedback argument.  However, an immediate question that 
may arise is whether integrating the Fed model, let alone the E/P ratio, is a theoretically 
justifiable proposition. 
As previously discussed in this chapter, data mining is a concern and can 
misrepresent the truth.  We therefore need to include variables that we can justify on 
theoretical grounds and avoid including variables simply because they tell us a good 
story. Merton (1973) argues that researchers should only include instrumental variables 
that capture changes in the investment opportunity set and which can help to explain the 
time-series and cross-sectional variation in returns, something which few papers have 
attempted to do and is a motivation for this chapter.   
An integral piece of this chapter, therefore, is the discussion of the so-called Fed 
model and its constituents, and whether they can justifiably be considered to help answer 
the intertemporal risk-return puzzle.  There are two variables that constitute the Fed 
model: the market earnings-yield, E/P, and the 10-year government bond yield.  To be 
more exact, the Fed model is the spread between these two variables (i.e. the E/P ratio 
minus the 10-year risk free rate).  Before discussing the Fed model’s role in this analysis, 
it needs to be made clear why the E/P ratio is useful and what role it plays here in this 
thesis and in the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff literature. Most studies investigating 
this tradeoff focus on GARCH methodologies or emphasize the use of different 
parameterization techniques to produce volatility forecasts.  What role can the E/P ratio 
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possible play in this literature?  There are three reasons why this ratio serves as a proxy 
for the required rate of return and why it can help to answer the volatility feedback 
argument. However, we first need to understand the problem with using historical 
realized returns. 
As mentioned, volatility feedback distorts findings and results in an insignificant 
or even negative conditional mean-variance relation. During periods of increased 
volatility, prices fall leading to a negative historical mean return. This is then 
misconstrued as a negative (or insignificant) conditional risk-return tradeoff. This is 
exactly the problem. However, as already mentioned, volatility is persistent. Hence, any 
volatility today will have a bearing on volatility tomorrow. A potential problem in 
existing research is the use of historical realized average returns as unbiased estimates of 
the future required rate of return. Simple reflection however reveals that this is 
unjustified.  If an investor perceives higher future volatility (e.g. a large piece of negative 
news regarding dividends in the near future), this will then result in an increase in the 
future required rate of return and an immediate drop in prices. The declining prices will 
produce a lower historical average return, misleading one to believe that the required rate 
of return is falling. In order to capture movements in the required rate of return, we need 
to use a proxy that is “forward-looking.” 
To illustrate what is meant by “forward-looking,” let us consider literature 
examining the term structure of interest rates, a common valuation method for bonds and 
fixed income assets.  When considering the expected return on bonds, it is incorrect to 
calculate the rate of change on the bond’s price, P, from the previous period, t-1, to the 
current period, t [i.e. ln(Pt/Pt-1)]. 
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Although this is used to calculate the historical rates of return on the prices of equities, it 
is inappropriate to use for bonds. Instead, yield-to-maturity (YTM) is used by 
practitioners and academicians to measure the relative value and return of the underlying 
instrument: 
Pt = ∑
=
n
i
CFi
1
/(1+r)I      (2.14) 
Where Pt is the price of the bond, CFi is the cash flow due at period i, and r is the internal 
rate of return (IRR) that equates future expected cash flows of the bond to its current 
market price. Calculating the YTM provides an accurate method for valuating fixed 
income assets and can help us to understand an underlying asset’s intrinsic properties.  
For example, bonds that are perceived as being relatively “riskier” investments should 
offer investors a higher return (YTM).  Amihud and Mendelson (1991) find, ceteris 
paribus, that YTM is higher for assets which have lower liquidity and make it harder for 
investors to cash out.  Other studies examining the term structure of interest rates argue 
that bond yields can tell us valuable information about the possible future state of the 
economy (see Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Campbell, 1995; Estrella and Mishkin, 
1998; Hamilton and Kim, 2002, to name only a few). 
 Alike term structure studies, we need to also adopt a forward-looking approach to 
tackle the volatility feedback argument. Any volatility today will have an impact on 
volatility tomorrow.  As Campbell and Hentschel (1992) indicate, stock price movements 
today are directly linked to future expected volatility. If investors perceive future 
volatility, prices will fall since the required rate of return is rising (i.e. volatility feedback 
effect).  Thus, comparing historical realized returns (which are backward-looking) with 
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volatility forecasts will likely produce spurious results. We need a forward-looking 
measure of the required rate of return that can accurately capture variations in the future 
risk premium.  The E/P ratio will serve as this proxy. 
An E/P ratio is the ratio of earnings to share price. It is the inverse of the well-
known PE multiple (or “P/E ratio”) that analysts use to value stocks and markets and to 
check whether stocks are reasonably priced.  For example, analysts usually construe a 
low E/P ratio (i.e. a high PE ratio) as signs that an asset may be overvalued and that 
investors are expecting a firm to produce higher earnings in the future (i.e. the “price” in 
the E/P ratio is too high and the “earnings” are too low).  When the E/P ratio is low, it is 
usually followed by a correction in the stock’s price.  The opposite is usually true in the 
case of a high E/P ratio.  Since this chapter is concerned with the intertemporal risk-
return tradeoff of market indices, it calculates the E/P ratio from a market’s overall index 
(such as the S&P 500 for the U.S. market). Calculating an E/P ratio for a market is 
similar to calculating it for individual firms – average earnings per share of the firms in 
the index divided by their average price.  In this case, the “average” is the weighted 
average that is proportional to each firm’s market capitalization. 
Many studies exist supporting the use of the E/P ratio as an indicator of future 
market performance and claim that it has the ability to forecast future returns reliably and 
consistently. The E/P ratio and its predictive power has even drawn the interests of 
central bankers who are responsible for implementing monetary and fiscal policies that 
impact the overall financial health of the economy. 
Before presenting evidence, it is important to understand how the E/P ratio works.  
Since earnings are in the numerator and price is in the denominator, this ratio compares 
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stock prices relative to fundamentals. Furthermore, stock prices should reflect the 
fundamental value of the firm and be positively related to expected returns.  Consistent 
with the mispricing view, when the E/P ratio is low, it warns investors that stocks are 
overpriced and may entail low returns in the near future. The converse is true when the 
E/P ratio is high. A good question to ask is why some literature focuses on the PE 
multiple while others talk about the E/P ratio. After all, one is simply a reciprocal of the 
other. Usually practitioners and academicians talk about the E/P ratio when valuing 
markets for two reasons. Firstly, the P/E ratio will approach an infinite value should 
earnings approach zero and, second, because the E/P ratio is linearly linked to growth in 
earnings as well as interest rates (see Beaver and Morse, 1978; White, 2000; Jain and 
Rosett, 2006).  This allows researchers to easily compare the level of the E/P ratio with 
interest rate levels which is the basis of the Fed model. 
The expectation that deviations in E/P ratio should be “corrected” in the future is 
based on the well-established premise of mean reversion (i.e. the value of a variable may 
fluctuate but should eventually gravitate towards its mean value). For example, markets 
can reasonably expect that prices of a stock should not drift away from their historical 
values and from fundamental measures of value (such as earnings). If they do, such 
deviations should only be transitory. Now let us consider the E/P ratio. Should prices drift 
too far from earnings – a fundamental measure of a firm’s value – we can expect to see 
the price adjust accordingly to bring the ratio back to normal historical levels.  For sake 
of argument, consider a bull run in a firm’s stock price that has nothing to do with 
changes in its fundamental value.  Such a price increase will only be temporary as the 
price “corrects” in the future to restore the E/P to its normal historical level. In December 
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3 of 1996, two Economists, Professor Campbell and Professor Shiller, testified before the 
Federal Reserve Board that mean reversion applies to the E/P ratio and has the power to 
predict future stock performance (see Shiller, 1996; Campbell and Shiller, 1998 and 
2001).  Namely, a low E/P ratio signals market downturns and low future returns while a 
high E/P ratio signals high future returns. 
One may naturally ask, why not use dividends as a fundamental measure of 
value? The reason dividend-price (D/P) ratios are used sparingly and may not be as 
effective as the E/P ratio is because their value is strongly influenced by changes in 
corporate financial policies such as stock repurchases. For example, a company may wish 
to save taxes during a fiscal period and, as an alternative, repurchase stocks from 
shareholders. This means that any future dividend payments will be distributed to fewer 
shareholders. If a firm continues to do this, it will effectively reduce the number of 
shareholders and increase the growth rate of its dividends-per-share. 
All in all, there is mounting evidence in support of the E/P ratio as a predictor of 
future market performance.  Very early research has identified the E/P ratio as a proxy for 
market performance (see Fama and French, 1988a; Campbell and Shiller, 1988a). More 
recently, with new estimation techniques and a wider range of data, evidence in support 
of the E/P as a forecasting variable has strengthened.  Shiller (2000) warns that a high 
P/E (low E/P) signals “irrational exuberance” in the marketplace.  Shen (2000) finds that 
E/P ratios are positively linked to growth in future returns while low E/P ratios signal 
trouble.8  Dudney, Jirasakuldech and Zorn (2004) find that E/P ratios are also very 
valuable because they incorporate other pieces of information that impact investors’ 
                                                 
8
 Pu Shen is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. This paper can be accessed through the bank’s website: 
www.kc.frb.org 
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future outlook of the market.  Other evidence supports the observation that the E/P ratio 
responds positively to changes in inflation (i.e. as inflation increases, so does the E/P 
ratio) (see Modigliani and Cohn, 1979; White, 2000, to name only a few).  Thus, as 
inflation rises, the required rate of return demanded by investors also rises. 
Given the forecasting properties of the E/P ratio and its ability to read the 
market’s “pulse,” it is no surprise that it plays such a large role in the so-called Fed 
model.  The Fed model is the spread between the E/P ratio and the 10-year government 
bond yield.  This model gained prominence when it was mentioned in a monetary policy 
report on July 1997 by the Federal Reserve to Congress detailing the nation’s economic 
outlook (see Greenspan, 1997).  Although it is not officially endorsed by any central 
bank, it serves as a valuation method for markets among practitioners and it accurately 
and reliably forecasts future economic conditions. 
The question is why does the Fed model look at the spread between the E/P ratio 
and the 10-year government bond yield (i.e. E/P minus the 10-year risk-free rate)?  
Theoretically, studies normally decompose the required rate of return into two parts:  The 
risk-free rate and the risk premium.  From a practical perspective, this makes sense.  For 
example, as an investor, you can either put your money in the equity market or you can 
put it in a risk-free asset.  If the yield on a risk-free government asset exceeds the yield of 
a risky portfolio of stocks, then there is no reason to put your money in the portfolio of 
stocks.  Implicitly stated, the Fed model judges the stock market to be “fairly” valued 
when the E/P ratio equals the long-term government bond yield.  The 10-year 
government bond yield is used in the Fed model for two reasons:  Firstly, since the 
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average investor typically invests in stocks over the long-term, the E/P ratio is more 
likely related to the yield on long-term bonds. 
Secondly, since the price of a stock is contingent on dividends that will be 
received in the future (after applying the appropriate discount rate), long-term interest 
rates are naturally more related to this discount rate than short-term yields.  Another 
question may be why are 10-year government bond yields used instead of other long-term 
corporate debt instruments?  One of the advantages of the 10-year government bond yield 
is that it incorporates a wide range of macroeconomic factors. Firm-specific debt 
instruments also incorporate information regarding the prospects of a specific firm and 
may not be relevant information regarding aggregate market conditions [e.g. an 
automobile manufacturer’s bonds may be influenced by a massive recall or a defect in 
their products]. 
To see the Fed model in action, let us consider what happens when there is a 
disparity between the E/P ratio and the 10-year government yield.  The E/P ratio is 
similar to the yield on the 10-year bonds in the sense that it shows average earnings per 
dollar invested in a stock or portfolio of stocks. The bond yield shows what interest 
income you get per dollar invested in bonds. If the bond yield is higher that the E/P ratio, 
it means that stocks are over-valued and a market correction will likely ensue.  Shen 
(2000) finds that decreases in the E/P ratio relative to the long-term risk-free rate result in 
a reduction in future returns. Maio (2007) confirms that the yield spread accurately 
forecasts future returns.  Furthermore, if one were to implement a trading strategy using 
the predictive power of the yield spread, they would be successful and produce a much 
higher Sharpe ratio than if one were to passively hold the market index.  These very same 
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findings corroborate a claim by Lander, Orphanides and Douvogiannis (1997) who 
maintain that formulating a strategy using the yield spread will earn higher returns than if 
one were to just hold the market.9  These findings are echoed in many other empirical 
findings that argue that the Fed model is a reliable predictor of the future outlook of the 
market (see Wong, Chew and Sikorski, 2002; Thomas and Zhang, 2008). 
Apart from its predictive capabilities and use in the Fed model, however, the E/P ratio 
can theoretically be justified as the required rate of return because it can be derived from 
the Gordon (1962) Constant Growth Model: 
Pt = 
gk
dt
−
+ 1
       (2.14) 
where  
Pt = price at time t  
dt+1 = dividends at time t+1 
g = long-term growth rate 
k = the required rate of return 
 
Dividends at time t+1 can be calculated based on a firm’s earnings at time t+1, Et+1, as 
well as it retention rate (RR).  More specifically, 
dt+1 = Et+1*(1-RR)      (2.15) 
Substituting equation (2.15) in the numerator of equation (2.14), we derive the following: 
Pt = 
gk
RREt
−
−+ )1(*1
      (2.16) 
Through algebraic manipulation, we can take Et+1 to the left-hand side: 
                                                 
9
 The contents of this paper were presented at an October 1996 Conference of the International Association of Financial Engineers in 
New York City. Joel Lander, Athanasios Orphanides and Martha Douvogiannis are Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System. 
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1+t
t
E
P
 = 
gk
RR
−
−1
      (2.17) 
We know from theory that growth, g, is the return on equity (ROE) multiplied by the 
retention rate, RR.  When the market is in equilibrium, ROE is equivalent to the required 
rate of return, k.  Although individual firms may temporarily deviate from equilibrium, 
overall, in a steady state economy, ROE equals k: 
1+t
t
E
P
 = 
RRROEk
RR
*
1
−
−
 or, if k = ROE, 
1+t
t
E
P
 = 
RRkk
RR
*
1
−
−
 = )1(*
1
RRk
RR
−
−
     (2.18) 
Through algebraic manipulation, we can effectively show that 
1+t
t
E
P
 = 
k
1
       (2.19) 
Therefore, since the earnings-yield is the reciprocal of the PE multiple, we can now show 
that the earnings-yield is equivalent to the required rate of return: 
t
t
P
E 1+
 = k       (2.20) 
Since the numerator is at time t+1 and the denominator is at time t, this is commonly 
referred to as the “forward” E/P ratio. In the case of this study, since I used monthly data, 
t is on a monthly basis. 
Due to the fact that the constant growth model makes several assumptions, we 
expect Equation (2.20) to hold as an approximation. A more realistic representation 
would be  
t
t
P
E 1+
 = k + υτ.      (2.21) 
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Now, let us consider a version of the Merton (1973, 1980) ICAPM: 
k = r + θστ2       (2.22) 
From combining equation (2.21) and (2.22), we get the following: 
t
t
P
E 1+
 = r + θστ2 + υτ     (2.23) 
On the left-hand side we have the required rate of return and on the right-hand side we 
have the 10-year government bond yield, r, and an error term, υτ.  
 The above equation is consistent with the views of Sharpe (1978), Elton (1999) 
and Lundblad (2007) which argue of the need to stop relying on historical realized returns 
as a proxy of investors’ required rate of return. On the left-hand side we have the 
earnings-yield, which has the power to forecast future returns.  The 10-year government 
bond yield was also mentioned by Merton (1973) as an instrumental variable but, as we 
can see, serves a very important role in the Fed model. 
 The proposed model in equation (2.23) is also comparable to that of the two-
factor approach implemented by Scruggs (1998) in the sense that the 10-year government 
yield serves as an important factor and determinant in investors’ required rate of return 
and investment decision-making. However, the fundamental difference between his study 
and the proposed model in this chapter is the use of the forward earnings-yield as a proxy 
for the required rate of return. Furthermore, the study by Scruggs (1998) employs a two-
factor version of the Merton (1973) ICAPM whereby the long-term government bond 
yield serves as a proxy for the investment opportunity set, as is discussed in greater depth 
in the third chapter.  
 In order to produce conditional variance estimates, this chapter uses an 
asymmetric GJR-GARCH(1,1)-in-mean method where the conditional mean is related to 
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the conditional variance (see Glosten, Jaganathan and Runkle, 1993). More specifically, 
στ
2
 is estimated using the percentage change in price of each market index. Therefore,  
ln [
1+t
t
P
P ] = constant + υτ ,  where the error term follows a GARCH process. The GJR 
method is used since it effectively captures negative and positive innovations and may 
provide better volatility estimates than standard GARCH models (see Brailsford and Faff, 
1996). 
 It is expected that the coefficient of risk aversion in Equation (2.23), θ, will be 
positive and statistically significant.  In other words, as στ2 increases, so should the 
required rate of return.  The 10-year government bond yield should also be positively 
related with the earnings-yield since, as the risk-free yield increases, so should the 
required rate of return in risky assets. Many studies exist which document a positive 
relation between long-term bond yields and the E/P ratio (see Gordon, 1962; Bleiberg, 
1989; Fairfield, 1994; Greenspan, 1997; White, 2000). 
 
2.4. Discussion of Data and Results 
As mentioned previously, this chapter aims to test empirically the existence of a 
conditional risk-return tradeoff. The data used for this purpose are solely collected from 
DataStream, a well-respected source of financial and economic data used by practitioners 
and academicians alike. It is important that the data came from a single source and I 
avoided splicing together data from different sources such as, for example, adjoining data 
from DataStream with data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the National 
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Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), or other research divisions within various 
Central Banks. 
The frequency of the data is monthly and it covers eight industrialized countries, 
namely, those of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States. The reason for selecting this cross-section of countries is to test the 
proposition that the earnings-yield serves as a proxy for the required rate of return and to 
see whether there exists a positive relation between the market earnings-yield and market 
volatility among these industrialized nations. It might be the case that globalization has 
led developed countries’ markets to behave similarly and, as such, the market earnings-
yield may serve to capture investors’ required rate of return in these respective markets. 
Apart from robustness among this cross-section of G-7 countries, it is important to see 
whether in fact the market earnings-yield responds positively to increased market 
volatility in these various markets. The choice of data frequency is dictated by the fact 
that some of the variables used are available only monthly.  
Table 2.1 reports the markets covered and the sample period for each market 
whereby the sample ranges are dictated by data availability for all the given variables 
needed to complete this study. The particular variables used for each market are, the 
national stock market index, the dividend yield, the price to earnings ratio and the yield to 
maturity on the 10-year government bond. The price to earnings ratio is used to calculate 
the earnings yield. 
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Table 2.1: Sample Ranges for Each Market Index 
COUNTRY 
 
EXCHANGE SAMPLE PERIOD NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
Australia 
 
Sydney January 1973 – December 2006 408 
Canada 
 
Toronto January 1973 – December 2006 408 
France 
 
Paris January 1988 – December 2006 228 
Germany 
 
Frankfurt August 1984 – December 2006 269 
Italy 
 
Milan January 1986 – December 2006 252 
Japan 
 
Tokyo June 1985 – December 2006 259 
UK 
 
London December 1966 – December 2006 481 
USA 
 
New York January 1968 – December 2006 468 
Note: This study uses monthly data and explores eight major stock markets; namely, the Australian, Canadian, French, 
German, Italian, Japanese, English and American stock exchanges. 
 
 
The unconditional return series for each market is calculated by taking the natural 
logarithmic difference of the respective market’s price level at time t and t-1 and 
multiplying by 100.  That is, Rt = 100*[ln(Pt) – ln(Pt-1)], where Pt is the price level of the 
stock market index at time t.  Dividends are also factored into each index’s return series 
by adding in the appropriate market’s monthly dividend-yield.  All stock market indices 
are broadly based and value-weighted (i.e. stocks in each index are assigned weights 
proportional to their market capitalizations). 
Table 2.2 presents several preliminary statistics on the earnings-yield, historical 
annualized returns and long-term government bond yields for each market. It appears that 
the UK, Australia, Canada and France (in that sequence) had the highest historical 
average E/P ratios. Japan’s E/P ratio is historically the lowest when compared to that of 
other countries and also exhibits the least variability whereas in the U.K., U.S., Canada 
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and Australia, the E/P has a relatively higher standard deviation. Skewness and kurtosis 
calculations indicate that the E/P is positively skewed and leptokurtic compared to the 
normal distribution. This is not surprising considering that market E/P ratios are a 
weighted average of all its stock constituents and, on average, companies have positive 
earnings.  Therefore, we would expect them to be positively skewed. 
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Table 2.2: Preliminary Statistics 
 Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
Mean         
Earnings yield 7.4821 7.4758 7.3500 6.0010 5.6947 2.3429 7.8249 6.8010 
Historical annual return 14.1262 10.8509 11.8012 11.3327 9.2829 3.1367 13.1536 10.1268 
Long-term interest rate 9.6316 8.4128 6.2393 5.9079 7.6886 3.3138 8.4584 7.5152 
         
Standard Deviation         
Earnings yield 2.6719 2.9238 1.7782 1.4093 1.2754 0.5821 3.3085 2.9451 
Historical annual return 20.7846 16.5233 17.6837 20.3126 22.2814 20.4604 20.0733 15.3017 
Long-term interest rate 3.3013 2.8466 2.0518 1.5443 3.1900 1.9164 3.3023 2.4548 
         
Skewness         
Earnings yield 0.8866 1.0236 0.0093 1.0658 0.3028 0.4536 1.5629 0.7885 
Historical annual return -1.7143 -1.1916 -0.6226 -1.3066 -0.2683 -0.1535 0.9189 -0.5371 
Long-term interest rate 0.1277 0.3845 0.3666 0.2112 0.1444 0.3829 0.3041 0.9635 
         
Kurtosis         
Earnings yield 3.2691 2.9962 2.1452 3.5095 4.0481 2.5306 6.7203 2.7037 
Historical annual return 16.4906 9.2025 3.8134 7.3322 4.4950 3.5494 22.6994 5.3159 
Long-term interest rate 
 
Minimum 
Earnings yield 
Historical annual return 
Long-term interest rate 
 
Maximum 
Earnings yield 
Historical annual return 
Long-term interest rate 
1.6618 
 
 
4.0580 
-46.8811 
4.6500 
 
 
16.8091 
22.7897 
16.4500 
2.9000 
 
 
3.4360 
-32.7745 
3.6600 
 
 
16.2700 
13.3733 
17.3200 
1.7854 
 
 
3.5242 
-17.6523 
3.1633 
 
 
11.3984 
13.1672 
10.4500 
2.2036 
 
 
3.8580 
-33.0690 
3.0883 
 
 
11.0590 
15.1990 
10.8000 
1.3756 
 
 
2.6942 
-27.6521 
3.2943 
 
 
10.5983 
21.1279 
13.8300 
1.7830 
 
 
1.1520 
-17.2490 
0.5310 
 
 
7.0841 
20.4557 
10.3000 
2.0404 
 
 
3.5822 
-34.6271 
3.3200 
 
 
25.9290 
55.9477 
16.0700 
3.6392 
 
 
2.0995 
-21.5996 
3.3300 
 
 
14.5461 
17.1135 
15.3200 
Note: The sample ranges of these statistics are found in Table 2.1. This table reports descriptive statistics on the major 
variables considered here. Namely, it reports the mean, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, minimum and maximum 
for the market earnings-yield, the historical annual returns and long-term government yield for each of the respective 
markets in the sample. 
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Countries with the highest E/P ratios also appear to have the highest historical 
mean stock market returns. Japan, for instance, with the lowest E/P ratio also had the 
lowest historical mean stock market returns. Variability in historical returns seems to be 
highest for the Italian market and lowest for the U.S. market. When measuring skewness 
and kurtosis, all return series appear to be negatively skewed and highly leptokurtic 
relative to the normal distribution. This is expected considering that market returns show 
evidence of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (see Figure 2.1 in section 2.2.3 
for example) and is consistent with previous findings that they are not normally 
distributed (see Mandelbrot, 1963; Fama, 1965). 
Finally, the mean long-term government bond yield has been historically lowest 
for the Japanese market relative to other markets. This is expected considering that the 
Japanese central bank has kept interest rates artificially low to encourage spending and 
investment. This yield is most variable in the U.K., U.S. and Italian markets, in that 
order. For all markets the long-term government bond yield is positively skewed and 
leptokurtic relative to the normal distribution. 
Following Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993), the asymmetric GJR-
GARCH(1,1)-in-mean is used to calculate the conditional mean-variance tradeoff using 
each respective country’s market returns.  This can be expressed as follows: 
     rt = c + θσ2τ + ετ     (2.24a) 
σ2τ = α0 + α1ε
2
τ−1 + α2u
2
τ−1It-1 + βσ2τ−1   (2.24b) 
      where Iτ−1 = 1 if υτ−1 < 0 
            = 0 otherwise 
 
The conditional mean, rt, is specified in equation (2.24a) and is linearly dependant 
on the conditional variance, σ2τ. The coefficient of risk aversion is represented by 
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θ and, consistent with theory, should have a positive sign.  The conditional variance at 
time t is expressed in equation (2.24b) as a function of past squared residuals (i.e. 
innovations), ε2τ−1, and squared lags of the conditional variance, σ2τ−1. Squared 
residuals are used as proxies for shocks to volatility.  The GJR-GARCH model is 
asymmetric since the “indicator” variable, It-1, captures any incremental impact due to 
negative innovations. For example assuming that α1 and α2 are positive, it can be seen 
from equation (2.24b) that a positive residual will increase volatility by α1 whereas a 
negative residual will increase volatility by α1 + α2.      
Studies find that lower order GARCH models, such as the GJR-GARCH(1,1) 
process, are sufficient in terms of modeling conditional heteroskedasticity (see 
Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner, 1992). The model is estimated in EVIEWS7 and the 
maximization technique used is based on the algorithm suggested by Berndt, Hall, Hall 
and Hausman (1974). Furthermore, I assume the error term is drawn from a normal 
density distribution (see Hentschel, 1995) and by maximizing the likelihood function 
over the sample period, which can be expressed as 
 
L (θ) =  – (1/2) ln(2pi) – (1/2) ln(σ2Μ,t) – (1/2)( ε2t-1 / σ2Μ,t) 
 
Conditional risk-return relationships for each country index are reported in Table 
2.3.  Results indicate that market returns for each index are conditionally heteroskedastic.  
Therefore, current volatility is a function of past squared residuals and past values of the 
conditional variance.  Volatility persistence, measured by β, is highest for Australia 
followed by Canada, Great Britain, United States, France, Japan, Italy and Germany, in 
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descending order.  Consistent with theory, we expect the coefficient of risk aversion, θ, to 
have a positive sign.  In other words, as conditional risk rises, we expect to see an 
increase in conditional returns.  Results show that the sign is negative for half of the 
countries and positive for the remaining half. However, for all markets, θ  is not 
statistically different from zero suggesting a non-existent conditional risk-return tradeoff. 
 
Table 2.3: Asymmetric GARCH-M 
 Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
c 
 
1.4033 
(3.646)** 
-0.2428 
(-0.238) 
2.6965 
(1.895) 
1.9939 
(1.705) 
-0.0785 
(-0.084) 
1.2649 
(1.175) 
0.7074 
(1.486) 
0.4961 
(1.012) 
θ -0.0084 
(-0.756) 
0.0591 
(1.319) 
-0.0587 
(-1.032) 
-0.0250 
(-0.721) 
0.0238 
(1.001) 
-0.0279 
(-0.829) 
0.0162 
(1.004) 
0.0192 
(0.7136) 
α0 -0.0460 
(-1.267) 
0.0609 
(0.276) 
6.4356 
(2.522)** 
18.8174 
(2.866)** 
10.5526 
(2.111)** 
12.1244 
(2.397)** 
3.9675 
(3.497)** 
3.9556 
(4.160)** 
α1 0.0205 
(11.064)** 
0.1512 
(4.129)** 
-0.1138 
(-3.026)** 
-0.0128 
(-0.1238) 
0.2862 
(3.241)** 
-0.0972 
(-2.438)** 
0.0103 
(0.253) 
-0.0217 
(-0.6156) 
α2 -0.0313 
(-11.811)** 
-0.1555 
(-4.271)** 
0.2564 
(2.377)** 
0.3000 
(1.876) 
-0.1392 
(-1.026) 
0.3086 
(2.602)** 
0.2278 
(2.924)** 
0.3211 
(4.545)** 
β
 
0.9950 
(1276.519)** 
0.9456 
(67.738)** 
0.7174 
(5.689)** 
0.2996 
(1.277) 
0.5250 
(3.232)** 
0.5927 
(3.527)** 
0.7462 
(13.984)** 
0.6547 
(10.612)** 
Note: This table reports findings for the GJR-GARCH(1,1)-in-mean estimation for the returns of each of the stock 
indices. Namely, it estimates the following equation: rt = c + θσ2τ + ετ and σ2τ = α0 + α1ε2τ−1 + α2u2τ−1 + βσ2τ−1.  (**) 
and (*) denote significance at the 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. The conditional mean, rt, is linearly 
dependant on the conditional variance, σ2τ. The coefficient of risk aversion is represented by θ and, consistent with 
theory, should have a positive sign. 
 
 
These findings are consistent with Campbell and Hentschel (1992) and the 
findings of many other authors discussed in the Literature Review section of this chapter 
(section 2.2.4).  These findings are also consistent with the notion of volatility feedback 
which states that if volatility is priced, increases in volatility raise the required rate of 
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return on stocks leading to an immediate drop in stock price.  This chapter argues that the 
earnings-yield should serve as a proxy for the required rate of return and should be 
regressed against conditional volatility (see section 2.3 for arguments and a formal 
proof). 
Before proceeding to investigating the presence of a conditional risk-return 
tradeoff I test for stationarity in the earnings yield, the long term rate and the volatility 
series obtained earlier using the GJR-GARCH model. The tests used are the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) (see Dickey and Fuller, 1981; Phillips and 
Perron, 1986). The ADF technique estimates the regression:  
∆yt = a + φyt-1 + ∑
=
k
t
sb
1
∆yt-s + υτ    (2.25a) 
and then proceeding to test the null hypothesis, H0: φ = 0 against the alternative 
hypothesis, H1: φ < 1.  The PP technique is another test for stationarity and involves 
estimating the following regression: 
∆yt = a + m*(t - T/2) + φyt-1 + υτ   (2.25b) 
and testing the null hypothesis, H0: φ = 0 against the alternative hypothesis, H1: φ < 
1, where T is the number of observations.  Standard errors from the PP regression 
equation are computed using the Newey-West method in order to correct for serial 
correlation in the data (see Newey and West, 1987).  
In both the ADF and PP methods, failing to reject H0 indicates that a unit root is 
present in the series and that first-differencing is necessary to induce stationarity.  Results 
in table 2.4 suggest that the earnings-yield and long-term interest rate contain a unit root 
for all market indices and are therefore non-stationary.   
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If a non-stationary series, yt, needs to be differenced d times before it is 
stationary, then it is said to be integrated of order d: 
Yt ~ I(d) 
 
Applying the first-difference, ∆, to yt d times before it becomes stationary (i.e. 
converting an I(d) series to an I(0) series with no unit roots) can be expressed as: 
 
∆
dyt ~ I(0) 
 
Table 2.4: Unit Root Tests 
 Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
Augmented 
D-F 
test statistic 
 
Phillips-
Perron  
test statistic 
        
Earnings 
Yield 
(-2.3727) 
(-2.4508) 
(-3.3247) 
 (-2.6349) 
(-2.4236) 
(-2.3493) 
(-2.8628) 
(-2.7465) 
(-3.1401) 
(-3.3592) 
(-3.1325) 
(-3.2661) 
(-3.1210) 
(-2.9255) 
(-2.6496) 
(-2.5235) 
Long-term 
interest rate 
(-2.1535) 
(-2.2191) 
(-2.9895) 
(-2.8507) 
(-3.1161) 
(-2.8110) 
(-2.8774) 
(-2.1036) 
(-2.8251) 
(-2.5225) 
(-1.9431) 
(-2.2114) 
(-2.4205) 
(-2.3813) 
(-2.3684) 
(-2.1649) 
Volatility (-4.6041)** 
(-4.3590)** 
(-6.2375)** 
(-6.2205)** 
(-5.9611)** 
(-5.8738)** 
(-12.7497)** 
(-12.7422)** 
(-7.3008)** 
(-7.0655)** 
(-6.4900)** 
(-8.4618)** 
(-7.3406)** 
(-7.2464)** 
(-8.9218)** 
(-8.9089)** 
Note: Data ranges for each country index are specified in Table 2.1.  The first and second number in each cell represents the 
test statistic from the augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests, respectively.  The asymptotic critical value 
for the augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests at the 5% significance level is -3.42.  (**) denotes significance at the 
5% level and (*) denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
Since the earnings-yield and the long-term government bond yield contain one 
unit root they only need to be first-differenced to induce stationarity.  This is true for all 
countries.  As table 2.4 indicates, conditional volatility is I(0) for all markets.  As is 
expected, in all instances, the ADF and PP methods yield qualitatively similar results. 
 As discussed, the volatility feedback effect produces a negative or statistically 
negligible relationship between conditional risk and returns.  As such, the earnings-yield, 
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as explained in section 2.3, will serve as a proxy for the required rate of return.  As 
volatility rises we expect to see a rise in E/P, the required rate of return. 
 In table 2.5, E/P is regressed against conditional risk, σ2τ, and the long-term 
government bond yield, LT_IR, as is described in Eq. (2.23) and takes the following 
form: 
t
t
P
E 1+
 = β0  +  β1στ2  +  β2 LT_IR + υτ     (2.26) 
 
The long-term government bond yield serves as the long-term risk-free rate.  Now, if we 
were to rearrange the above equation and move the long-term government bond yield to 
the left-hand-side and treat it as a regressand, we would get the following: 
t
t
P
E 1+
 - LT_IR = β0  +  β1στ2  +  υτ    
 
Now, the left-hand-side of the above equation looks very much like the so-called 
“Fed Model” with one substantial difference. In the equation above, the difference 
between the long-term rate and the earnings yield is a function of risk. As such, this can 
be thought of as a “Risk-Adjusted Fed Model”. 
Much literature finds evidence in support of the Fed Model (see Lander, 
Orphanides and Douvogiannis, 1997; Thomas and Zhang, 2008; and references therein).  
Namely, they find that this model is a good predictor of future returns and future market 
conditions, and that there exists a long-run relationship between E/P and the long-term 
government bond yield. None of these studies however account for risk. Given that the 
earnings yield and the long term government yield have unit roots the regression above 
can be interpreted as a long-run equilibrium relationship, assuming that the error term is 
stationary. 
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Table 2.5 provides a summary of results when E/P, the required rate of return, is 
regressed against στ2 and the LT_IR. The results indicated that there exists a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the required rate of return, E/P, and 
conditional risk, στ2 with the exception of the Italian and the German markets. In fact, 
this relationship is significant at the 1% level.  Therefore, as volatility tends to rise, we 
can expect a rise in E/P.  This is now consistent with theory and the notion of volatility 
feedback, whereby increases in volatility lead to an increase in the required rate of return.  
In the German market the relation between E/P and στ2 is positive but statistically 
significant at the 10% level. For the Italian market findings are counterintuitive; E/P and 
στ
2
 are inversely related and this relation is statistically significant at the 1% level.  This 
implies a negative tradeoff between conditional risk and the required rate of return. 
 
Table 2.5: Cointegrating Regressions 
 Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
β0 2.5732 
(8.677)** 
0.9453 
(1.698) 
2.4680 
(5.961)** 
8.0938 
(24.502)** 
5.3656 
(24.897)** 
2.0060 
(18.231)** 
1.3017 
(4.393)** 
-0.5422 
(-1.782) 
β1 0.0727 
(7.356)** 
0.0701 
(3.310)** 
0.0477 
(4.349)** 
0.0046 
(1.742) 
-0.0164 
(-5.056)** 
0.0149 
(5.518)** 
0.0401 
(12.807)** 
0.0221 
(3.919)** 
β2 0.2850 
(6.017)** 
0.5845 
(14.159)**  
0.5776 
(13.654)** 
-0.3825 
(-7.525)** 
0.1311 
(5.478)** 
-0.0519 
(-2.902)** 
0.6099 
(19.729)** 
0.9163 
(25.858)** 
E-G test 
 
-4.188** -3.581** -2.2925 -2.609 -3.813** -2.625 -5.017** -3.233* 
Note: This table reports results of the following regression: E/P = β0 + β1σ2τ + β2(LT_IR) + ut using data ranges from Table 2.1.The 
Engle-Granger (E-G) test is reported in the last row of the table. Critical values for the E-G test can be found in MacKinnon (1991) 
and are -4.00, -3.37, and -3.02 for the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. This regression represents the long-run 
relation between risk and investors’ required rate of return, proxied for using the market earnings-yield. The coefficient β1 and 
represents investors’ degree of risk aversion. 
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The coefficient β2 is statistically significant for all market indices at the 1% level, 
suggesting that the LT_IR is related to E/P.  For the Australian, Canadian, French, Italian, 
British, and American markets, this relationship is positive. On the other hand, in the 
German and Japanese markets this relationship is negative. This would provide 
preliminary support for the “Risk-Adjusted Fed Model” provided as I mentioned earlier 
that the error term is stationary. To answer this question I utilize the Engle-Granger 
methodology (see Engle and Granger, 1987).   
The Engle-Granger methodology entails two steps.  Firstly, a regression with the 
I(1) variables needs to be estimated.  This has already been performed in the first three 
rows in table 2.5.  E/P, the required rate of return is on the left-hand-side, and στ2 and 
LT_IR are on the right-hand-side of the equation, as is indicated in Eq. (2.26): 
t
t
P
E 1+
 = β0  +  β1στ2  +  β2 LT_IR + υτ    
The second step is to apply a stationarity test to the residuals, υτ, to determine whether 
or not they are stationary. The appropriate critical values for the Engle-Granger test are 
given in MacKinnon (1991). To complete this step, the ADF test is applied to the residual 
series for each market. 
 Testing for cointegration (i.e. a long-run equilibrium relationship) between E/P 
and LT_IR is the equivalent of measuring whether there exists a linear combination of 
these I(1) series that is stationary. This approach is unique in providing new insights into 
the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. Consistent with the Engle-Granger procedure, the 
two I(1) series are cointegrated only if υτ is a stationary process.  Results in the last row 
of table 2.5 report these statistics and find that in four of the eight market indices, namely 
Australia, Canada, Italy and the U.K., cointegration is present.  More specifically, signs 
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of this cointegration are statistically significant at the 1% level for Australia and the U.K. 
and at 5% for Canada and Italy.  For the U.S. market, this statistic is significant at the 
10% level. For the remaining country indices (i.e. France, Germany and Japan), 
cointegration is not statistically present. 
 Although E/P and the long-term government bond yield are ‘tied together’ in the 
long-run, in the short-run, they may drift apart from one another. It is possible to model 
this and ‘correct’ for this disequilibrium using an error correction representation.10  This 
so-called disequilibrium term, EC, is the residual series from the long-run equilibrium 
regression in Eq. (2.26). It is thus called a disequilibrium term, or an “error correction” 
term, because it captures deviations from the long-run equilibrium.   
The so-called Granger representation theorem argues that a vector autoregressive 
model with cointegrated I(1) variables is misspecified if the data are differenced (see 
Engle and Granger, 1987, p. 259). However, the model becomes well-specified once 
adding in lagged disequilibrium terms as explanatory variables which serve to ‘correct’ 
any deviations from long-run equilibria. Such a model is referred to as an error 
correction model and is expressed in table 2.6 (Panels A through D). 
The error correction model is a dynamic representation of the short-run relation of 
first-differences of the I(1) cointegrating variables E/P and the LT_IR.  Taking first-
differences of these variables induces stationarity (i.e. they are now I(0)) and are 
expressed as ∆ 





P
E
t and ∆(LT_IR)t, respectively.  In addition to including the 
lagged error correction term, EC, it is also of interest to see whether a lead-lag 
                                                 
10
 Since the seminal work by Engle and Granger (1987), cointegration and error correction representations have become a powerful 
tool in time-series econometrics.  Most modern econometrics texts cover the foundations necessary to apply these concepts (see 
Hamilton, 1994; Enders, 1995; Cuthbertson and Nitzsche, 2004, to name only a few authoritative sources). 
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relationship is evident between first-differences of the E/P and the LT_IR.  The seminal 
study by Granger (1988) posits this very question and argues that if a pair of I(1) 
variables are cointegrated, then there must be ‘causation’ in some direction. For example, 
consider a time-series of jointly stationary variables {xt} and {yt} that are cointegrated. It 
is possible that lags of one variable may better help explain variations in another. More 
specifically, variable x is said to Granger cause y if, when included as a lagged 
explanatory variable, it better helps predict movements in y. 
Table 2.6: Short-Run Regressions 
PANEL A: Data from Table 2.1 
 Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
β0 
 
0.0590 
(1.002) 
-0.3057 
(-2.642)** 
-0.3706 
(-3.507)** 
-0.2644 
(-7.953)** 
-0.0367 
(-0.616) 
-0.2703 
(-9.417)** 
-0.1335 
(-2.682)** 
-0.2039 
(-6.049)** 
β1 
 
-0.0023 
(-1.289) 
0.0135 
(2.757)** 
0.0137 
(3.628)** 
0.0075 
(10.373)** 
0.0013 
(1.047) 
0.0079 
(10.057)** 
0.0039 
(3.637)** 
0.0099 
(7.567)** 
β2 
 
0.3109 
(4.180)** 
0.3186 
(4.860)** 
0.3773 
(3.068)** 
0.2474 
(2.492)** 
0.2377 
(2.733)** 
0.0046 
(0.124) 
-0.0302 
(-0.399) 
0.2795 
(4.402)** 
β3 
 
-0.0474 
(-3.087)** 
-0.0224 
(-1.932) 
-0.0425 
(-1.810) 
-0.0385 
(-2.325)** 
-0.0761 
(-3.100)** 
-0.0453 
(-2.454)** 
-0.0345 
(-2.300)** 
-0.0232 
(-2.149)** 
Note: This Panel reports results from the following regression: ∆ 





P
E
t = β0 + β1σ2τ + β2 ∆(LT_IR)t-1 + β3(ΕC)t-1 + ut. It seeks 
to decipher the nature of the time-series risk-return relation using the earnings-yield as a measure for investors’ required rate of 
return in the stock market. (**) and (*) denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. The data ranges can be 
found in Table 2.1 
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Table 2.6 {Continued} 
PANEL B: Data from Table 2.1 
 Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
β0 
 
-0.0620 
(-1.501) 
0.1127 
(1.288) 
0.0576 
(0.982) 
0.0147 
(0.703) 
0.0783 
(1.785) 
0.0775 
(1.537) 
-0.0579 
(-1.981)** 
0.0305 
(1.220) 
β1 
 
0.0017 
(1.368) 
-0.0052 
(-1.418) 
-0.0030 
(-1.443) 
-0.0008 
(-1.767) 
-0.0028 
(-3.000)** 
-0.0028 
(-2.006)** 
0.0017 
(2.726)** 
-0.0016 
(-1.623) 
β2 
 
-0.0176 
(-0.491) 
-0.1150 
(-3.161)** 
0.0123 
(0.346) 
-0.0155 
(-0.473) 
-0.0311 
(-0.680) 
0.0764 
(0.824) 
-0.1151 
(-4.288)** 
-0.0742 
(-2.289)** 
β3 
 
-0.0016 
(-0.144) 
0.0194 
(2.220)** 
-0.0025 
(-0.198) 
-0.0048 
(-0.461) 
-0.0135 
(-0.740) 
-0.0208 
(-0.663) 
0.0406 
(4.437)** 
0.0198 
(2.530)** 
Note: This panel reports results from the following regression: ∆(LT_IR)t = β0 + β1σ2τ + β2 ∆ 





P
E
t -1 + β3(ΕC)t-1 + ut. It seeks 
to determine whether there is any so-called ‘Granger causality’ from shifts in E/P to shifts in the long-term government bond 
yield. (**) and (*) denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. The data ranges can be found in Table 2.1 
Table 2.6 {Continued} 
PANEL C: January 1988 – December 2006 
 Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
β0 
 
0.0465 
(0.984) 
-0.2553 
(-2.315)** 
-0.3706 
(-3.507)** 
-0.4126 
(-9.014)** 
0.1116 
(1.489) 
-0.2777 
(-8.481)** 
-0.0414 
(-1.129) 
-0.1278 
(-3.265)** 
β1 
 
-0.0027 
(-1.200) 
0.0113 
(2.342)** 
0.0137 
(3.628)** 
0.0119 
(10.370)** 
-0.0029 
(-1.619) 
0.0082 
(9.174)** 
0.0011 
(1.095) 
0.0065 
(3.743)** 
β2 
 
0.2175 
(3.383)** 
0.1247 
(1.845) 
0.3773 
(3.068)** 
0.1986 
(1.874) 
0.2984 
(3.346)** 
0.0009 
(0.016) 
0.1312 
(1.636) 
0.1266 
(1.423) 
β3 
 
-0.1151 
(-3.563)** 
-0.0376 
(-2.125)** 
-0.0425 
(-1.810) 
-0.0369 
(-2.207)** 
-0.0786 
(-3.141)** 
-0.0429 
(-2.026)** 
-0.0236 
(-1.537) 
-0.0332 
(-1.668) 
Note: This Panel reports results from the following regression: ∆ 





P
E
t = β0 + β1σ2τ + β2 ∆(LT_IR)t-1 + β3(ΕC)t-1 + ut. It seeks 
to decipher the nature of the time-series risk-return relation using the earnings-yield as a measure for investors’ required rate of 
return in the stock market. (**) and (*) denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. The data ranges from 
January 1988 through December 2006 for all stock markets. 
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Table 2.6 {Continued} 
PANEL D: January 1988 – December 2006 
 Australia Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
β0 
 
-0.0099 
(-0.1943) 
-0.0318 
(-0.288) 
0.0576 
(0.982) 
0.0467 
(1.598) 
-0.0570 
(-1.014) 
0.0614 
(1.454) 
-0.0231 
(-0.756) 
0.0207 
(0.696) 
β1 
 
-0.0011 
(-0.472) 
0.0002 
(0.0414) 
-0.0030 
(-1.443) 
-0.0016 
(-2.191)** 
0.0008 
(0.552) 
-0.0021 
(-1.828) 
0.0000 
(-0.036) 
-0.0020 
(-1.507) 
β2 
 
-0.0720 
(-1.079) 
-0.1015 
(-1.552) 
0.0123 
(0.346) 
-0.0132 
(-0.376) 
-0.0634 
(-1.318) 
0.0230 
(0.311) 
-0.1216 
(-2.208)** 
0.0309 
(0.620) 
β3 
 
0.0562 
(1.677) 
-0.0024 
(-0.140) 
-0.0025 
(-0.198) 
-0.0020 
(-0.191) 
-0.0213 
(-1.132) 
-0.0077 
(-0.291) 
0.0131 
(1.026) 
0.0090 
(0.589) 
Note: This panel reports results from the following regression: ∆(LT_IR)t = β0 + β1σ2τ + β2 ∆ 





P
E
t -1 + β3(ΕC)t-1 + ut. It seeks 
to determine whether there is any so-called ‘Granger causality’ from shifts in E/P to shifts in the long-term government bond 
yield. (**) and (*) denote significance at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. The data ranges from January 1988 through 
December 2006 for all stock markets. 
 
 
The error correction representation described in table 2.6 therefore ‘corrects’ for 
disequilibrium in the short-run and examines whether Granger causality is present.  The 
following two regression equations are therefore considered for each stock market index: 
 
∆ 





P
E
t = β0 + β1σ2τ + β2 ∆(LT_IR)t-1 + β3(ΕC)t-1 + ut            (2.27A) 
 
∆(LT_IR)t = β0 + β1σ2τ + β2 ∆ 





P
E
t -1 + β3(ΕC)t-1 + ut            (2.27B) 
 
Both regressions contain the lagged disequilibrium term, ECt-1, and estimate the degree of 
Granger causality between first-differences of the E/P and the LT_IR.  The first 
regression Eq. (2.27A) estimates the short-run relation between risk, σ2τ, and the required 
rate of return, ∆ 





P
E
t. The lagged error correction term, ΕCt-1, serves to ‘correct’ any 
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deviations from the long-run equilibrium expressed in Eq. (2.26). Depending on whether 
or not the coefficient for ∆(LT_IR)t-1 is significant will allow us to detect the presence 
of Granger causality.  The second regression, Eq.(2.27B), is comparable to the first one 
except that ∆(LT_IR)t-1 is on the left-hand-side and ∆ 





P
E
t -1 serves as an explanatory 
variable.  Its purpose is to find whether Granger causality also works in the other 
direction. 
For both equations, the size of the coefficient for the error correction term tells us 
how quickly the adjustment to long-run equilibrium occurs following a market shock.  
For instance, if this coefficient is significantly large in either direction, reversion to long-
run equilibrium will be relatively quick.  A priori, we should expect to see two things.  
Firstly, the error correction term is expected to be significant since cointegration tests in 
table 2.5 lend support for the Fed model that E/P and the long-term government bond 
yield are tied together in the long-run.  If in the short-run they diverge from equilibrium, 
then the error correction term is expected to play a significant role.  Secondly, we should 
continue to see a positive short-run tradeoff between risk and the required rate of return.  
 Table 2.6 consists of four panels.  The first two (A and B) describe the error 
correction representation for each country using the full sample sizes as summarized in 
table 2.1. The second two panels (C and D) use the sample range January 1988 through 
December 2006, for a total of 228 monthly observations, for all country indices.  The 
purpose for this is to compare results across different countries during the same time 
period so that the economic environment is the same across all markets. It turns out that 
the largest common sample is January 1988 through December 2006. Furthermore, it is 
of interest to see whether the relation between conditional risk and the required rate of 
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return, E/P, is robust to different sample periods.  Existing literature finds that the relation 
between risk and return is not particularly robust across different sample ranges [see 
Section 2.2.4 of this chapter for examples]. 
 In panel A we see that the short-run relation between conditional risk, σ2τ, and 
the required rate of return, ∆ 





P
E
t, is positive and significant at the 1% level for Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and U.S.  For Italy, as in the long-run regression in 
table 2.5, the sign is negative but no longer statistically significant.  For Australia the sign 
is positive and significant in the long-run regression however, for the short-run, it is not 
statistically different from zero.  The coefficient β2 is positive and significant for all 
countries except Japan and Britain, suggesting a positive causality from the lagged 
difference of the long-term government yield to the differenced E/P.  Thus, if the long-
term government yield jumps up today, we can anticipate increases in E/P tomorrow.  It 
can also be said that in this case the changes in the long-term government bond yield 
Granger-cause changes in the earnings yield. 
The coefficient β3 estimates what role the lagged error-correction term, ECt-1, 
plays in ‘adjusting’ for short-run disequilibria.  Results indicate that in all market indices, 
except Canada and France, this coefficient is significant.  This provides support that a 
long-run equilibrium relation exists between E/P and the LT_IR, as the Fed model 
purports. 
 Panel B checks if there is any causality from ∆ 





P
E
t-1 to ∆(LT_IR)t and is 
therefore the reason why they are positioned on the right- and left-hand-side of Eq. 
(2.27B), respectively.  Test statistics for the coefficient β1 signify that conditional 
 140
volatility is significant and negative for Italy and Japan, and is significantly positive for 
the U.K. market.  Granger causality from the differenced lagged E/P to the differenced 
long-term government yield is only statistically present in the Canadian, U.K. and U.S. 
markets.  For all these cases the test statistic is negative implying that if E/P increases 
today we can anticipate a fall in the LT_IR tomorrow, and vice versa.  The coefficient for 
the lagged error correction term, β3, is significant for the U.S., U.K. and Canadian 
markets. 
 At this point, it is worthwhile mentioning that although the error correction term 
is not significant for every single country index, it still provides some support that the 
Fed model holds in the long-run and there is an equilibrium relation between E/P and the 
long-term government bond yield.  Research in this field is relatively nascent when 
compared to studies examining the conditional risk-return tradeoff and findings are 
mixed.  Some findings argue there is indeed a long-run equilibrium relation [see section 
2.3].  Others, such as Estrada (2006), find that too few country indices seem to provide 
support for this model.  
Panels C and D repeat the error correction representation, as in panels A and B, 
but sample ranges for all market indices is from January 1988 through December 2006.  
The purpose of truncating the sample and re-estimating short-run relations is to see 
whether the relation between σ2τ and ∆ 





P
E
t changes significantly.  The lagged error 
correction term, ECt-1, is significant for half the countries in panel C but for none in panel 
D.  It can be seen from the coefficient β2 that ∆(LT_IR)t-1 Granger causes movements 
in the differenced E/P for three out of the eight countries.  In panel D we only see 
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Granger causality from ∆ 





P
E
t-1 to ∆(LT_IR)t in only one country index.  More 
importantly, these results show that, even with the truncated sample, we still observe a 
positive and significant link between risk and E/P in five of the eight market indices.  In 
Italy and Australia (as in panel A) this relation is not statistically different from zero.  
The only difference is in the U.K., where in panel A it was positive and significant and 
now it turns out to be insignificant. 
All in all, the above results make two important findings.  Firstly, cointegration 
tests do provide some support for the Fed model.  Secondly, they provide evidence in 
favor of a positive tradeoff between risk and the required rate of return, E/P.  This 
relationship is positive in the long-run (as expressed in table 2.5) and in the short-run 
when E/P is differenced into an I(0) series (as shown in panel A in table 2.6).  
Furthermore, this positive tradeoff is robust across a different sampling period (as shown 
in panel C in table 2.6). 
It is important to perform the Engle-Granger cointegration analysis in order to see 
what the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff looks like in the short- and long-run. This 
cointegration framework allows for a tractable approach to measuring how the market 
earnings-yield (i.e., the required rate of return) responds to shifts in market volatility. The 
short-run regressions are advantageous because they are corrected via the disequilibria 
term which serves to measure the ‘speed’ by which adjustment back to long-run 
equilibrium takes place. This approach and the findings herein contribute useful insights 
into the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff, which is the underlying theme of this thesis. 
The approach used here for estimating this important tradeoff is also unique and is useful 
in future research which may focus on specific industries or other sectors of the market.  
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2.5. Concluding Remarks 
The volume of literature examining the conditional mean-variance tradeoff is enormous.  
It appears as though different econometric methodologies or the use of different data 
samples results in contradictory delineations of the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff.  
The Merton (1973) ICAPM posits a positive and significant time-series relationship 
between conditional risk and conditional returns. Nonetheless, many studies find the 
relationship to be negative or simply non-existent. This contradicts our notions that we 
are rational risk-averse investors. 
Of the three well-established hypotheses attempting to rationalize these findings, 
the volatility feedback argument appears to be the most prominent and the most widely 
cited hypothesis.  There exist many arguments against the other two hypotheses (i.e. the 
leverage effect and trading-based hypothesis) and, therefore, examination of these two is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  Instead, it is found that extant studies finding a negative 
or insignificant relation cite volatility feedback as the culprit, but take no additional 
measures to correct for this.  Namely, the volatility feedback hypothesis maintains that 
declines in price result from increases in volatility since the required rate of return 
demanded by investors increases. Volatility is persistent and, therefore, volatility today 
will have an impact on volatility tomorrow.  GARCH-type models serve well in the 
formation of conditional mean and conditional variance forecasts.  Yet, it is theoretically 
unjustified to use a conditional mean series as a proxy for the required rate of return.  
Historical returns, in the presence of increased volatility, will show up as negative 
average returns.  This is misleading and will illustrate a negative or insignificant tradeoff.  
It is important to understand that these returns are backward-looking and, if volatility is 
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persistent, we need a forward-looking proxy for returns. Few studies have taken Merton’s 
(1973) cue and actually included instrumental variables that take into account changes in 
the investment opportunity set. This shortcoming was the motivation for the third chapter.   
 In spirit with Sharpe (1978) and Elton (1999) who warn of the pitfalls associated 
with using ex post realized returns to test asset pricing theories and to estimate expected 
returns, this chapter uses the E/P ratio as a proxy for the required rate of return.  Its 
foundation is rooted in the Gordon (1962) DDM.  In particular, it uses E/P as a measure 
of investors’ forward-looking required rate of return in the stock market. The E/P ratio 
has been explored in a variety of other contexts, as is described in the Literature Review 
section of this chapter, yet has not been considered when evaluating the conditional risk-
return tradeoff. As section 2.3 demonstrates, the E/P ratio can theoretically be derived as 
a proxy for investors’ required rate of return. 
What is unique about this chapter is that it incorporates two strands of literature. 
The first strand is literature on the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff and the second 
strand is on the so-called Fed Model which uses the spread between the E/P ratio and the 
long-term government bond yield to predict future movements in the economy. The Fed 
model has raised the eyebrows of central bankers who use this model to assess market 
conditions and has also been used by practitioners. Finally, academic research is now 
considering the Fed Model and whether there is any merit to this market valuation tool. 
 The findings in this chapter are very interesting and provide a strong contribution 
to existing studies and to our understanding of the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. 
Firstly, there is much criticism for using ex post realized returns as a proxy for investors’ 
expected rate of return. This is because investors’ discount factor (i.e. their required rate 
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of return) changes along with changes in market conditions and volatility. If there is an 
increase in volatility today (at time t), it signals that volatility will be higher tomorrow (at 
time t+1), this principle is consistent with the volatility feedback hypothesis which states 
that increases in volatility lead to more volatility in the future (see Campbell and 
Hentschel, 1992). When this happens, investors discount expected cash flows at a higher 
discount factor and this leads to a reduction in stock prices. These falling historical prices 
lead to declining returns leading one to believe that expected returns are falling. 
However, the opposite is true, it is because the required rate of return is rising and that is 
the reason for the falling prices. So far, extant studies have not addressed this issue from 
the perspective advocated here in the second chapter of this thesis. 
 Given therefore that investors are forward-looking, this chapter makes the point 
that researchers must consider alternative proxies to measuring their required rate of 
return instead of continuously relying on ex post historical rates of return. Koutmos 
(2010) makes this argument and highlights reasons why there is a deficiency in existing 
techniques and why future work in this area is called for. 
  When the E/P ratio is used as a proxy for the required rate of return, seven of the 
eight markets under scrutiny provide support for a positive and significant intertemporal 
risk-return tradeoff. Cointegration tests also indicate the presence of a relationship 
between the 10-year government bond yield and the E/P ratio, further providing support 
for the Fed model. By integrating two seemingly disparate strands of literature, as well as 
drawing on theory from corporate finance and valuation of firms, this chapter shows a 
positive intertemporal risk-return link and provides additional insights as to the 
forecasting power and use of the market earnings-yield. 
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- Chapter Three - 
Modeling the Conditional Risk Premium Using a Dynamic Two-Factor 
Model: Evidence from the G-7 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Dynamic models have produced conflicting results on the nature of the conditional risk 
premium. Some studies find positive and significant results, others negative and 
significant results and yet others insignificant results. Recent research has focused on the 
types of models used and the possible misspecification bias (see Guo and Whitelaw, 
2006; Scruggs, 1998; Scruggs and Glabadanidis, 2003). This issue is very important in 
empirical finance given that investors’ risk aversion and expectations varies through time 
as investment opportunities and market conditions fluctuate. Whereas the second chapter 
investigated the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff in a model which uses the market 
earnings-yield as a proxy for investors’ required rate of return, this third chapter explores 
a two-factor variant of the Merton (1973) ICAPM which accounts for intertemporal risk. 
These issues are important in their own right and distinctive in terms of the approach 
taken to address them. In other words, the approach taken in the second chapter of 
addressing the potential pitfalls of using historical returns as a proxy for the required rate 
of return required re-visiting some of the theory behind the Gordon (1962) dividend 
constant growth model in order to derive the earnings-yield as a proxy for the required 
rate of return in the stock market. This third chapter now addresses the importance of 
integrating intertemporal risk in the two-factor version of the Merton (1973) ICAPM. The 
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theme here is again the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff but it is now being examined 
from a different perspective. 
Scruggs (1998) argues that the conflicting results are due to model 
misspecification. Citing Merton (1973), Scruggs (1998) shows that the investment 
opportunity set is stochastic. As such, the conditional market return will be a linear 
function of its conditional variance as well as its conditional covariance with investment 
opportunities. The first component is called the risk component and the second 
component is called the hedging component.  Most studies do not account for the second 
component and this may be responsible for the conflicting empirical findings.  Scruggs 
(1998) uses the long-term bond rate as a proxy that describes the state of investment 
opportunities in the economy.  Using data from the US, and a bivariate EGARCH model 
he finds that the conditional risk premium is positive and statistically significant. In a 
related study, Guo and Whitelaw (2006) find that the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
is positive using the dynamic two factor model of Merton (1973). This study also uses 
data from the US and it applies instrumental variables econometric techniques to model 
risk. They conclude that the second factor (hedging component) is very important and its 
omission is partly responsible for the contradictory results.  
In this chapter I rigorously examine the issue of the dynamic risk premium in the 
context of the two-factor model of Merton (1973) and in view of the finding of these 
recent studies. The contributions to the literature will be as follows: Firstly, it is important 
to realize that the debate has been limited to US data. In this chapter I plan to investigate 
the presence of a dynamic risk premium in the stock markets of the Group of 7 (G-7) 
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industrialized nations. It may be that globalization has led markets to behave in a similar 
manner or, it is possible that there are important national idiosyncrasies. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the use of the long-term rate as a proxy 
for the opportunity set by Scruggs (1998) may not be necessarily the best choice for all 
countries. I plan to use in addition the industrial production index as a proxy for the 
opportunity set.  The reason is that the long-term rate is highly correlated with decisions 
from policymakers by Central Banks. For example, the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) will meet at schedule time to decide whether, through the use of open market 
operations, it should provide more liquidity in the market in order to adjust interest rates. 
Industrial production on the other hand has a higher correlation with real economic 
production activity and hence it should be a better proxy. Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) use 
industrial production as one of the factors in their empirical Arbitrage Pricing Model. 
Likewise, the slope of the yield curve has been found to predict with high accuracy 
impending recessions (see Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Campbell, 1995; Estrella and 
Mishkin, 1998; Hamilton and Kim, 2002, to name only a few studies). Therefore, this 
chapter is innovative also in the sense that it brings together financial and aggregate 
economic factors in deciphering the intertemporal risk premium. 
Finally, from a methodological point of view, the bivariate EGARCH of Scruggs 
(1998) assumes that the correlation between the market returns and the second factor 
(long-term rate in this case) is constant over time.  However, as Cappiello, Engle and 
Sheppard (2006) show for several international markets, the correlation between stock 
returns and bond returns is time-varying. In this chapter I will use the BEKK model of 
Engle and Kroner (1995). This model has the advantage that it ensures positive definite 
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variance-covariance matrices and it allows the covariance and the correlation coefficients 
to be time-varying. 
The findings from this chapter are of interest to academics and practitioners alike. 
From the perspective of academic theory, the findings herein lend credible support to a 
positive intertemporal risk-return tradeoff in the context of the Merton (1973) ICAPM. 
These findings hold in international markets and suggest that perhaps conflicting extant 
findings are an artifact of omitting the second factor in the ICAPM which serves as a 
proxy for the investment opportunity set. 
 Another major finding from this empirical chapter is the observation that 
intertemporal risk is important and this can consistently be seen to play a significant role 
across most of the G-7 markets here in the sample. This finding sheds new light on 
existing studies. Namely, up until now, studies have not made it clear whether conflicting 
findings are the result of econometric (miss-)specifications or because of omission of the 
second factor which serves to proxy for the investment opportunity state. Whereas 
Scruggs (1998) argues in favor of the two-factor ICAPM, Scruggs and Glabadanidis 
(2003) report empirical evidence to the contrary. The findings in this empirical chapter, 
however, provide strong evidence in favor of the notion that intertemporal risk is an 
important ingredient in determining investors’ risk premium in the stock market and may 
be a possibly strong reason for extant conflicting findings in the literature.  
Furthermore, another major finding that has not been addressed before is that, 
consistent with the tests conducted in this chapter, is that the empirical evidence here 
supports the Merton (1973) theoretical view of the ICAPM without a constant term. This 
is conducted in this chapter via a likelihood ratio test to see whether restricting the 
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constant to zero is supported. The findings here lend support to the theoretical ICAPM of 
Merton (1973) and to the second assumption in his seminal paper regarding capital 
market structure which is the foundation for intertemporal asset pricing; namely, 
transactions costs do not exist and there are no taxes or other constraints (see Merton, 
1973, p.868). This theoretical proposition has enabled motivation of the ICAPM, 
although Scruggs (1998) mentions perhaps it will be useful to include a constant term to 
account for these very market imperfections. Before this thesis chapter, the literature does 
not give a clear distinction as to whether the Merton (1973) theoretical two-factor model 
holds with or without constant. The findings here support the notion of the theoretical 
ICAPM and the empirical findings show that if we accept the assumptions that Merton 
(1973) establishes, the proposed state factors do a comparatively better job in explaining 
variations in investors’ intertemporal risk premium relative to the model if we account for 
a constant term which attempts to capture such market inefficiencies. 
 From the perspective of practitioners, this chapter of the thesis, apart from 
investigating the intertemporal risk-return relation, sheds light on what kind of factors 
investors ought to consider when assessing economic conditions and when trying to 
explain variations in expected stock market returns. In particular, the empirical findings 
reported here show strongest evidence for suggesting that shifts in the yield curve 
describe states in the economy. This finding provides some basis for using the yield curve 
in order to track market and economic performance and predict future states of the 
economy. These empirical findings thus provide further support to studies which argue of 
the economic information content embodied in the yield curve (see Estrella and 
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Hardouvelis, 1991; Campbell, 1995; Estrella and Mishkin, 1998; Hamilton and Kim, 
2002, to name only a few). 
Finally, this chapter suggests that perhaps the long-term government bond yield 
may not be the only proxy for investment opportunities, given that it does not exhibit 
consistently reliable empirical significance in terms of explaining intertemporal 
variations in investors’ risk premium. This provides support to the argument made in this 
chapter that the long-term bond yield is a financial variable that is, to a large extent, 
controlled by the actions of central banks (see Mishkin, 2005) and may not fully reflect 
investment opportunities. This may be a contributing reason why Scruggs and 
Glabadanidis (2003) do not find a positive risk-return relation when focusing on the U.S. 
market. However, the international evidence here corroborates the view of Guo and 
Whitelaw (2006, p.1435) that this does not “imply a rejection...” of the ICAPM, and 
contributes to literature by empirically showing the behavior of the intertemporal risk 
premium using proposed factors rooted in theory. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a 
review of relevant literature.  It discusses in-depth the importance and implications of 
Merton’s (1973) ICAPM as well as empirical challenges associated with applying this 
model.  The literature which applies a two-factor variant of the ICAPM is not quite as 
expansive as studies discussed in the second chapter which tend to examine the simple 
relation between the conditional first and second moments of returns on the market 
portfolio.  Nonetheless, two-factor literature is very important within the context of the 
intertemporal risk-return tradeoff and it is important to understand what contributions it 
seeks to make over studies that apply a single-factor ICAPM variant.  Namely, as is 
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discussed in greater detail, this two-factor literature argues of the importance of including 
a hedging factor in order to characterize shifts in the investment opportunity set and how 
the distribution of market returns changes through time.  This factor was neglected in 
most studies discussed in the second chapter and may be the reason for their 
counterintuitive findings. 
 Section 3.3 discusses the methodology.  It extends the work of Scruggs (1998) 
and Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) insofar as it uses the long-term government bond 
yield as a hedging factor to seven other industrialized countries.  In addition, this chapter 
also uses industrial production as well as the slope of the yield curve, respectively, as 
potential hedging factors to account for changes in investment opportunities.  These 
additional hedging instruments are also applied internationally to examine the behavior of 
the dynamic risk premium of other countries and to see if globalization has led them to 
behave in a similar manner.  The multivariate BEKK-GARCH specification is applied in 
this section to describe the time-varying covariances between market returns and the 
instruments used to account for changes in the investment opportunity set.  As is 
discussed in greater detail, it may be fallacious to assume that the covariance between the 
market portfolio and a specified hedging component is constant over the sampling period, 
as is assumed by Scruggs (1998).   
Major empirical findings of this chapter are discussed in section 3.4 along with 
the nature of the data used to conduct this study. Finally, concluding remarks are offered 
in section 3.5. 
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3.2. Review of Literature 
The second chapter discussed the possibility of variable misspecification as a reason for 
why studies cannot agree on the nature of the intertemporal risk-return relation.  Namely, 
use of historical returns as unbiased estimates of the future required rate of return will 
yield a negative or insignificant tradeoff, as is consistent with the volatility feedback 
hypothesis.  When E/P is used as a proxy for the required rate of return, there is 
international evidence of a positive intertemporal risk-return tradeoff both in the short- 
and long-run. 
This third chapter introduces a strand of literature arguing that model 
misspecification may be the reason for the mixed results.  Oftentimes, as cited in the 
second chapter, research tends to use some variant from the (G)ARCH-in-mean family of 
models to relate conditional mean returns on a market proxy (which serves as the 
regressand) with its conditional variance (which serves as the regressor) (see Pindyck, 
1984; French, Schwert and Stambaugh, 1987; Baillie and DeGennaro, 1990; Nelson, 
1991; Chan, Karolyi and Stulz, 1992; Glosten, Jaganathan and Runkle, 1993; Harrison 
and Zhang, 1999; Koulakiotis, Papasyriopoulos and Molyneux, 2006, to name only a 
few). 
 I now present literature in this chapter arguing that it may be necessary to include 
a second regressor that captures changes in the investment opportunity set.  This second 
factor (or component) is theoretically motivated and selected from a universe of financial 
and macroeconomic variables.  Usually referred to as a “state” or “instrumental” variable, 
it is also identified in the literature as a “hedging” component due to investors’ desire to 
hedge against adverse changes in investment opportunities. This so-called hedging factor 
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is representative of shifts in the investment environment and is calculated as the 
conditional covariance between market returns and changes in some other factor (e.g. 
such as interest rates or possibly some other macroeconomic variable). 
Inclusion of this hedging component is proposed in the intertemporal capital asset 
pricing model (ICAPM) of Merton (1973).  The ICAPM, unlike the single-period Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965b) and Black (1972), is 
based on the premise that investment opportunities are stochastic and that the risk 
premium is time-varying. It further argues that investors are intertemporal utility 
maximizers and their investment decisions at time t-1 depend on investment opportunities 
at time t (i.e. Current demand and investment decisions depend on possible future 
investment opportunities). An intertemporal utility maximizer therefore considers the 
uncertainties associated with future events and will select a portfolio based on a 
distribution of possible future returns and states of the economy.  They also consider the 
relation between current returns and returns that may be available in the future.  For 
example, suppose that the current return on a hypothetical asset is negatively correlated 
with the future state of the economy.  By choosing to hold the asset, the investor would 
expect to earn a higher return if the economy experiences a recession in the near future. 
 Section 3.2 of this chapter will cover some of the underlying assumptions behind 
the two-factor ICAPM and what its critics have to say. It will explain the importance of 
including a hedging factor to motivate the ICAPM and what significance and economic 
interpretation this factor has. Finally, it will discuss relevant literature that deals with the 
two-factor ICAPM and what some of the major findings are. These findings are 
undoubtedly important since they set the scene for this chapter. 
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3.2.1. Introduction to the Two-Factor ICAPM 
The two-factor ICAPM of Merton (1973) formulizes the notion that investment 
opportunities are time-varying and stochastic. It postulates that the conditional market 
risk premium, Et-1[rM,t], is a linear function of its conditional market variance, σ2M,t, as 
well as its conditional covariance,  σMF,t-1, with a state variable (factor) F that describes 
shifts in investment opportunities as in Equation (3.1): 
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Intertemporal investors therefore demand compensation for carrying systematic (i.e., 
market) risk, σ2M,t, as well as an additional risk component (i.e. a hedging component), 
σMF,t, that reflects uncertain and potentially adverse changes in investment opportunities.  
Investors identify state variables that capture this latter type of risk and form portfolios 
that provide hedging protection against changes in these variables. Et-1[.] denotes an 
expected value that is conditional on information available at time t-1. Therefore the 
market risk premium is conditional on this past information, which is assumed to 
disseminate quickly and unrestrictedly to all investors. 
 Assuming markets are in equilibrium, and after aggregating all investors’ demand 
curves, the ICAPM can now theoretically describe a representative risk-averse agent’s 
utility of wealth function, J(W(t),F(t)).11  W(t) and F(t) denote wealth and a state variable 
that describes shifts in investment opportunities, respectively.  Since this an optimization 
                                                 
11
 Merton (1969) presents a more involved discussion of how investors optimize their utility in a continuous-time economy where 
investment opportunities are stochastic. These very same principles are elaborated in Merton (1971, 1973), where he provides a formal 
mathematical and theoretical justification of his model. 
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problem to the representative investor’s utility of wealth function, the subscripts J denote 
partial derivates. The coefficient [-JWW,tWt/JW,t] represents aggregate relative risk 
aversion, since it describes the degree of risk-aversion that all investors exhibit.  It is 
usually assumed to be an intertemporal constant and, consistent with theory, should have 
a positive sign (i.e. JW,t > 0 and JWW,t < 0).  Some studies also justifiably refer to this as 
the price of “market risk” since it measures the degree to which conditional expected 
returns respond to changes in the conditional market variance, σ2M,t. 
 Being that there are two regressors, Merton’s (1973) ICAPM in Eq. (3.1) suggests 
a positive partial relation between the market risk premium and the conditional market 
variance. The second chapter presented many studies which examine the intertemporal 
risk-return tradeoff in the context that the market risk premium is simply a function of its 
conditional market variance (see Nelson, 1991; Glosten, Jaganathan and Runkle, 1993). 
As mentioned, they mostly implement (G)ARCH-in-mean modeling techniques to 
simultaneously relate a representative market index’s conditional mean with its 
conditional variance. Results are mixed due to the volatility feedback hypothesis that was 
discussed (see Campbell and Hentschel, 1992). However, many of these studies seem to 
omit the hedging component, σMF,t, from any empirical considerations.  This factor, as 
Merton (1973) presented, is an important piece that describes how the distribution of 
returns changes through time (i.e. shifts in investment opportunities), which are assumed 
to be stochastic, and investors’ desires to hedge this risk. Therefore, the conditional 
market premium is a function of both the conditional market variance and its conditional 
covariance with changes in investment opportunities. This contrasts sharply with the 
empirical approach of many studies (presented in the second chapter) that assume there is 
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a simple relation between conditional market risk premium and its conditional variance.  
It may also be the reason why some authors find a negative risk-return tradeoff while 
others find a positive one and still others find no statistical evidence of a relationship. 
 The coefficient in front of the hedging component is denoted as [-JWF,t/JW,t] and 
can rightly be referred to as the price for bearing “intertemporal risk.” In addition to 
bearing market risk, σ2M,t, investors face the risk of possibly adverse changes in the 
investment environment through time. As is discussed in further detail in this chapter, 
there is evidence to suggest that bearing intertemporal risk yields relatively higher 
premiums during recessionary periods. It is therefore an economically meaningful factor 
to consider in an investor’s asset allocation decision-making, given their level of risk 
aversion.  From an asset pricing perspective, it is also important because it provides 
insights into how the nature of the risk-return relation changes between economic 
recessions and expansions. 
Whereas theory dictates that the sign of relative risk aversion is positive, the sign 
of the intertemporal risk coefficient is not readily apparent. Since a representative agent’s 
utility increases relative to their wealth, W(t), it is implied that JW,t is positive.  This is 
consistent with the notion of non-satiation in utility theory economics which states that 
individuals always prefer more wealth to less and are never satisfied (i.e. they can never 
have “too much” and any incremental increases in wealth will lead to a marginal increase 
in utility).  Since therefore JW,t is positive, the sign of intertemporal risk is determined by 
the sign of JWF,t. Alike investors’ aggregate relative risk aversion, the coefficient [-
JWF,t/JW,t], regardless of its sign, is assumed to be an intertemporal constant. 
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If the marginal utility of wealth is independent of intertemporal risk (i.e. JWF,t = 
0), the conditional expected market risk premium is solely a function of the conditional 
market variance. Therefore, there exists a simple relation between the conditional market 
risk premium (which can be denoted as rM,t for short) and the conditional variance: 
 
rM,t = λ0 + λMσ2M,t + εM,t,   (3.2) 
 
The constant, λ0, and the error term, εM,t, are typically included in empirical surveys to 
account for market imperfections such as government interventions in the marketplace, 
transactions costs, and so forth.  The coefficient of aggregate relative risk aversion is re-
expressed as λM, and is equivalent to [-JWW,tWt/JW,t]. As was previously discussed, the 
above relation in Eq. (3.2) is extensively investigated in existing literature (covered in the 
second chapter) by means of GARCH-in-mean modeling and has yielded mixed results 
up to now in the literature.   
If, however, intertemporal risk plays a determining role (i.e. JWF,t ≠ 0) in 
investors’ decision-making, the conditional expected risk premium is then a function of 
its conditional market variance and its conditional covariance with the state variable F: 
rM,t = λ0 + λMσ2M,t + λFσMF,t + εM,t    (3.3) 
If this is the case then models that omit the price for intertemporal risk (denoted as λF 
for short), such as the conditional single-factor model in Equation 3.2, which were 
explored in the second chapter, are possibly misspecified and biased. Like in the 
conditional single-factor model, the constant, λ0, and the error term, εM,t, are included 
to account for market imperfections. As already mentioned, both aggregate relative risk 
aversion, λM, and the price for bearing intertemporal risk, λF, are assumed to be 
intertemporal constants. 
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Before proceeding any further, it is important to understand what is meant when I 
say a conditional single-factor model is potentially “biased.”  If intertemporal risk 
actually matters to investors (i.e. JWF,t ≠ 0), then it may be appropriate to use the 
conditional two-factor model in Equation (3.3).  Let us suppose that this is the “true” 
model that describes the nature of the conditional risk premium demanded by investors 
on aggregate.  If a researcher erroneously chooses to estimate the simple conditional risk-
return relation, Mλˆ , using the single-factor model in Equation (3.2) instead of the “true” 
relation, λM, using the two-factor model in Equation (3.3), then the direction and 
magnitude of the bias is driven by JWF,t and the covariance between market returns and 
the state variable F, as is indicated by Scruggs (1998): 
Mλˆ - λM = λF
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Let us now consider how the behavior of the risk premium is influenced by the 
sign of the price for intertemporal risk, λF, and what implications this has for investors.  
As already mentioned, since utility increases with wealth, JW,t is strictly positive. The 
sign of the price for intertemporal risk is therefore determined by the signs of JWF,t and 
σMF,t, respectively. For example, if JWF,t and σMF,t are of the same sign (i.e. both 
positive or both negative), it therefore means that investors demand a lower risk premium 
on the market portfolio since the market portfolio has a higher payoff during periods 
when the marginal utility of wealth is higher. Conversely, if JWF,t and σMF,t are of the 
opposite sign, then investors will demand a higher risk premium on the market portfolio 
since the market portfolio has a higher payoff when the marginal utility of wealth is 
lower. 
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If however we make the assumption that the investment opportunity set is 
constant and is state-independent (i.e. JWF,t = 0), then the intertemporal utility 
maximization of the investor simplifies to a single-period utility function.  Fama (1970) 
provides some justification for this.  Namely, it can be shown that once we relax the 
assumption of a constantly-changing investment opportunity set and we assume that 
investor preferences are fixed, Merton’s (1973) intertemporal model collapses to the 
classical single-period CAPM. 
Observation of financial markets reveals that investors are forward-looking and 
are dynamically hedging their positions to respond to their stochastically changing 
investment environment (see Campbell and Hentschel, 1992).  An investor’s tastes and 
preferences therefore respond accordingly in order for them to maximize their lifetime 
consumption (i.e. at time t+1, t+2, t+3,…,t+n).  Thus, the use of single-period utility 
maximization models and single-period asset pricing models, such as the CAPM, to study 
investors’ dynamic consumption and decision-making behavior may be inappropriate.12 
 Since the investment opportunity set and investors’ preferences are time-varying, 
it is natural to deduce that this is reflected in the price for bearing intertemporal risk, λF.  
As is discussed in greater detail, there is evidence to suggest that the premium demanded 
for bearing intertemporal risk fluctuates with the state of the economy (see Merton, 
1973).  In particular, during recessionary periods investors demand a relatively higher 
premium for bearing intertemporal risk than during periods of economic expansion.  An 
important theoretical question to ask however is, what actually constitutes a hedging 
                                                 
12
 Fama and Miller (1972) provide a more involved discussion of the restrictive properties that govern single-period asset pricing 
models.  In particular, interested readers are directed to Chapter 8, which discusses the importance of multi-period models in solving 
investors’ utility maximization problem. 
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factor?  What underlying forces dictate which assets an investor will prefer over others to 
include in their hedging portfolio? 
 
3.2.2. The ICAPM and Utility Theory 
Before examining what the literature has to say about the two-factor ICAPM, we need to 
understand the fundamental message that the ICAPM is trying to convey.  Investors are 
intertemporal utility maximizers and are therefore concerned with all possible future 
events that may impinge on their present and future consumption.  Consider the following 
rather simple example:  Suppose that over my lifetime I heavily rely on bread to feed 
myself and my family.  Therefore, the utility over my lifetime is maximized through 
steady purchases and consumption of bread.  However there is always the possibility that 
the price of bread will increase in the future, thereby reducing my future consumption.  If 
there were future markets for bread for every date over the course of my life I could 
hedge against any potential upswings in the price of bread, which would impinge on my 
consumption.  Such markets however do not exist.  Instead, as a next best alternative, I 
can purchase wheat futures which are closely tied to the price of bread.  I could even hold 
stocks of companies that produce the bread.  Thus, should there be an unexpected rise in 
the price of bread (due to shocks in demand or supply), I can be partially protected.  
Another more common example is homeowners who rely on oil to heat their homes.  
Oftentimes, their heating agreements provide them with two options:  Either the cost per 
unit of oil they consume within their contractual period can, to some degree, fluctuate 
with the price of oil on the open market, or, they can choose to “lock-in” the price of oil 
at a certain price.  If they have reason to believe that the price of oil will rise considerably 
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in the near future, thereby impinging on their long-term consumption and wealth, they 
may choose the latter of the two options. 
One can cite countless of such examples in everyday life where risk-averse 
individuals make decisions at time t to protect, or hedge, risks to their future consumption 
and wealth (at time t+1, t+2, t+3,…,t+n).  This is the very essence behind Merton’s 
(1973) model and allows us to describe investors’ utility maximization behavior in a 
realistic multi-period framework instead of the unrealistic single-period framework 
proposed in the static CAPM. 
In order to allow for investors to make decisions in a continuous-time economy to 
maximize their lifetime utility, Merton (1973) extends the classical assumption that 
capital markets operate void of transactions costs, taxes and other hindrances to free 
trade.  Namely, Merton (1973) assumes that investors have the ability to constantly trade 
and revise their portfolios at any given time.  This follows directly from the classical 
assumption that markets are perfectly free, thus enabling investors to constantly and 
unrestrictedly revise their portfolios at any time (should they choose to do so) without 
restrictions.  This empowers investors to quickly respond to changes in their investment 
opportunity set and to maximize their lifetime utility of wealth.  After all, an investor 
making a decision that is irrevocable (i.e. cannot be altered or changed) for many years 
will choose very differently than if they had the option (even at a cost) to revise their 
portfolio whenever they deemed necessary.  The ICAPM is therefore dynamic in the 
strictest sense, whereby investors’ preferences and their desire to hedge against 
unfavorable changes in investment opportunities follows a stochastic process. 
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Merton’s (1973) generalization of continuous trading has sweeping implications 
for the structure of capital markets.  If we assume that information disseminates freely 
and quickly to all market participants, the notion of continuous trading also ensures 
market efficiency.  If all investors are informed and have the ability to quickly respond to 
changes in the marketplace, then no single (or group) of investors can consistently exploit 
inefficiencies to earn riskless rewards.  In other words, there are no mispriced assets and, 
consequently, markets are in equilibrium.  Deviations from this equilibrium are transitory 
and, should they occur, investors respond to quickly induce market equilibrium once 
again.   
Since investors can freely trade at any given point in time a natural question to 
ask is, what dictates their choice of which assets make suitable candidates for their 
hedging portfolios?  An investor with a long holding horizon holding the market portfolio 
is obviously sensitive to future news that may influence their consumption and, 
ultimately, their utility of wealth.  He will be unhappy therefore if there is negative news 
that future returns will be lower.  The risk premium he demands from holding the market 
portfolio may thus be expressed as a function of the sum of two important components:  
The variance of the portfolio’s returns and the portfolio’s covariance with news that are 
correlated with the investment opportunity set.  Ceteris paribus, if an investor has reason 
to believe there will be a downturn in the market, they will naturally prefer a hedging 
portfolio that is negatively related to economic conditions.  
In the context of Merton’s (1973) ICAPM, an “unfavorable” shift in the 
investment opportunity set (i.e. negative news about future market conditions) occurs 
when (future) consumption declines for a given level of (future) wealth with respect to 
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changes in the state factor F.  More specifically, let us consider for a moment the 
implications of Merton’s (1973) formula in Equation (3.3) and the role that each 
component plays on the dynamic risk premium, rM,t.  For sake of argument, suppose an 
investor holds the market portfolio and to hedge their exposure to adverse changes in the 
investment environment holds a portfolio of gold, which denotes our state factor F.  If the 
returns on gold are counter-cyclical (i.e. offer higher returns during economic recessions 
and market downturns) and independent of those on other assets, then we can expect the 
conditional covariance between the market and gold, σMF,t, to have a negative sign since 
they are oppositely related.  During periods of economic expansions, where market 
returns are generally high, intertemporal investors demand more of the market portfolio, 
ceteris paribus.  In periods of economic recession investors demand more gold and other 
assets that are positively related to gold in the hopes of realizing a higher risk premium 
(as a reward for bearing higher intertemporal risk). 
Although the ICAPM provides an intuitively straightforward approach to 
modeling the dynamic risk premium, there appears to be a noticeable disconnect between 
its original inception in 1973 and when it began to receive rigorous empirical attention in 
the 1990s and onwards.  A possible explanation for this is the difficulty in theoretically 
motivating state variables to integrate into the ICAPM.  Cochrane (2001, p.172) argues 
that it is perhaps since, up to now, there was insufficient evidence to suggest that we can 
proxy for future returns on assets and, consequently, future states of the economy:  “The 
ICAPM remained on the theoretical shelf for 20 years mostly because it took that long to 
accumulate evidence that returns are, in fact, predictable.” 
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3.2.3. The Identification of State Factors 
There is a large body of empirical research that theorizes on the cross-sectional variations 
in expected stock returns.  Apart from an asset’s beta, they include additional factors that 
can better explain movements in expected returns.  Prime examples of such research 
include the Fama and French (1993, 1995 and 1996) three-factor model whereby 
expected equilibrium excess returns on an underlying asset are a linear function of its 
beta, the returns on small-firm stocks less the returns on large-firm stocks (denoted as 
SMB) and the returns on high book-to-market stocks less the returns on low book-to-
market stocks (denoted as HML). 
The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), developed by Ross (1976), is yet another 
such example whereby equilibrium expected returns on an asset i, Ri, are defined as a 
linear function of a set of k factor loadings, bij, multiplied by their corresponding factor 
risk premia, F (indexed by j) and whereby the regression error term, εi, represents the 
‘unexplained element’ of Ri: 
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The underlying premise behind the APT is that there exists two “news” components that, 
to some degree, determine the returns on the underlying asset, Ri:  ‘General news’ that 
affects the aggregate market, and, ‘specific news’ that may affect a particular industry, 
asset class or, more specifically, a certain stock.  Although general news may influence 
the overall direction of the economy, it also has, to some varying degree, an influence on 
all stocks.  For example, a 1% unexpected rise in interest rates will have a greater impact 
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on firms that are more leveraged relative to firms with little or no leverage.  Likewise, A 
1% shock in the price of steel will have a greater impact on companies in the automotive 
industry than companies in the computer software industry. 
 The APT does not embody any of the assumptions about utility theory or that 
mean and variance are the only two elements that matter to investors.  However, alike the 
CAPM and ICAPM, it does assume that investors carry homogeneous expectations about 
future outcomes and that they all perceive news in a similar fashion. To operationalize 
the APT, a researcher must first identify a set of systematic factors that impact the 
economy on aggregate. Such factors may include, for example, measures of economic 
activity (such as GDP, industrial production, etc.), short- and long-term interest rates, 
inflation, to name only a few.  These economy-wide factors F (each indexed by j) may 
have varying effects on different stocks, as is reflected in each ‘beta’ factor loading, bij, 
which take on different values for each jth stock. 
 In terms of which factors F to choose from, a researcher need not select ones that 
can be theoretically motivated.  Instead, a researcher can select literally any observable 
and measurable factor that can statistically characterize movements in the returns of the 
asset under scrutiny. The only assumption that must hold however, in addition to investor 
homogeneity, is that the covariance between each specified regressions’ residuals should 
be (approximately) zero (i.e. E(εiεj) = 0).  This is consistent with the idea that a 
holder’s portfolio is fully diversified and that firm-specific (i.e. idiosyncratic) risks across 
securities are uncorrelated.  A researcher typically stops adding factors Fj if the next 
factor contributes relatively “little” additional explanation as to the movements of the 
returns in asset i. 
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 I explicitly mention the APT here in order to make an important point.  Since 
Merton’s (1973) ICAPM does not specify the identity of the state factors which proxy for 
changes in investment opportunities, some researchers resort to using arbitrary factors, or 
even factors comprised of ad hoc portfolios, simply because they yield statistically 
significant test statistics and offer empirically pleasing results. Whereas this may be 
acceptable when implementing the APT, it is unacceptable when applying the ICAPM.  
Perhaps a reason why the ICAPM is misapplied is because it is oftentimes “confused” 
with the APT.  Cochrane (2001, p. 183) expresses this concern: “The APT and ICAPM 
stories are often confused.” The source for this confusion lies in the motivation for 
deriving empirically testable factors F. 
In the APT, a researcher can select any arbitrary factor that is observable and 
measurable and can statistically characterize movements in the returns of the asset in 
question.  On the other hand, the ICAPM requires theoretically motivated variables that 
can describe shifts in investment opportunities which impact investors’ marginal utility of 
wealth function. Cochrane (2001, p.183) emphasizes the fundamental distinction in 
deriving factors for these two asset pricing models: 
“The biggest difference between APT and ICAPM for empirical work is in the 
inspiration for factors.  The APT suggests that one start with a statistical analysis 
of the covariance matrix of returns and find portfolios that characterize common 
movement.  The ICAPM suggests that one start by thinking about state variables 
that describe the conditional distribution of future asset returns.  More generally, 
the idea of proxying for marginal utility growth suggests macroeconomic 
indicators, and indicators of shocks to nonasset income in particular.”    
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Cochrane (2001) explains that, when putting the APT into practice, researchers 
may include in their regressions factors which increase the R2 coefficient of their overall 
model.  Such a practice however when implementing the ICAPM is inappropriate if the 
selected factors are theoretically incapable of describing changes in investment 
opportunities which influence investors’ (future) consumption and utility of wealth.  An 
important point to make here, as Cochrane (2001, p.172) notes, is that economic factors 
“need not forecast returns on any traded assets…”  Instead, potential economic factors 
should affect the average investor and their (future) consumption decisions and utility of 
wealth. 
 The seeming open-endedness of the ICAPM, whereby researchers are free to 
select from a universe of factors, has drawn censure in the literature.  Fama (1991) likens 
the ICAPM, and other multifactor models, as a “license” to fish for factors that, ex post, 
yield empirically desirable results.  As Fama (1991) puts it, such models “leave one 
hungry for economic insights about how the factors relate to uncertainties about 
consumption and portfolio opportunities that are of concern to investors…”  Of course, 
any such model comprised of ad hoc factors does not provide us with meaningful and 
objective information and only compromises the integrity of its arguments.  Fama (1991, 
p.1594) makes this point clear: 
 
“Since multifactor models offer at best vague predictions about the variables that 
are important in returns and expected returns, there is the danger that measured 
relations between returns and economic factors are spurious, the result of special 
features of a particular sample (factor dredging).”  
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Instead, Fama (1991, p.1610) argues that inclusion of state factors must provide a 
“coherent story” of how the risk premium varies and interacts with changes in the real 
economy. 
Perhaps a reason why it took so long for the Merton (1973) ICAPM to receive 
rigorous empirical attention is because of the difficulty associated with identifying 
relevant state factors.  Identifying state factors that can be theoretically motivated has 
been the subject of much debate in the literature and is also a major criticism against the 
ICAPM.  Namely, although Merton’s (1973) model provides an empirically tractable 
method for modeling the dynamic risk premium, it does not directly address which 
factor(s) constitute hedgeable sources of risk.  Bhattacharya and Constantinides (2005, 
p.9) point out that beyond Merton’s (1973) two-factor formulization in Equation (3.3), 
his theory “does not provide an operational procedure for identifying state variables.”  
 
 
3.2.4. Some Possible Empirically Testable State Factors 
 
In reality, there is an indefinite number of hedgeable sources of uncertainty that impact 
investors’ utility maximization decision-making behavior. With an abundance of 
empirically observable data, how does a researcher know which factors can justifiably be 
used as proxies for changes in the investment opportunity set?  
Observation lends support to the notion that asset prices are, to some varying 
degree, influenced by an array of unanticipated events and economic forces.  Much of 
financial theory is devoted to the identification of these “systematic” phenomena and 
their role as a likely source of economic risk. As already mentioned, when attempting to 
identify state factors we must consider hedgeable sources of risk that are of concern to 
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the average investor. Consistent with the ICAPM, these factors must be theoretically 
driven and may not consist of arbitrary factors that simply yield desirable results. 
The seminal study by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) is an important step in the right 
direction in identifying relevant state factors. As noted in their study, “A rather 
embarrassing gap exists between the theoretically exclusive importance of systematic 
‘state variables’ and our complete ignorance of their identity” (p.384).  Even though the 
prices of assets exhibit statistically significant comovement with one another, suggestive 
of the existence of common exogenous factors, research is still trying to uncover the 
identity of these factors.  Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) begin by specifying a set of 
macroeconomic factors which, a priori, should affect (and proxy for changes in) firms’ 
cash flows, c, and shifts in the discount factor, k, that investors use to appraise the price, 
P, of an underlying equity asset: 
 
    P = 
k
cE )(
      
 
where E(.) denotes an expectations operator. 
 It is reasonable to argue that systematic forces which influence returns also have a 
pervasive impact on firms’ expected cash flows, E(c), and investors’ approximation of 
the appropriate discount factor, k.  The discount factor used to discount expected cash 
flows may change over time and embodies general information such as investors’ degree 
of risk aversion, returns on competing assets and the market portfolio and shifts in 
investors’ consumption which, ultimately, impacts their marginal utility of wealth.  The 
discount factor also encompasses firm-specific information such as future growth 
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prospects for the issuing firm and the covariance of its returns with future economic 
‘news.’ 
 Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) then begin their empirical investigation by examining 
whether a set of prespecified macroeconomic factors can systematically affect the returns 
of the average firm and, consequently, returns on the aggregate market portfolio. These 
factors are as follows, respectively: (a) the monthly growth rate in industrial production; 
(b) the change in expected inflation; (c) unexpected shifts in inflation; (d) the spread 
between low-grade (Baa and under) corporate bonds yields and long-term government 
bond yields (i.e. default premium); (e) the spread between long- and short-term 
government bond yields (i.e. maturity premium).  If these factors have a statistically 
important impact on market returns (i.e. these risk exposures are “priced” in the 
marketplace) then investors may wish to hedge their exposure to shifts in these factors 
since they may lead to changes in their marginal utility of wealth. 
Industrial production is the first factor considered in their study. It serves as a 
natural candidate for an economic state factor for its ability to identify (future) cyclical 
movements in macroeconomic conditions which impact investors’ consumption and, 
ultimately, their utility of wealth function. More specifically, fluctuations in stock market 
levels are directly linked with shifts in industrial production, evidence suggesting that it 
may be a systematic source of risk which impacts investors’ marginal utility of wealth 
and therefore merits attention. 
A distinguished body of literature provides support for the relation between 
current stock market returns and future shifts in industrial activity (see Fama, 1981; 
James, Koreisha and Partch, 1985; Schwert, 1990; Fama, 1990, to name only a few).  
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Fama (1990) proposes that this result is attributable to three non-mutually exclusive 
explanations:13  Firstly, current prices of assets contain information about future real 
productive capacity and thus serve as a chief indicator to the direction of the overall 
economy.  Secondly, changes in the discount factor, k, may entail an immediate impact 
on assets’ prices but may take relatively longer to influence real productivity.  Thirdly, it 
is possible that as prices of assets change (for whatever reason) investors’ wealth also 
changes accordingly.  This subsequently affects their demand for (future) consumption 
and investment goods.  Therefore, from a supply-side perspective, industrial production 
levels take relatively longer to drop in order to compensate for dwindling demand. 
Fama (1981) who found a positive relation between stock returns and future shifts 
in industrial production also documents a positive contemporaneous relation from his 
multivariate regression results. 
This evidence lends support to industrial production as a significant risk factor 
that can possibly serve as an instrument to describe shifts in investment opportunities.  As 
Fama (1990) indicates through his three possible explanations, industrial production 
subsumes information regarding the general state of the economy and can predict future 
movements in economic activity which directly impacts investors’ utility of wealth 
function. 
A more recent study by Artis, Kontolemis and Osborn (1997) actually uses 
fluctuations in industrial production as a key variable to determine shifts in business 
cycle regimes for the United States and 11 other industrialized countries. 
                                                 
13
 Fama (1990) does not formally discriminate between each of these explanations but instead proposes them as likely reasons for this 
relationship. 
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In the United States, studies typically reference the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) as an authoritative source for a chronology on the direction, duration 
and magnitude of shifts in business cycles (see Boldin, 1994).14  After constructing a 
chronology of business cycles based solely on industrial production, Artis, Kontolemis 
and Osborn (1997) find a striking resemblance to the chronology established by the 
NBER.  Since the NBER identifies business cycles using an exhaustive list of 
macroeconomic and other related factors (such as industrial activity, inflation, 
unemployment, interest rates, consumption, etc.), it suggests that industrial production 
also embodies a broad range of information content that represents hedgeable sources of 
risk to investors.  It can therefore justifiably be used as a state factor to proxy for shifts in 
the investment opportunity set.  Moreover, as this chapter does, industrial production data 
can be obtained and used as a hedging component to test for a risk-return tradeoff in 
international markets. 
The findings from Artis, Kontolemis and Osborn (1997) not only support the 
position that industrial production subsumes a broad range of information content 
regarding the overall state of the economy, they also provides useful insights as to the 
nature and magnitude of business cycles.  Namely, economic ups and downs exhibit 
asymmetry; whereby industrial production declines more in absolute terms during 
recessions than it rises during periods of economic prosperity.  Preceding their study, this 
asymmetry is documented in other studies too; Neftci (1984) as well as Hamilton (1989) 
present evidence from the U.S. market and Acemoglu and Scott (1994) explore this 
asymmetry in the U.K. market, to name only a few authoritative examples. 
                                                 
14
 The Business Cycle Dating Committee at the NBER defines a business cycle in the context of Burns and Mitchell (1946).  
Additional information about the NBER can be found at www.nber.org and, for a historical reference of business cycles, see 
www.nber.org/cycles. 
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Inflation (both expected and unexpected) serves as another empirically testable 
economic factor in the study by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) to determine whether it can 
systematically influence stock market returns. Selecting it as a potential factor that 
explains shifts in economic conditions may be intuitively obvious; as inflation changes, 
so do investors’ and firms’ real purchasing power. Existing studies find a negative 
relation between contemporaneous changes in inflation and aggregate stock returns. This 
is contrary to the Fisherian notion of interest whereby the nominal expected return on an 
asset equals real interest and the real risk premium plus expected inflation. Geske and 
Roll (1983) however defend this seemingly counterintuitive relation on the basis that 
there exists a series of causal macroeconomic linkages.   
More specifically, consider a negative (positive) shock in the aggregate stock 
market that persists for an indefinite time period.  Such a shock may serve as a signal that 
corporate earnings will be lower (higher) and that unemployment may rise (decline).  
Since government revenues consist of personal taxes levied on individuals and investors 
as well as corporate taxes from firms, there is a possibility that its generated revenue will 
be lower (higher).  Since government expenditures do not usually change in response to 
changes in its tax revenues, there is a rise (fall) in the Treasury deficit.  The Treasury then 
increases (decreases) its borrowing activity from the public through its treasury notes and 
bonds.  A portion of this Treasury debt is purchased by the Federal Reserve System, 
which eventually pays for it through monetization [i.e. an expansion (contraction) in the 
money supply].  An expansion (contraction) in the monetary base effectively leads to a 
proportional increase (decrease) in the rate of inflation.  Given therefore this chain of 
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monetary and fiscal events, it is somewhat plausible that stock returns cause changes in 
inflation and that the two move in contra to one another.15 
James, Koreisha and Partch (1985) employ a more refined econometric technique 
to improve on some of the limitations they identified in Chen, Roll and Ross (1986).  
Namely, they implement a vector autoregressive moving average (VARMA) model to 
simultaneously examine the causal relationships that tie together aggregate stock returns, 
real economic activity, changes in the monetary base, and inflation.  Chen, Roll and Ross 
(1986), on the other hand, examine these relationships individually essentially 
implementing an “equation-by-equation” modeling procedure.  Such a method may be 
inappropriate if the error terms across each of the equations correlate with one another.  
Another advantage that VARMA affords is that it imposes no structural or a priori 
precincts on the data or direction of the causal relationship(s). 
Results from the VARMA estimation methodology substantiate the findings in 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) that there exists a link between aggregate stock returns, real 
productive activity, and inflation. More specifically, shocks in stock returns cause 
reductions in the productive capacity of real economic activity and “signal” higher 
unemployment and widening gaps in the Treasury deficit.  This ultimately induces higher 
inflation through the Fed’s monetization of Treasury debt and leads to increases in the 
money supply.   
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) explore whether each of the potential state factors 
discussed can adequately characterize stock market returns.  Essentially extending the 
APT of Ross (1976), they empirically test the proposition of whether shocks (i.e. 
innovations) in each of the aforementioned factors impact stock market returns.  Since 
                                                 
15
 In this case, the term “cause” is used in an econometric context consistent with Granger (1969). 
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these factors are observed economic shocks, we can thus interpret each respective beta 
coefficient in an economically meaningful way.  For example, we can determine whether 
movements in these sources of risk are “priced” in the marketplace; i.e. do these factors 
constitute pervasive sources of risk that impact investors’ marginal utility of wealth? 
They operationalize Equation (3.5) to see whether innovations in each of the 
aforementioned factors represent systematic sources of risk.  Their model takes the form 
 
RM,t = α + βMP(MPt) + βDEI(DEIt) + βUI(UIt) 
+ βUPR(UPRt) + βUTS(UTSt) + εt 
 
where the returns on the market portfolio, RM,t, are a linear combination of the monthly 
changes in industrial production (MP), expected and unexpected shifts in inflation (DEI 
and UI, respectively), changes in the default risk premium (UPR), twists in the yield 
curve (UTS) and each of these factors’ respective ‘beta’ factor loadings, βMP, βDEI, 
βUI, βUPR and βUTS.  Each beta represents the market’s sensitivity to shocks in each of 
the respective economic state variables.  The constant as well as the idiosyncratic error 
term are denoted as α and εt, respectively. 
 From this model, they find that changes in IP, shifts in the default risk premium 
and in the yield curve and finally, somewhat more meekly, changes in expected and 
unanticipated inflation, significantly explain variations in stock market returns.  These 
findings lend some support that these factors are systematic sources of risk and that the 
prices of assets are, to some degree, determined in accordance to these assets’ exposures 
to these factors. 
 The signs and magnitudes of each of the coefficients are not surprising, given the 
literature that was discussed.  For example, βMP is positive and statistically significant, 
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suggesting that, ceteris paribus, substantial declines in IP may signal periods of economic 
contractions and, as a result, diminished market returns. Since this coefficient is 
significant, it also emphasizes the importance for investors to hedge against shifts in real 
production.  The signs of the coefficients for expected and unanticipated inflation, βDEI 
and βUI, respectively, are also negative and statistically significant, as is consistent with 
existing literature.  Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) argue that the reason for the negative sign 
is maybe because stock market assets are generally perceived by investors to afford more 
hedging protection against adverse changes in investment opportunities rather than other 
investment assets that are ‘fixed’ in a nominal sense.  The sign of the risk premium, 
βUPR, is positive since investors wish to protect themselves against increases in the risk 
premium caused by the general effects of uncertainty in the economy.  Finally, the 
negative sign of βUTS can be interpreted as investors’ desire to hold assets with returns 
that move contra to shifts in the yield curve.  Such assets therefore carry a negative risk 
premium. 
 The yield curve is oftentimes used by macroeconomists and practitioners as a 
benchmark for other debt instruments and to evaluate the current state of the economy as 
well as predict future shifts in its movement (see Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; 
Campbell, 1995; Estrella and Mishkin, 1998; Hamilton and Kim, 2002, to name only a 
few).  A ‘normal’ yield curve means that government bonds with a long-term maturity 
offer higher yields relative to short-term government bonds.  This is to compensate 
investors for risks associated with the passage of time.  When the spread between long- 
and short-term government bonds becomes thinner relative to its long-run average (i.e. 
the yield curve becomes ‘flat’), it is likely that the economy may be heading towards a 
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recession.  This probability increases in the case of an ‘inverted’ yield curve (i.e. when 
short-term government yields exceed long-term government yields).  It makes sense, 
therefore, that investors prefer assets that do well when the yield curve flattens or 
becomes inverted. 
 Another interpretation for the negative sign of βUTS is that the long-term 
government bond yield also reflects the return on any capital investment.  If the long-
term rate falls, so does the return on capital.  Investors naturally want to hedge against 
this possibility and therefore want to hold assets whose price appreciates during declines 
in the long-term government bond yield.  
 Overall, the results by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) are consistent with the 
intertemporal asset pricing theory of Merton (1973) and that APT model of Ross (1976).  
Namely, their findings are consistent with rational expectations that assets prices move in 
accordance to their exposure to a set of state factors which depict underlying market and 
economic conditions. 
 As a side note, they also explore whether real consumption or the risk associated 
with exposure to innovations in oil prices are rewarded in the marketplace.  A large body 
of asset pricing literature provides empirically tractable consumption-based theories 
which derive assets’ betas according to investors’ marginal utility of consumption (i.e. 
assets’ covariance with aggregate real consumption) (see Breeden, 1979; Cox, Ingersoll 
and Ross, 1985).   
Of course, it is worth mentioning that, although such consumption-based theories 
provide insights into the dynamics of assets’ prices, they are not free from criticisms.  For 
example, instantaneous consumption rates cannot be derived and, instead, researchers 
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obtain real consumption data at longer frequencies (such as quarterly or annually).  
Another perhaps more serious shortcoming is that consumption data contains 
significantly more measurement error when compared to asset pricing theories that 
instead utilize prices of the market portfolio which contain virtually no measurement 
error. 
In their study, Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) find that the beta for aggregate 
consumption, both in the entire period and in subperiods, is statistically insignificant for 
pricing stock market returns. 
 As for oil prices, there is no a priori justification which supports its use as a state 
variable that will provide any incremental explanatory power for the variations in stock 
market returns beyond the main five factors that were just discussed.  Instead, an intuitive 
justification for identifying oil price fluctuations as a systematic source of risk is because 
it exerts a significant impact on consumption, firms’ real productive capacity, inflation, 
and the macroeconomic structure at large. 
 The relation between oil price fluctuations and shifts in macroeconomic 
conditions is a topical issue and of concern to investors, economists and policymakers.  
An extensive body of literature is devoted to examining this relation and whether 
fluctuations in oil prices drive business cycles.  Hamilton (1983) presents evidence 
showing that substantial increases in the price of oil may be a contributing factor to 
recessions in the U.S. economy.  In that regard, his study finds that languishing economic 
activity statistically coincides with rapid increases in the price of oil.  Mork (1989) 
extends the work by Hamilton (1983) and, when investigating a longer data sample, 
concludes that oil prices and economic activity are asymmetrically related.  Other more 
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recent studies find that positive shocks in oil prices have a large influence on 
macroeconomic factors which, to some degree, ‘signal’ that a recession is eminent.  For 
example, LeBlanc and Chinn (2004) argue that rising oil prices coincide with high levels 
of inflation in the U.S., Japan and Europe. 
 Despite convincing evidence that oil price risk impacts economic conditions, 
Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) find that the beta for this risk is statistically insignificant, 
especially during the 1968 – 1977 subperiod, a time when the OPEC cartel imposed an 
oil embargo on the U.S. in October 1973. 
 All in all, although their study has not exhaustively explored all economic state 
factors that constitute fundamental sources of market risk, their findings have important 
implications for studies seeking to apply Merton’s (1973) ICAPM to explore the risk-
return tradeoff.  Though there are numerous techniques for modeling volatility (i.e. 
estimating σ2M,t in Equation (3.3), there is still the question of which factors, F, we can 
incorporate to estimate the hedging component, σMF,t.  As Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) 
demonstrate, economic ‘news’ may be measured as innovations in the aforementioned 
state variables.  Perhaps these variables can also be incorporated into Merton’s (1973) 
intertemporal asset pricing framework and can take the role of hedging factors.  This is 
something that, to my knowledge, has not been attempted in the literature thus far. 
 
3.2.5. Criticisms against the Two-Factor ICAPM 
Although the ICAPM is intuitively appealing, in practice, it is nearly impossible to 
specify all likely sources of risk. The study by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) provides a 
comprehensive investigation of some factors that are likely candidates which can be 
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incorporated as hedging factors. As mentioned earlier, the fundamental differences 
between the APT and Merton’s (1973) ICAPM are often confused because both models 
involve a multi-factor approach to explaining variations in expected market returns.  
However, whereas the APT gives the researcher the absolute freedom to select from a 
universe of observable factors, factors that enter into the ICAPM must theoretically 
justify what role they play in capturing shifts in investment opportunities that impact 
investors’ utility of wealth function.  As mentioned, there exist indefinite sources of risk 
that our beyond our means to estimate, quantify or explain. For example, I cite a body of 
literature in the second chapter which documents that bad weather appears to have an 
impact on stock returns (see Saunders, 1993; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003).  Although 
this may appear as an unlikely, and rather farfetched, source of risk, it illustrates the point 
that no model is capable of capturing all sources of uncertainty.   
 As already mentioned, one of the most prevalent criticisms I found in the 
literature has to do with the fact that Merton’s (1973) ICAPM does not provide a 
procedure for electing factors that represent hedgeable sources of risk.  As Fama (1991, 
p. 1594) points out, 
“The multifactor asset-pricing models of Merton (1973) and Ross (1976)...involve 
multiple factors and the cross-section of expected returns is constrained by...factor 
loadings...The multifactor models are an empiricist’s dream...that can 
accommodate...any set of factors that are correlated with returns.” 
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The ICAPM should not be construed as an empiricist’s dream but instead should be 
applied when one can theoretically justify why they selected the hedging factors they did 
and what role they play in describing shifts in the investment opportunity set. 
 Another common criticism worth mentioning has to do with the underlying 
assumption of investor homogeneity. Namely, it makes the assumption that, when 
markets are in equilibrium, all heterogeneous investors can be simplified to one investor 
(the “representative” agent) with preferences that are equivalent to the sum of the 
heterogeneous investors. This assumption also forms a pillar for which makes application 
of the classical CAPM possible.  Namely, if one can stomach such an assumption, they 
can proceed to deduce an asset’s expected returns solely on the basis of its underlying 
beta. 
Now, however, we see the same assumption behind Merton’s (1973) ICAPM.  
This criticism is warranted since observation of financial markets and market participants 
reveals diversity in the investment world.  After all, different market participants 
(institutional investors, hedge funds, small investors, households, etc.) implement 
different strategies within their unique levels of risk aversion to satisfy their unique goals 
and objectives. Furthermore, markets are not in a steady state of equilibrium and, even if 
they were, such an ideal state may merely be transitory.  
 As was mentioned in the second chapter however, it oftentimes necessary to make 
a set of assumptions which govern the seemingly chaotic intricacies and dynamics that 
drive financial markets.  This enables us to establish relationships and to better 
understand the effects different factors have, ceteris paribus, on others.  For example, the 
study by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) is very precise in the factors it wishes to investigate 
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and their impact on stock market returns; the Fama and French three-factor model is yet 
another example which posits that an asset’s returns are a function of a particular set of 
factors (see Fama and French, 1993; 1995 and 1996).  This model, has drawn criticisms 
however that it merely “hunts” for factors which, ex post, yield favorably significant 
coefficient parameters; Black (1993, p.10) expressed a strong criticism towards the Fama 
and French three-factor model expressing that “...the Fama and French results are 
attributable to data mining” 
 In reality, there is no model that can perfectly describe returns of assets, or that 
can answer any of our questions for that matter, with absolute certainty.  This is why it is 
necessary to establish a set of assumptions that will allow us come to grips with the 
financial world.  Merton (1973, p. 868) willingly expresses this: 
 
“...Such a model cannot be constructed without costs. The assumptions, 
principally homogeneous expectations, which it holds in common with the 
classical model, make the new model subject to some of the same criticisms.” 
 
It is important to acknowledge however that this assumption may not pose serious 
theoretical objections against, or necessarily disrepute, the ICAPM or any estimates 
associated with its use. Constantinides (1980) illustrates that the simplification of investor 
homogeneity can be attained in a simple economy with heterogeneous investors, so long 
as prices are established as if buyers and sellers are homogeneous. Constantinides (1980) 
describes that an aggregation property holds when equilibrium prices are ascertained 
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when all market participants hold homogeneous beliefs, expectations, and have similar 
preferences. 
Despite some of its shortcomings, the ICAPM is a significant theoretical 
improvement over the classical single-period CAPM. It is now widely accepted in the 
literature as a paradigm for how to model the dynamic risk premium in an investment 
environment where the investment opportunity set is stochastically evolving throughout 
time. 
 
3.2.6. Empirical Literature on the Two-Factor ICAPM 
Scruggs (1998, p.576) describes the existing inconclusive state of the risk-return tradeoff 
literature as “unsatisfactory” and proposes using long-term government bond returns as a 
state factor to describe the dynamics of the investment opportunity set and how the 
distribution of the market risk premium changes through time. Long-term government 
bonds make for a potentially suitable hedging factor since they are used as an instrument 
to hedge against risks in the market and changes in interest rates. Merton (1973, p. 879) 
proposed considering the implications behind changes in interest rates: 
 
“The interest rate has always been an important variable in portfolio theory, 
general capital theory, and to practitioners...while it is surely not the sole 
determinant of yields on other assets, it is an important factor.  Hence, one should 
interpret the effects of a changing interest rate in the forthcoming analysis in the 
way economists have generally done in the past: namely, as a single 
(instrumental) variable representation of shifts in the investment opportunity set.”  
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If the behavior of interest rates accurately reflects shifts in economic conditions 
then long-term government bond returns can justifiably be used as a hedging factor.  
Scruggs’ (1998) main objective is to see whether a conditional two-factor model can 
better explain variations in the market risk premium.  Since long-term government bond 
returns may provide hedging protection against adverse changes in interest rates.  In 
particular, long-term government bond returns are negatively, albeit not perfectly, related 
to changes in interest rates and other market conditions. 
 Suggesting that long-term interest rates embody a broad range of information 
content regarding market conditions which represent hedgeable sources of risk is also 
motivated from the findings of other researchers.  For example, Sweeny and Warga 
(1986) investigate whether unanticipated shifts in interest rates are priced in the market.  
Employing a two-factor APT model [as in Equation (3.4)], they test whether shifts in the 
long-term government bond yield can statistically characterize movements in stock 
market returns. They test this proposition across stocks in several industries to see 
whether specific industries are particularly sensitive to fluctuations in the long-term 
government bond yield. Findings from their study indicate that movements in the long-
term government bond yield tend to exert a negative influence on stock portfolio returns 
regardless of industry; evidence that it represents a likely source of systematic risk in the 
market and merits investors’ attention. 
 The negative relation between bond yields and stock returns documented by 
Sweeny and Warga (1986) also corroborate the findings of Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) 
mentioned earlier. The explanation given by them is that the long-term government bond 
yield is a reflection of the return on any capital investment. Thus, if the long-term 
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government bond yield falls, so does the return on capital. Investors naturally want to 
hedge against this possibility and will therefore desire assets with returns that move 
opposite to shifts in the long-term government bond yield. 
Sweeny and Warga (1986) afford an alternative explanation for this negative sign 
based on the present value of firms’ dividend payouts. Namely, if the real interest rate 
increases, so does the discount rate by which future dividend cash flows are discounted.  
Ceteris paribus, discounting future dividend cash streams at a higher rate tends to 
decrease the overall investment attractiveness of the firm. 
Interestingly, the negative relation between the long-term government bond yield 
and stock returns is most pronounced for firms within the utilities industry. This oddity 
may lend support to their dividend argument since utility companies tend to pay higher 
dividends relative to firms in other industries. Therefore, investors pay a (relatively 
higher) premium to invest in such companies in the hopes of reaping higher dividends.  
When the long-term government yield rises, utilities’ dividend future cash flows will be 
most affected (relative to other firms) and this will exert (relatively more) downward 
pressure on their stock price. 
 Scruggs (1998) is also motivated to use the long-term government bond yield as a 
second factor since there was a preceding study by Turtle, Buse and Korkie (1994) that 
used it as a hedging factor within the context of Merton’s (1973) ICAPM.  In that study, 
they conclude that the long-term government bond yield, within a GARCH-in-mean 
framework to capture the first two moments of market returns, serves as a good proxy for 
shifts in the investment opportunity set and that “previous rejections of the conditional 
CAPM using only stock market data may be due to omitted hedge terms…” (p. 15). 
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 Scruggs (1998) proceeds to model the partial relation between the market risk 
premium and conditional market volatility [i.e. Equation 3.3], postulating that previous 
research which estimates the simple relation [i.e. Equation 3.2] suffers from an omitted 
variable bias and is the reason why many researchers do not find a positive and 
statistically significant relation between the first two moments of stock market returns.  
To accomplish this, Scruggs (1998) employs a bivariate EGARCH-in-mean system to 
estimate the relation between the first two moments of market returns.  As is discussed 
later on in greater depth, and in the proceeding section of this chapter, the methodology 
by Scruggs (1998) assumes a constant correlation parameter between movements in the 
long-term government bond yield and changes in the market portfolio.  As is discussed 
later on, making such an assumption may be fallacious and, accordingly, is relaxed to 
allow a time-varying interaction between the market portfolio and the specified hedge 
portfolios I introduce later on. 
 The bivariate EGARCH-in-mean methodology of Scruggs (1998) takes the form 
 
 rM,t = λ0 + λMσM,t2 + λFσMF,t + εM,t 
 rF,t = µF + εF,t 
 
ln(σM,t2) = ωM,t + αM,tφ(ζM,t-1) + βM,tln(σM,t-12) + γM,trF,t 
 ln(σF,t2) = ωF,t + αF,tφ(ζF,t-1) + βF,tln(σF,t-12) + γF,trF,t 
 σMF,t = ρMF,tσM,tσF,t 
 φ(ζM,t-1) = |ζM,t-1| - εt-1[|ζM,t-1|] + δM,tζM,t-1 
 φ(ζF,t-1) = |ζF,t-1| - εt-1[|ζF,t-1|] + δF,tζF,t-1   (3.5) 
 
This model, alike other traditional GARCH specifications, allows researchers to explore 
asset pricing relations within a framework that allows a time-varying interaction between 
the first two moments of market returns.  It explicitly models the conditional variance as 
a deterministic function of past squared variances and past innovations in the disturbance 
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term.  As Turtle, Buse and Korkie (1994) indicate, GARCH-type models are intended to 
“fit” volatility rather than strictly describe it in an economic sense (p. 16). 
 Given the structure of the EGARCH specification, introduced by Nelson (1991), 
negative estimates of the conditional market variance, σM,t2, are precluded.  This is a 
desirable feature and an improvement over other traditional GARCH-type models since 
researchers need not manually impose any non-negativity constraints on the parameters.  
The EGARCH-in-mean system of equations also allows σM,t2 to respond 
asymmetrically according to the signs and magnitudes of innovations and allows 
researchers to relate the conditional mean and variance of an asset’s returns. 
 The construct of Scruggs’ (1998) EGARCH specification, as is expressed in 
Equation (3.5), allows the conditional variance to be estimated as a deterministic function 
of past squared variances and innovations in the disturbance term.  Although not the main 
purpose of his paper, he also includes the nominal one-month Treasury bill yield, rF,t, in 
the conditioning information set to estimate the conditional variances of the market 
portfolio and the long-term government bond yield, σM,t2 and σF,t2, respectively, and 
see what influences it has on these parameters. 
 The conditional covariance between the market portfolio and the long-term 
government bond yield is denoted as σMF,t. This is equivalent to the product of the 
correlation between the market portfolio and the long-term government bond yield, 
ρMF,t, and the respective conditional variances of the market portfolio and the long-term 
government bond yield, σM,t and σF,t respectively.  An important point to make here 
is that Scruggs (1998) assumes that the conditional correlation between the market and 
long-term government bond yield is constant (i.e. time-invariant). Recent research 
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however argues that the correlation between market returns and bond returns is not 
‘static’ but dynamic and time-varying (see Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard, 2006).  One of 
the contributions of this chapter is to relax this assumption and explore the intertemporal 
risk-return tradeoff on an international level utilizing alternative factors as the hedging 
component. Allowing the covariance parameter between the state factor and the market 
portfolio to be time-varying is more intuitively realistic since the interaction between the 
investment opportunity set and the market portfolio undoubtedly changes through time 
(especially during changes in the business cycle).   
 In Equation (3.5), the parameter ζM,t-1 represents the conditional standardized 
innovation in the returns of the market portfolio (i.e. εM,t-1/σM,t-1). φ(ζM,t-1) is a 
characterization of the ‘news response function’ in the context of Engle and Ng (1993).  
Since the EGARCH model is asymmetric in nature, the news response function allows 
σM,t
2
 to respond in accordance with the direction and magnitude of the lagged 
innovation.  If the parameter δM,t = 0, the news response function, φ(ζM,t-1), is 
determined solely by the scale of the market return innovation, ζM,t-1.  The parameter δM 
describes the reaction of the conditional market variance to the direction of the lagged 
innovation in market returns.  If, for example, 0 < δM < 1 or conversely, (-1 < δM < 0), 
then conditional market volatility tends to rise more with respect to positive (negative) 
return innovations relative to negative (positive) return innovations of equal magnitude.  
In the case where δM = 1 (δM = -1), the news response function, φ(ζM,t-1), slopes 
upwards (downwards) if δM > 1 (δM < -1). 
 Intuitively, the news response function for the state factor F, which is the long-
term government bond yield, is denoted as φ(ζF,t-1).  The constituent parameters that 
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determine this function can be interpreted in a similar fashion with the parameters that 
form the news response function for the market portfolio. 
 Implementing the model in Equation (3.5), and assuming that the correlation 
between shifts in the long-term government bond yield the market portfolio is constant, 
Scruggs (1998) finds that the partial relation between rM,t and σM,t2 is positive and 
statistically significant. Therefore, investors’ degree of relative risk aversion, λM, is 
positive and means that investors demand a higher risk premium to take on an additional 
unit of systematic risk. This conclusion is now coherent with the basic tenet of portfolio 
theory which advocates a positive relation between risk and return and also provides 
support to Scruggs’ (1998) claim that previous studies suffer from an omitted variables 
bias, and this is why they find a negative or insignificant risk-return relation. 
 Furthermore, his study finds that the partial relation between rM,t and σMF,t is 
negative and statistically significant.  This result is consistent with the findings of Chen, 
Roll and Ross (1986) who find that the beta which captures interest rate risk is negatively 
related to movements in stock market returns.  This can be interpreted as investors’ desire 
to hold assets with returns that move opposite to shifts in the long-term government bond 
yield.  Furthermore, the long-term government bond yield also reflects the return on 
capital investment and, if it declines, so does the return on capital.  Investors seeking to 
hedge against this possibility will hold assets whose price appreciates during downturns 
in the long-term government bond yield. Scruggs’ (1998) results substantiate this 
proposition. Namely, an investor demands a lower (higher) premium on the market 
portfolio when σMF,t is positive (negative). 
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 Finally, the study by Scruggs (1998) is an important piece in understanding the 
intertemporal risk-return puzzle.  He concludes that estimates of the simple relation 
between σM,t2 and rM,t [i.e. as in Equation (3.2)], are biased and yield estimates of 
investors’ aggregate risk aversion which is statistically negligent. Therefore we must not 
overlook the importance of identifying state factors that accurately depict economic 
conditions and shifts in the investment opportunity set which are of hedgeable concern to 
market participants.  By including this so-called state factor into our model (i.e. 
implementing a two-factor approach as is depicted in Equation (3.3) and advocated by 
Scruggs (1998), we ensure that our model is correctly specified and can estimate a true 
and unbiased relationship between market risk and the dynamic market risk premium. 
 Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) address the potential shortcoming in Scruggs’ 
(1998) study of a constant correlation restriction imposed on the covariance matrix 
between returns on the market portfolio and the long-term government bond yield.  
Comparable to Scruggs (1998), they employ a two-factor variant of Merton’s (1973) 
ICAPM whereby the long-term government bond yield serves as a state variable that 
proxies for systematic sources of risk and changes in investment opportunities.  However, 
their model allows the correlation parameter to be time-varying instead of constant by 
implementing the Asymmetric Dynamic Covariance (ADC) model proposed by Kroner 
and Ng (1998) in order to estimate the conditional moments of market and government 
bond returns and to explore the risk-return tradeoff. 
 The ADC specification is advantageous given its flexibility and ability to describe 
important characteristics in data such as volatility clustering and persistence, and the 
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asymmetric influence past innovations have on current volatility.16 It also allows for 
time-varying correlation between state factor(s) and the market portfolio. 
 Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) examine the puzzling relation between the 
market risk premium and its conditional second moments.  They utilize the ADC 
framework whereby, similar to Scruggs (1998), the long-term government bond yield 
serves as a hedge portfolio.  Findings from their study show that their conditional two-
factor model is unsuccessful in explaining variations in the dynamic market risk 
premium.  Namely, the estimate for investors’ aggregate degree of relative risk aversion 
is statistically marginal.  This finding contrasts sharply with the findings of Scruggs 
(1998), who argues that the reason why studies cannot find a positive and statistically 
significant risk-return tradeoff is because they omit the hedging component from their 
models.  Now, however, Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) report counterintuitive results 
when they allow the correlation parameter between the market portfolio and the long-
term government bond hedging portfolio to be time-varying. 
 They argue that perhaps the risk-return tradeoff reported in Scruggs (1998) is an 
artifact of the restrictive constant correlation assumption imposed in his model. Scruggs 
and Glabadanidis (2003) provide evidence that the correlation parameter is clearly time-
varying and, therefore, making the assumption that it is constant is fallacious and 
unrealistic. This chapter seeks to contribute to existing research by investigating the 
intertemporal risk-return tradeoff using a BEKK framework whereby the correlation 
parameter between the market portfolio and the respective hedging factors varies with 
time. 
                                                 
16
 The notion of volatility clustering is illustrated in the literature review section of the second chapter of this thesis. 
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 Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) conclude their paper by suggesting that future 
research needs to perhaps investigate whether other factors or modeling techniques can 
better explain the behavior of the dynamic risk premium: “It is left for further research to 
determine whether an alternative set of risk factors or an alternate empirical specification 
might perform better” (p. 314).  The aim of this chapter is to address this very matter.  
Perhaps the long-term government bond yield is not purely representative of shifts in 
economic conditions since it is correlated with the decisions of the central banks and 
government.  Alternative factors within a BEKK framework are discussed in greater 
depth in the proceeding section of this chapter. 
 Guo and Whitelaw (2006) approach the risk-return puzzle from a different angle 
in relation to the studies by Scruggs (1998) and Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003), which 
both use the long-term government bond yield as a hedging portfolio.  Instead, Guo and 
Whitelaw (2006) establish an empirical framework whereby monthly implied volatility 
on the S&P100 options index serves as an instrumental variable for the conditional 
market variance. This is an innovation relative to exiting studies and is justified on the 
basis that implied volatility subsumes the information content of past volatility and is a 
forward-looking measure of future volatility (see Christensen and Prabhala, 1998). 
 Of course, it is worth noting that using implied volatility may not generally 
provide researchers with a better estimate of volatility beyond what is produced by 
conventional models (such as the GARCH framework).  For example, literature on this 
subject has drawn mixed conclusions. Jorion (1995) documents that implied volatility 
predicts future volatility for foreign currency futures. Day and Lewis (1992) and Canina 
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and Figlewski (1993) find that implied volatility on S&P100 index options is not a 
reliable predictor of future volatility. 
 These above findings notwithstanding, Guo and Whitelaw (2006) find, using 
implied volatility, that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is positive and statistically 
significant.  Furthermore, shifts in the dynamic market risk premium appear to be driven 
primarily by shifts in the investment opportunity set and not changes in volatility.  
Therefore, they reach a conclusion similar to Scruggs (1998).  Namely, existing studies 
which document counterintuitive and insignificant results suffer from a “classical omitted 
variables problem” (p. 1436). 
 One obvious drawback to using implied volatility is the fact that it only goes back 
until November 1983. To counter this problem and to check the robustness of their results 
over a larger sample, they estimate volatility using the consumption-wealth ratio (see 
Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001) and the stochastically detrended risk-free rate.17 Even when 
using this approach they obtain qualitatively similar results.  Although the standard error 
for their estimate is higher, they still find relative risk aversion to be significantly positive 
and that the risk premium is driven by changes in the investment opportunity set.  
Therefore, its omission may be responsible for the conflicting findings documented in the 
literature and can result in biased estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
 In terms of defining the hedge component, Guo and Whitelaw (2006) employ an 
empirical specification to describe shocks to expected returns and to the hedge 
component.  This methodology is based on a long-linearization model by Campbell and 
                                                 
17
 Details on the importance and uses of the consumption-wealth ratio, as well as actual data, are available at Professor M. Lettau’s 
website, http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/lettau/. 
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Shiller (1988) and models the risk and hedge component using the risk-free rate and cash 
flow forecasts.18 
 When discussing previous studies and the reason why Scruggs (1998) and 
Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) document conflicting results, they argue that this result 
“Does not imply a rejection of… (Merton’s ICAPM); rather, it challenges the assumption 
that bond returns are perfectly correlated with investment opportunities” (p. 1435).  This 
conclusion is similar to the one discussed from Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) in the 
sense that these authors question whether the long-term government bond yield is a 
perfect proxy for investment opportunities.  Perhaps an alternative set of factors should 
be explored when testing Merton’s (1973) ICAPM; one of the principal suggestions of 
existing authors and the contribution of this chapter. 
 Gerard and Wu (2006) examine the importance of the hedging component within 
the context of investors’ asset allocation strategy and whether omission of this component 
is responsible for the weak risk-return relation described by many authors.  Consistent 
with Turtle, Buse and Korkie (1994), Scruggs (1998) and Scruggs and Glabadanidis 
(2003), they too employ the long-term government bond yield as a hedge factor that 
characterizes how the distribution of returns changes through time as investment 
prospects and economic conditions change.  The study by Gerard and Wu (2006) is 
innovative in the sense that it tests the proposition that the long-term government bond 
yield represents a significant priced risk factor on four broad asset classes: Large stocks, 
small stocks, long-term treasuries and corporate bonds, respectively. They further 
examine the time-varying nature of the market risk component, σM,t2, and the 
                                                 
18
 Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997, Chapter 7) provide a thorough discussion of this methodology. 
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intertemporal risk component, σMF,t, for these broad asset portfolios and whether their 
respective premia fluctuate with shifts in the business cycle.  The benefits associated with 
diversification are equally addressed and whether such benefits are more pronounced 
during recessionary periods relative to periods of economic expansion. 
 They propose a unified framework to explore these questions, adopted from Glen 
and Jorion (1993), in which they construct optimal asset allocation portfolios for different 
classes of investors.  Their objective is to model the respective prices for bearing market 
and intertemporal risk, as well as to allow the covariance between the long-term 
government bond yield and each of the broad asset portfolios mentioned to be time-
varying. This framework thus provides useful insights as to which portfolios are most or 
least sensitive to changes in investment opportunities. This approach is also instrumental 
in identifying whether shifts in the business cycle play a significant role in estimating the 
premia for the market and intertemporal risk components. 
 From their analysis, Gerard and Wu (2006) find that exposure to market and 
intertemporal risk is significantly priced. However, market risk is the dominant form of 
risk for equities while exposure to intertemporal risk accounts for the majority of the risk 
premium for assets comprised of fixed-income instruments.  Therefore, this evidence 
suggests that stocks (especially from small firms) can serve as hedges against shifts in 
investment opportunities:  “Our findings point to the merit of including small stocks in 
long-term strategic asset allocations for investors such as pension funds and insurance 
companies” (p. 2205). 
 As mentioned previously, Artis, Kontolemis and Osborn (1997) find that 
economic conditions respond asymmetrically to shifts in business cycle regimes.  For 
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example, they find that industrial production in the United States declines substantially 
more during economic downturns than it rises during expansionary periods. Therefore 
one can intuitively deduce that intertemporal risk also varies according to general market 
conditions and, especially, to changes in the business cycle.  More specifically, we would 
expect investors to demand a higher premium for bearing intertemporal risk during 
market downturns. 
 Gerard and Wu (2006) test this proposition and find that the effects of business 
cycle shifts on the market and intertemporal risk premia are, in fact, asymmetric in 
nature.  Namely, the price for bearing intertemporal risk during periods of economic 
contraction is much higher relative to periods of economic expansion. Therefore, 
investors demand a relatively higher return to carry intertemporal risk during market 
downturns proportionate to periods when the market is doing well.  Likewise, and not 
surprisingly, the price for bearing systematic risk is also much higher during market 
downturns. 
 These results complement the findings of Artis, Kontolemis and Osborn (1997) 
and highlight the economic significance of considering intertemporal risk when 
constructing a portfolio, especially during down markets. Their study concludes that, 
during economic recessions, the benefits of intertemporal hedging are more pronounced 
and that investors are even willing to pay a premium for this hedging. Gerard and Wu 
(2006) point out that their results are in agreement with a study by Ang and Bekaert 
(2004), who find that investors switch to more liquid investments during periods of 
adverse economic conditions. This finding is also evocative of the recognized market 
phenomena known as “flight to liquidity;” whereby investors, in the face of augmented 
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market volatility and uncertainty, sell their positions in risky and illiquid assets and invest 
in relatively “safer” and more liquid instruments (such as short-term treasuries). 
 Faff and Chan (1998) apply a two-factor variant of Merton’s ICAPM to the 
Australian and World market indices, respectively.  Unlike some of the other studies 
cited which use the long-term government bond yield as a hedging factor, they explore 
whether the price of gold bullion can capture intertemporal risk and if, along with the 
price for market risk, their model can better characterize movements in the dynamic risk 
premium.  They explicitly investigate the possibility of price movements in gold as a 
potential hedging factor in the Australian market and cite three reasons for this: (a) 
Australia is a leader among nations in the production of gold; (b) a large portion of the 
mining companies in Australia are gold mining companies; and (c) Australia’s mining 
sector is a huge source of wealth for its economy.19 
 Their decision to use movements in gold as a hedging factor is also motivated by 
a study by Rubio (1989), which explores the empirical implications of the ICAPM when 
using gold and the long-term government bond yield, respectively, as state factors within 
the Spanish stock exchange.  Findings from Rubio’s (1989) study give a statistically 
unambiguous rejection of Merton’s (1973) ICAPM, regardless of whether the long-term 
government bond yield or gold serves as a hedging factor.  This result calls into question 
whether gold and the long-term government bond yield can serve as adequate proxies for 
the hedging component.  As Rubio (1989) points out, with regards to the long-term risk-
free rate, the Spanish economic authorities imposed tight regulations on the issuance of 
public debt and maintained absolute control over the level of its interest rates.  In 
addition, publicly issued securities came with a predefined set of conditions which had to 
                                                 
19
 For more information, see the Australian Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://www.abs.gov.au. 
 198
be met in order to be qualified for investment by banks and other financial institutions.  
This tight regulation depressed the trading volume of these securities and essentially 
immobilized the exchange of bonds in the secondary market.  This was not surprising 
considering that the market for government issued bonds represented only a small 
percentage of the value of the total market. 
 Although in the United States market such tight regulation does not exist as it 
prevailed for some time in Spain, the long-term government bond yield is still correlated 
to the decisions and actions of the Federal Reserve Bank. Hence, implementation of this 
factor as a hedging component may not necessarily reflect all true intertemporal risk 
which impacts the consumption and marginal utility of investors on aggregate. This point 
forms the basis for the argument in this chapter that perhaps we should seek alternative 
proxies, such as industrial production  and twists in the yield curve, which may serve as 
hedging factors.  
 Keeping this in mind, it is not surprising that Rubio’s (1989) findings reject the 
ICAPM when the long-term government bond yield is used as a hedging factor.  As far as 
gold is concerned, when used as a hedging factor within the framework of Merton’s 
(1973) ICAPM, Rubio (1989) finds that it is no better in characterizing movements in the 
dynamic risk premium:  “It seems, at least when gold is used as the hedging asset, that 
the empirically implemented ICAPM does not provide a more reasonable description of 
security returns than the CAPM” (p. 734). Rubio (1989) expresses in his paper that 
perhaps alternative hedging factors merit consideration and that more research in this area 
is warranted:  “Unfortunately, the failure of the model might be due to the practical 
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impossibility of finding an adequate hedging asset. More research in this direction is 
largely justified” (p. 737). 
 Faff and Chan (1998) seek to expand on this topic by applying gold as a hedging 
factor to the Australian market for the reasons mentioned earlier.  If gold is such an 
important element in Australia’s economy, intuitively, it may therefore serve as an 
appropriate hedging factor which can proxy for changes in intertemporal risk.  Faff and 
Chan (1998) explore this possibility and provide evidence from an earlier paper of theirs 
(see Chan and Faff, 1998) which tests whether price movements in gold have a pervasive 
influence on various industry sector returns in the Australian market.  Similar to applying 
an extended single-period CAPM using ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation (i.e. a 
two-factor CAPM), their model takes the form 
   Ri,t = αi + βiRM,t + γiGPRt + εi,t     
where Ri,t represents the return on the ith industry portfolio at time t.  The return on the 
market index and its corresponding market beta are denoted as RM,t and βi, respectively.  
The return series for the price of gold is denoted as GPRt and its corresponding factor 
loading is represented by γi.  The disturbance term is indicated by εi. 
 When applying this model across different industry sectors, estimates for their 
asset pricing parameters indicate prevalent sensitivity to price movements in gold over 
and above the return on the market index. 
  Further evidence on the usefulness of gold as an effective hedging asset in 
investors’ portfolios has been discussed extensively in literature aimed to practitioners 
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and investors.20 These studies all point to the merit of including gold in investment 
portfolios which, in some cases, can reduce the variance of the overall portfolio. 
 Other academic studies provide evidence that gold is tied to a broad range of 
macroeconomic, and even political, factors; all of which directly impact investors’ 
consumption and ultimately their marginal utility of wealth.  Spieler (1967) presents 
views on how gold can act as a hedge against political unsteadiness.  Koutsoyiannis 
(1983) presents evidence from the U.S. market on the interlinkages gold has with a 
comprehensive set of factors; namely, among others, the strength of the U.S. dollar, 
changes in the interest rate, movements in the expected rate of inflation, the prices of 
other equities and financial instruments, and the world price for oil.  Consistent with a 
priori expectations, the demand for gold (and consequently its price) is inversely related 
to the strength of the U.S. dollar, the rate of interest (which can be rightly construed as 
the opportunity cost of holding gold instead of investing money in possibly other income-
earning assets), and the prices of equities and other financial instruments. Movements in 
the price for crude oil are positively related to the demand and price for gold insofar as 
the official decisions of the OPEC cartel are coherent with real market supply and 
demand conditions. Thus, gold exhibits no statistical relation to the official price in Saudi 
Arabia of crude oil established by the OPEC cartel; an indication that gold reflects real 
fundamentals in the marketplace and not arbitrary forces. 
 Of course, a caveat when measuring the movements of any economic factor 
against another is that no empirical model can wholly give us a pure representation and 
oftentimes there are a multitude of other factors that have not been accounted for.  Capie 
                                                 
20
 See for example Shishko (1977), Carter, Affleck-Graves and Money (1982), Sherman (1982), Landa and Irwin (1987), Jaffe (1989), 
and Adrangi, Chatrath and Raffiee (2003), to name only a few.  
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and Wood (2005) make this point and although find some support that gold can hedge 
against inflation, they remark that this relationship holds “faute de mieux” (p. 352). 
  Nonetheless, given the evidence from their earlier paper; i.e. Chan and Faff 
(1998), and literature discussing gold as a unique asset class which can guard investors’ 
portfolios from adverse shifts in economic conditions, Faff and Chan (1998) proceed to 
test empirically Merton’s (1973) ICAPM.  They focus on the Australian market for the 
reasons outlined earlier and, unlike some of the other studies mentioned which utilize 
some form of the bivariate GARCH framework, instead use the GMM estimation 
procedure. 
Others explore whether other factors, apart from the macroeconomic factors 
proposed by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) can possibly serve as proxies for the investment 
opportunity set, though not exactly within the context of the risk-return tradeoff.  For 
example, Breenan and Xia (2006) explore a variant of Merton’s (1973) ICAPM whereby 
stochastic shifts in investment opportunities are characterized by movements in the 
interest rate and the Sharpe ratio; i.e. the slope of the capital market line (CML).  Their 
study is motivated by an earlier model they developed (see Breeden, Wang and Xia, 
2004) in which variations in the opportunity set are contingent only on the dynamics of 
the interest rate and the Sharpe ratio and, as they report, this model compares favorably to 
the three-factor model proposed by Fama and French (1993, 1995 and 1996). 
 They defend using the Sharpe ratio on theoretical grounds.  Namely, the slope of 
the CML is dependent on the volatility and risk premium of the market portfolio.  As 
already mentioned, one of the major criticisms against the classical single-period CAPM 
is the fact that it ignores changes in the investment opportunity set and does not capture 
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the time-varying properties of risk and the risk premium on the market portfolio.  
However, strong evidence suggests that these parameters are time-varying across 
different time periods and business cycles.  For example, Fama and French (1989), Keim 
and Stambaugh (1986), Kandel and Stambaugh (1989) and Whitelaw (1994), to name 
only a few, use various macroeconomic factors in an attempt to predict returns on the 
market portfolio.  The general consensus is that these macroeconomic factors vary in 
terms of explanatory power across sample periods and shifts in business cycle regimes; 
evidence which supports the notion that the conditional first and second moments of 
market returns are time-varying.  Therefore, given this stylized fact in the literature, we 
would also expect to see time variation in the market Sharpe ratio; something which has 
in fact been documented by authors (see Perez-Quiros and Timmermann, 2000).  Nielsen 
and Vassalou (2001) provide a formal discussion demonstrating that investors wish to 
hedge against any shifts in the intercept (i.e. the interest rate) and slope (i.e. Sharpe ratio) 
of the CML. 
 In light of these previous findings, Breenan and Xia (2006) proceed to test the 
relationship between security betas and the respective risk qualities of their cash flows.  
Consistent with other empirical findings (see for example Cornell, 1999) and with a priori 
expectations, security betas rise when the cash flow maturity is higher.  Expected returns 
on securities appear to be more difficult to decipher than betas on these securities.  Even 
so, their evidence suggests that expected returns are a function of the ‘riskiness’ behind a 
firm’s cash flows as well as shifts in their two state factors; namely, the Sharpe ratio and 
the interest rate.  They conclude that state factors are “likely to be an important 
determinant of the level of stock prices…” (p. 28).   
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 Given the vital importance of considering state factors as a proxy for shift in the 
investment opportunity set, this chapter proceeds to test a two-factor version of the 
Merton (1973) ICAPM in Equation (3.3) across the G-7 stock markets to see whether it is 
possible to detect a positive intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. If so, it is quite possible 
that existing studies which predominantly use some GARCH-in-mean methodology are 
omitting the importance of intertemporal risk in agents’ utility maximization investment 
decision-making. 
 
3.3. Methodology 
The empirical version of the dynamic two-factor model, based on Merton’s (1973) 
ICAPM can be described by equations (3.6a) and (3.6b): 
  rm,t  = λm,0 + λm,m σ
2
m,t + λm,h,tσmh,t + εm,t   (3.6a) 
   rh,t  = λh,0 + λh,m σmh,t + λhhσ
2
h,t  + εh,t    (3.6b) 
 
where, rm,t  is the excess return on the market portfolio, rh,t  is the excess return on the 
hedging factor,  σ2m,t is the conditional variance of the market, σ2h,t the conditional 
variance for the hedging factor, εm,t and εh,t are the error terms and λm,0, λm,m, 
λm,h,t, λh,0, λh,m, λh,h,t are parameters to be estimated. As can be seen from 
Equations (3.6a) and (3.6b) the conditional means of rm,t  and rh,t  are functions of their 
corresponding conditional variances and the conditional covariance.
 
Using matrix 
notation, the variance-covariance equation of the joint distribution of the error terms can 
be written as: 
   Ht = C'C + A'Et-1E't-1A + D'Ut-1U't-1D + B'Ht-1B    (3.7) 
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where, Ht is the (2x2) variance covariance matrix; Et is the (1x2) vector of error terms; Ut 
is the (1x2) vector of negative errors i.e., Ut=min(0, Et); A, B, and D are symmetric (2x2) 
matrix of slope coefficients; and C is the (1x2) vector of constants.   
 Expanding Equation (3.7) and imposing the restriction that the off diagonal 
elements of A, B, and D are zero we obtain the following scalar expressions for the 
variances and the covariance:21 
 
σ
2
m,t = c
2
m + a
2
mε
2
m,t-1 + d2mu2m,t-1 + b2mσ2m,t-1   (3.8a) 
σ
2
h,t = c
2
h + a
2
hε
2
h,t-1 + d2hu2h,t-1 + b2hσ2h,t-1      (3.8b) 
σmh,t = cmch + amahεm,t-1εh,t-1 + dmdhum,t-1uh,t-1 + bmbhσmh,t-1    (3.8c) 
 
The structure of Ht described by Equations (3.8a), (3.8b) and (3.8c) is referred to as the 
BEKK model and it has two advantages over competing multivariate GARCH models. 
Firstly, it ensures that the variance-covariance matrix is positive semi-definite and 
secondly it allows the covariance and the correlation coefficient to be time varying (see 
Engle and Kroner, 1995).  The conditional variances in Equations (3.8a) and (3.8b) are 
functions of past squared residuals and past conditional variances very much like in the 
standard GARCH models. The parameters are squared to ensure non-negativity.  
Likewise, the covariance is a function of the product of past errors and past covariances.  
The model allows for both variances and the covariance to respond asymmetrically to 
past residuals. This asymmetry is introduced via the terms um, t= min(0, εm,t) and uh,t = 
min(0, εh,t).  For example, when εm,t = +1% the conditional variance will increase 
by  a2m and when εm,t = -1% the conditional variance will increase by  a2m + d2m so that 
d2m measures the incremental impact of the negative errors.  A measure of volatility 
asymmetry can be based on the ratio (a2m + d2m)/ a2m.  In the covariance function 
                                                 
21
  Setting the off-diagonal parameters equal to zero is very common and it is done to make the model easier to estimate and interpret. 
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asymmetry is captured by dmdh.   The time-varying correlation coefficient is equal to 
σmh,t /σm,t σh,t.  
 In order to estimate the parameters of the model some assumption needs to be 
made about the joint distribution of the error terms.  Assuming conditional normality, we 
can estimate the parameters by maximizing the sample log-likelihood function which can 
be written as: 
  L(Θ)= -T log(2pi) - (1/2)Σt(logHt+EtHt-1E't) for t=1,…T       (3.9) 
 
where, T is the number of observations, Et=[ εm,t , εh,t] is the vector of errors and Ht is 
the variance-covariance matrix described by Equations (3.7) through (3.8c). The 
maximization of Equation (3.9) is based on the Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (1974) 
algorithm.  The code is written in RATS version 7. 
 
3.4. Data and Major Empirical Findings 
This study applies the dynamic two factor model to the markets of the G-7 (Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and USA). It is important to examine the 
intertemporal risk-return tradeoff in international markets because this carries 
implications about how investors’ risk premium varies with changes in market volatility 
and intertemporal risk of various respective countries. 
The data used are monthly and they consist of the following variables for each 
country: The stock price index, the dividend yield, the 10-year yield to maturity on 
government bonds, the short term-rate on Treasury bills and the industrial production 
index. The sample periods and the number of observations are reported in Table 3.1 and 
are dictated by the availability of all data necessary to complete this study at the time of 
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data collection. It is important that the data came from a single source and I avoided 
splicing together data from different sources such as, for example, adjoining data from 
DataStream with data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (NBER), or other research divisions within various Central Banks. 
 
Table 3.1:   Markets and Sample Sizes 
 
COUNTRY 
 
EXCHANGE SAMPLE PERIOD NUMBER OF 
OBSERVATIONS 
Canada 
 
Toronto January 1980 – May 2008 341 
France 
 
Paris January 1989– May 2008 234 
Germany 
 
Frankfurt January 1975 – May 2008 401 
Italy 
 
Milan January 1980 – May 2008 341 
Japan 
 
Tokyo January 1973 – May 2008 425 
UK 
 
London January 1967 – May 2008 498 
USA 
 
New York January 1968 – May 2008 485 
Note:  For each market, the data set consists of monthly observation on the stock price index and its corresponding 
dividend yield, the industrial production index, the yield on the 10-year government bond and the yield on the 3-month 
Treasury bill. 
 
The stock price index and the dividend yield are used to calculate monthly excess 
returns on the stock market portfolio.  The 10-year yield to maturity is used to calculate 
the one-month holding period excess return on the long-term bond. The calculation is 
based on the duration, assuming yields to maturity correspond to par value bonds. The 
slope of the yield curve is calculated as the difference between long-term and short-term 
yields to maturity.   
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 Preliminary statistics for the market excess return, the long-term rate excess 
return, percent changes in industrial production and changes in the slope of the yield 
curve are reported in Table 3.2. 
 
 
Table 3.2:  Descriptive Statistics 
 Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
Market Excess Returns       
Mean 0.7977 0.5220 0.7849 0.9682 0.2872 0.9759 0.7264 
Standard Deviation 4.6206 5.6549 5.9144 6.9904 5.1724 5.6222 4.4983 
Skewness -1.2083 -0.5454 -0.8473 0.3157 -0.4537 0.0513 -0.7140 
Kurtosis 5.0432 0.4772 3.0797 1.4985 1.9454 8.4582 2.7063 
Minimum 
-25.3622 -18.9168 -29.1330 -22.9901 -22.7172 -30.7932 -24.2862 
Maximum 13.7084 12.8619 19.6155 28.6602 16.7493 42.7850 15.3846 
Long Bond Excess Returns       
Mean 0.8418 0.6223 0.6301 1.0038 0.50030 0.7809 0.6481 
Standard Deviation 2.2121 1.5525 1.4443 2.0213 2.0179 1.8956 2.0171 
Skewness 0.3414 0.2437 -0.2627 0.6272 0.0621 0.7404 0.3832 
Kurtosis 3.3312 0.2354 0.7106 2.9255 4.2992 2.0542 2.5335 
Minimum 
-7.8612 -3.2885 -5.2204 -4.9533 -9.2922 -5.3024 -7.8500 
Maximum 12.3358 5.2112 5.6695 11.2142 9.7178 9.5779 9.7851 
% Change in Industrial Production     
Mean 0.1276 0.0076 0.9867 0.00198 0.0841 0.0637 0.1733 
Standard Deviation 5.8888 1.1987 1.7247 32.6098 1.6744 1.3988 0.7576 
Skewness -0.7366 -0.4506 -0.0295 -0.0705 -1.4901 -0.1295 -1.0570 
Kurtosis 0.1277 2.0115 6.3930 2.8084 8.5569 10.6126 4.4613 
Minimum 
-15.9697 -5.4250 -9.4310 -9.7082 -10.6272 -8.1973 -4.0380 
Maximum 10.7418 3.3052 11.2711 9.6522 5.7787 9.4243 2.3643 
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Table 3.2 {Continued} 
Changes in the Slope of the Yield Curve      
Mean 0.0151 0.0133 0.0008 0.0114 -0.0012 0.0092 0.0056 
Standard Deviation 0.5514 0.3929 0.3530 0.5646 0.3973 0.5532 0.4066 
Skewness -0.9895 0.0225 -2.0099 0.5377 0.0437 -0.8791 0.6714 
Kurtosis 12.7435 6.0008 23.4449 6.0925 3.2773 5.8169 12.8650 
Minimum 
-4.1400 -1.8600 -3.4700 -2.0180 -1.6500 -3.6700 -2.1900 
Maximum 2.8100 2.0100 1.4762 3.5480 1.8861 1.8300 3.3300 
Note: The sample period of these statistics are found in Table 3.1. The following indices are used: Toronto 300 
Composite (Canada), CAC industrial price index (France), DAX price index (Germany), Milano price index (Italy), 
Nikkei 225 (Japan), FT All Share Index (UK) and the S&P 500 (USA). 
 
 
The sample means for the market and the long term rate excess returns are mostly 
significant with minor exceptions, whereas the means of percent changes in industrial 
production and changes in the slope of the yield curve are insignificant. Measures of 
skewness and kurtosis are almost always significant implying that the sample 
distributions are not normal. A good part of the non-normality is due to conditional 
heteroskedasticity (i.e., ARCH effects) which is present in most economic and especially 
financial time series and was discussed in further detail in the second chapter of this 
thesis. 
Table 3.3 reports pairwise correlations along with the corresponding t-statistics 
for the three hedging instruments used in this study.  As can be seen, the correlations 
between changes in the long-bond rate and changes in industrial production are very low 
and statistically no different than zero. The same is true for the correlations between 
industrial production and changes in the yield curve.  On the other hand, the correlations 
between the changes in the long term rate and changes in the yield curve are negative and 
in most cases statistically significant, even though the numerical values are very low.  It 
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should be pointed out though that these correlations are not very informative as far as 
their independent explanatory power in the dynamic two-factor ICAPM. The reason is 
that the model uses as explanatory variables the variances and the covariances rather than 
the variables themselves.   
 
 
Table 3.3:     Pairwise Factor Correlations 
 Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
ρB,IP 0.0605 
(1.084) 
-0.0549 
(-0.902) 
-0.0315 
(-0.742) 
0.0120 
(0.228) 
-0.0709 
(-1.081) 
-0.0321 
(-0.725) 
-0.0545 
(-0.579) 
ρB,YC -0.2745 
(-3.648)** 
-0.3749 
(-4.606)** 
-0.1438 
(-1.830)* 
-0.2134 
(-3.255)** 
-0.6009 
(-7.139)** 
-0.1351 
(-2.621)** 
-0.1340 
(-1.597) 
ρIP,YC
 
-0.0718 
(-1.555) 
-0.0367 
(-0.227) 
-0.0776 
(-1.408) 
0.0298 
(0.662) 
0.0331 
(0.861) 
-0.0169 
(-0.379) 
-0.0782 
(-1.255) 
Note:   (**) and (*) denote significance at the 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
ρB,IP is the correlation coefficient between the holding period return on the long bond and percent changes in industrial production; 
ρB,YC is the correlation coefficient between the holding period return on the long bond and changes in the slope of the yield curve;  
ρIP,YC  is the correlation coefficient between percent changes in industrial production and changes in the slope of the yield curve. 
Under the null hypothesis that the true correlation is zero, the t-statistic is calculated as  t =[ ρ(T-2)1/2]/ [(1-ρ2)1/2] where ρ is the 
estimated correlation coefficient.  
 
 
Tables 3.4 through 3.7 report results from univariate asymmetric GARCH models 
(see Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle, 1993) for the market excess returns and the three 
variables used as hedging instruments; namely, the long bond excess returns, percent 
changes in industrial production and changes in the slope of the yield curve. 
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Table 3.4:  Asymmetric GARCH-M for Excess Market Returns (rm,t) 
 
  rm,t  =  λ0  + λ1 σ
2
m,t  + ε m,t  and σ2m,t =  c2+ a2ε2m,t-1 + d2 u2m,t-1  +  b2σ2m,t-1 
 
 Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
λ0 
 
1.2641 
(1.755)* 
1.0082 
(1.088) 
0.7407 
(1.457) 
1.0584 
(1.420) 
1.0691 
(2.451)** 
0.7155 
(2.195)* 
0.7321 
(1.167) 
λ1 -0.0131 
(-0.290) 
-0.0058 
(-0.174) 
0.0063 
(0.367) 
0.0008 
(0.046) 
0.0243 
(1.220) 
0.0162 
(1.502) 
0.0065 
(0.188) 
c2 11.9994 
(5.199)* 
8.9349 
(2.099)** 
1.3721 
(2.145)** 
5.0446 
(1.820)* 
0.4801 
(2.159)** 
1.3964 
(2.036)** 
7.8077 
(3.682)** 
a2 0.0695 
(1.512) 
0.0536 
(0.633) 
0.1838 
(2.727)* 
0.2120 
(2.973)* 
0.0615 
(2.549)* 
0.1696 
(3.590)* 
0.0730 
(1.506) 
d2 0.6723 
(5.303)* 
0.2988 
(1.739)* 
0.0748 
(1.337) 
0.0701 
(1.098) 
0.0422 
(1.422) 
0.0110 
(0.228) 
0.2835 
(2.620)** 
b2 0.1503 
(1.295) 
0.4837 
(2.263)** 
0.8277 
(18.469)* 
0.7216 
(6.890)** 
0.9002 
(41.479)** 
0.7974 
(18.263)** 
0.4981 
(3.210)** 
Note:   (**) and (*) denote significance at the 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 3.5:  Asymmetric GARCH-M for Excess Long-Term Bond Returns (rh,,t) 
 
  rh,t  =  λ0  + λ1 σ
2
h,t + ε m,t  and σ2h,t =  c2+ a2ε2m,t-1 + d2 u2h,t-1  +  b2σ2h,t-1 
 
 Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
λ0 
 
0.3621 
(2.210)** 
1.7233 
(2.445)** 
0.5623 
(0.585) 
0.6802 
(4.989)** 
0.3207 
(2.773)** 
0.3046 
(1.907)* 
0.1967 
(1.072) 
λ1 0.1139 
(2.501)** 
-0.4302 
(-1.430) 
0.2767 
(4.987)** 
0.0218 
(0.600) 
0.0426 
(1.148) 
0.1301 
(2.417)** 
0.1172 
(2.196)** 
c2 0.0265 
(0.817) 
0.5044 
(1.167) 
1.9158 
(9.019)** 
0.7577 
(3.429)** 
0.4488 
(4.366)** 
0.0055 
(0.366) 
0.1884 
(2.937)** 
a2 0.0271 
(1.170) 
0.0187 
(0.376) 
0.0378 
(5.575)** 
0.6311 
(4.143)** 
0.5286 
(4.887)** 
0.0422 
(2.773)** 
0.1093 
(3.001)** 
d2 0.0432 
(1.325) 
0.1161 
(1.013) 
0.1150 
(9.610)** 
0.1175 
(0.679) 
0.2146 
(1.769)* 
0.0070 
(0.356) 
0.0047 
(0.137) 
b2 0.9394 
(52.829)** 
0.7251 
(3.751)** 
0.08623 
(0.974) 
0.3701 
(4.247)** 
0.5353 
(7.817)** 
0.9537 
(99.295)** 
0.8448 
(25.508)** 
Note:   (**) and (*) denote significance at the 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 3.6:  Asymmetric GARCH-M for Percent Changes in Industrial Production (rh,,t) 
 
  rh,t  =  λ0  + λ1 σ
2
h,t + ε m,t  and σ2h,t =  c2+ a2ε2m,t-1 + d2 u2h,t-1  +  b2σ2h,t-1 
 
 Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
λ0 
 
-2801 
(-0.685) 
-6.4870 
(-1.028) 
 0.1944 
(3.056)** 
-4.0292 
(-2.374)** 
-2.9584 
(-2.066)** 
0.0200 
(0.344) 
0.7719 
(11.900)** 
λ1 8.1088 
(0.115) 
6.6040 
(1.048) 
23.7310 
(0.087) 
1.5040 
(0.165) 
1.8278 
(2.140)** 
0.0451 
(1.197) 
-1.3188 
(-7.181)** 
c2 15.7849 
(3.562)** 
1.3533 
(9.200)** 
3.1394 
(6.012)** 
16.768 
(2.946)** 
2.4346 
(7.503)** 
0.7190 
(6.995)** 
0.0695 
(3.201)** 
a2 0.3290 
(5.381)** 
0.0328 
(1.006) 
0.0718 
(5.741)** 
0.2482 
(6.008)** 
0.0536 
(1.847)* 
0.5083 
(4.496)** 
0.0681 
(5.346)** 
d2 0.4346 
(2.593)** 
0.0859 
(1.012) 
0.3890 
(6.635)** 
0.4736 
(4.763)** 
0.1070 
(2.041)** 
0.3724 
(2.181)** 
0.2611 
(4.997)** 
b2 0.5538 
(4.242)** 
0.3718 
(3.417)** 
0.0250 
(0.162) 
0.0329 
(0.169) 
0.8526 
(11.294)** 
0.0632 
(1.202) 
0.7790 
(12.050)** 
Note:   (**) and (*) denote significance at the 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 3.7:  Asymmetric GARCH-M for Changes in the Yield Curve (rh,,t) 
 
  rh,t  =  λ0  + λ1 σ
2
h,t + ε m,t  and σ2h,t =  c2+ a2ε2m,t-1 + d2 u2h,t-1  +  b2σ2h,t-1 
 
 Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
λ0 
 
-0.0678 
(-2.713)** 
-0.0278 
(-1.763)* 
-0.0205 
(-1.154) 
-0.0266 
(-1.750)* 
-0.0097 
(-0.847) 
0.0050 
(0.239) 
-0.0181 
(-1.018) 
λ1 0.2552 
(2.432)** 
0.1720 
(0.892) 
0.1706 
(0.714) 
0.0849 
(0.772) 
0.0537 
(0.404) 
-0.0491 
(-0.479) 
0.0478 
(0.308) 
c2 0.0090 
(3.057)** 
0.0003 
(0.296) 
0.0006 
(1.274) 
0.0006 
(0.540) 
0.0008 
(2.084)** 
0.0001 
(0.448) 
0.0107 
(3.446)** 
a2 0.3255 
(3.942)** 
0.2059 
(2.635)** 
0.0763 
(3.660)** 
0.2119 
(2.819)** 
0.0413 
(2.201)** 
0.0721 
(5.184)** 
0.3185 
(4.832)** 
d2 0.1231 
(1.580) 
0.0490 
(0.473) 
0.0535 
(1.577) 
0.0569 
(0.569) 
0.1810 
(3.662)** 
0.0470 
(2.843)** 
0.0400 
(0.462) 
b2 0.7405 
(16.420)** 
0.7909 
(16.804)** 
0.9032 
(48.811)** 
0.7892 
(21.088)** 
0.8712 
(47.776)** 
0.9539 
(132.487)** 
0.6333 
(11.154) 
Note:   (**) and (*) denote significance at the 5% and 10% significance level 
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We can think of these models as restricted bivariate GARCH models where the 
covariances are set equal to zero.  Table 3.4 reports the results for the market excess 
returns. As can be seen the market premium linked to the market risk (variance) is 
insignificant for all seven countries.  Of course, this is a recurrent theme by most studies 
mentioned in the second chapter of this thesis. One of the explanations for this finding is 
based on the argument that the univariate model is misspecified because it ignores the 
role of the hedging factor (see Merton, 1973; Scruggs, 1998). 
 Regarding the dynamics of the conditional variance, the results show that the 
variance at time t is a function of the innovation or, error term, and the conditional 
variance at time t-1.  There is evidence of asymmetry (measured by coefficient d) in the 
conditional variance in the case of Canada, France and the USA.  The implication of this 
is that the variance rises more when innovations are negative (market declines) than it 
does when innovations are positive (market advances).  For the remaining markets there 
is no evidence of asymmetry. Also, with the exception of Canada, the degree of 
persistence measured by coefficient b is high. 
 Table 3.5 reports the results for the excess returns on the long bond. It is 
interesting to observe that in four out of the seven cases, the risk premium linked to the 
conditional variance is positive and statistically significant.  Specifically, in the cases of 
Canada, Germany, the UK and the USA the excess return on the long bond is a positive 
function of the level of the conditional variance. The relevant coefficient λ1 is positive 
and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance at least. This contrasts sharply 
with the total lack of such a relationship in the case of excess stock market returns.  The 
dynamics of the conditional variances are similar to those for excess stock returns, i.e., 
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the variance at time t is a function of innovations and variances at time t-1.  There is little 
evidence asymmetries in the variance given that the asymmetry parameter d is 
insignificant with the exception of Germany (at 5%) and Japan at (10%).   
 The results for industrial production are reported on Table 3.6.  It is remarkable 
that in most cases (with the exception of France) the volatility of industrial production is 
asymmetric. The asymmetry parameter d is statistically significant at the 5% level at 
least. This in turn implies that negative innovations to industrial production are associated 
with higher volatility than positive innovations. Moreover, in the case of the USA the 
higher volatility leads to reduced industrial production as can be seen from coefficient λ1.  
The opposite is true for Japan, whereas for the rest of the countries λ1 is insignificant.  
Similarly, for yield curve slope changes, Table 3.7 shows that volatility is a function of 
past innovations and past volatilities. Asymmetry is significant only for Japan and the UK 
and the risk premium parameter λ1 is significant only for Canada.   
 These preliminary results shed some light into the time-series properties of the 
excess market returns as well as the three variables that are being used as candidates for 
hedging instruments namely, excess returns on long-term bonds, changes in industrial 
production and changes in the yield curve. They do not take into account however the 
potential impact of the hedging factor. For that we turn to the dynamic two-factor 
ICAPM described by equations (3.6a) and (3.6b). 
 The results of the bivariate dynamic model are reported in Tables 3.8, 3.9, and 
3.10, for each respective hedging factor. The focus now is on the behavior of the 
conditional risk premium and to see whether there is a positive intertemporal risk-return 
tradeoff. 
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Table 3.8:  Bivariate BEKK Model with the Long Term Excess Return as Hedging Factor 
  rm,t  =  λm,0  + λm,m σ
2
m,t +  λm,h σm,f,t  +  ε m,t   
 rh,t  =  λh,0  + λh,m  σm,f,t   +  λh,h σ
2
h,t  +  ε h,t   
Ht = C'C + A' Et-1E't-1 A + D' Ut-1U't-1 D + B' Ht-1B 
 Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
λm,0 
 
0.9656 
(2.570)** 
-1.9728 
(-1.159) 
1.1429 
(2.054)** 
0.3518 
(0.469) 
0.6487 
(1.406) 
0.3842 
(1.091) 
0.2294 
(0.459) 
λmm -0.0094 
(-1.163) 
0.0069 
(0.391) 
-0.0061 
(-0.501) 
0.0086 
(0.724) 
-0.0051 
(-0.331) 
0.0077 
(1.218) 
0.0090 
(0.453) 
λmh
 0.0745 
(0.663) 
2.0637 
(1.531) 
-0.1620 
(-0.307) 
0.1978 
(1.238) 
-0.0867 
(-0.640) 
0.1240 
(2.275)** 
0.2787 
(1.858)* 
λh,0 
 
0.3193 
(1.292) 
1.7602 
(3.277)** 
1.2113 
(6.493)** 
0.9099 
(5.546)** 
0.4740 
(3.647)** 
0.2529 
(1.564) 
0.2675 
(1.486) 
λhm 0.0271 
(0.489) 
-0.3775 
(-0.935) 
-0.1445 
(-1.121) 
0.0224 
(0.472) 
0.0209 
(0.377) 
0.0642 
(3.558)** 
0.1736 
(2.417)** 
λhh
 0.1031 
(3.098)** 
-0.2586 
(-1.759)* 
-0.2539 
(-3.385)** 
0.0143 
(0.848) 
0.0035 
(0.228) 
0.0861 
(2.475)** 
0.0343 
(0.831) 
 Model with Zero Constants     
λmm -0.0031 
(-0.396) 
0.0020 
(0.115) 
0.0123 
(1.479) 
0.0130 
(1.725)* 
0.0119 
(1.264) 
0.0112 
(2.046)** 
0.0164 
(1.381) 
λmh
 0.2604 
(3.005)** 
0.6187 
(1.205) 
0.2545 
(0.520) 
0.2266 
(1.539) 
-0.0637 
(-0.473) 
0.1460 
(2.882)** 
0.3156 
(2.495)** 
λhm 0.0727 
(1.699)* 
0.5675 
(1.968)** 
0.2002 
(1.623) 
0.1575 
(3.712)** 
0.0889 
(1.674)* 
0.0721 
(4.163)** 
0.2035 
(2.947)** 
λhh
 0.1328 
(5.514)** 
-0.0389 
(-0.291) 
0.1701 
(4.385)** 
0.0625 
(4.149)** 
0.0286 
(2.054)** 
0.1282 
(5.793)** 
0.0754 
(2.451)** 
LM 5.5665 5.4754 8.3428 3.2626 5.7856 3.6276 3.4299 
Note:   (**) and (*) denote significance at the 5% and 10% significance level. 
The variance covariance matrix is estimated using the BEKK model. LM is the likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis that the 
constants are zero. It is distributed as a χ2 with 2 degrees of freedom. The 5% critical value is 5.99. 
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Table 3.9:  Bivariate BEKK Model with Industrial Production as Hedging Factor 
  rm,t  =  λm,0  + λm,m σ
2
m,t +  λm,h σm,f,t  +  ε m,t   
 rh,t  =  λh,0  + λh,m  σm,f,t   +  λh,h σ
2
h,t  +  ε h,t   
Ht = C'C + A' Et-1E't-1 A + D' Ut-1U't-1 D + B' Ht-1B 
 Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
λm,0 
 
1.4878 
(3.795)** 
0.3417 
(0.515) 
0.8827 
(1.625) 
1.6958 
(1.211) 
0.6308 
(1.369) 
0.6871 
(2.090)** 
0.6821 
(1.604) 
λmm -0.0132 
(-1.521) 
0.0100 
(0.566) 
-0.0074 
(-0.605) 
0.0092 
(0.766) 
-0.0068 
(-0.457) 
0.0112 
(1.794)* 
0.0017 
(0.087) 
λmh
 0.0970 
(1.354) 
-1.3473 
(-0.720) 
0.8518 
(1.087) 
0.0509 
(0.811) 
-0.3036 
(-0.371) 
-0.1190 
(-0.811) 
-0.7201 
(-0.958) 
λh,0 
 
-5.5904 
(-5.079)** 
-0.4023 
(-1.640) 
-0.1145 
(-0.481) 
-0.4295 
(-0.706) 
-0.1870 
(-1.174) 
-0.0852 
(-1.297) 
0.3503 
(8.779)** 
λhm 0.0596 
(0.686) 
0.0871 
(0.235) 
-0.1082 
(-0.483) 
-0.3813 
(-1.556) 
-0.3320 
(-1.503) 
0.1120 
(3.183)** 
0.0443 
(0.382) 
λhh
 0.1729 
(5.677)** 
0.3934 
(1.984)** 
0.1010 
(1.442) 
0.0421 
(13.145)** 
0.2025 
(2.690)** 
0.0739 
(6.334)** 
-0.2538 
(-7.258)** 
 
 Model with Zero Constants    
λmm 0.0089 
(1.359) 
0.0174 
(1.758)* 
0.0075 
(0.923) 
0.0145 
(1.298) 
0.0101 
(1.207) 
0.0196 
(4.095)** 
0.0291 
(2.758)** 
λmh
 
-0.0884 
(-1.652)* 
-1.5392 
(-0.841) 
1.2714 
(1.714)* 
-0.0152 
(-0.487) 
-0.1871 
(-0.229) 
-0.1113 
(-0.756) 
-0.8532 
(-1.140) 
λhm 0.1319 
(1.485) 
0.1311 
(0.353) 
-0.1399 
(-0.653) 
1.1185 
(8.515)** 
-0.3978 
(-1.860)* 
0.1095 
(3.116)** 
-0.3846 
(-3.400)** 
λhh
 0.0281 
(2.53)** 
0.0836 
(1.385) 
0.0706 
(2.326)** 
0.0295 
(10.353)** 
0.1229 
(3.744)** 
0.0679 
(6.335)** 
-0.1041 
(-3.166)** 
LM 8.5387 2.2613 3.7104 3.8447 2.3070 4.7288 5.7699 
Note:   (**) and (*) denote significance at the 5% and 10% significance level. 
The variance covariance matrix is estimated using the BEKK model. LM is the likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis that 
the constants are zero. It is distributed as a χ2 with 2 degrees of freedom. The 5% critical value is 5.99. 
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Table 3.10:  Bivariate BEKK Model with Yield Curve as Hedging Factor 
  rm,t  =  λm,0  + λm,m σ
2
m,t +  λm,h σm,f,t  +  ε m,t   
 rh,t  =  λh,0  + λh,m  σm,f,t   +  λh,h σ
2
h,t  +  ε h,t   
Ht = C'C + A' Et-1E't-1 A + D' Ut-1U't-1 D + B' Ht-1B 
 Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
λm,0 
 
0.9520 
(2.837)** 
0.6082 
(0.859) 
1.0034 
(1.891)* 
0.5560 
(0.799) 
0.3148 
(0.655) 
0.4464 
(0.940) 
0.7236 
(1.710)* 
λmm -0.0050 
(-0.581) 
0.0072 
(0.402) 
-0.0060 
(-0.488) 
0.0097 
(0.814) 
-0.0068 
(-0.455) 
0.0121 
(1.877)* 
0.0040 
(0.203) 
λmh
 
-0.8247 
(-1.004) 
0.8762 
(0.614) 
-1.3573 
(-0.553) 
0.7568 
(1.858)* 
-3.4460 
(-1.981)** 
0.7550 
(0.683) 
0.3740 
(0.446) 
λh,0 
 
-0.0470 
(-1.312) 
-0.0313 
(-0.933) 
-0.0442 
(-2.082)** 
-0.0148 
(-0.389) 
-0.0040 
(-0.142) 
-0.0848 
(-1.728)* 
0.0003 
(0.014) 
λhm -0.2680 
(-2.752)** 
0.0907 
(0.918) 
-0.0466 
(-0.318) 
-0.0515 
(-1.547) 
0.2050 
(1.456) 
0.3428 
(3.237)** 
-0.2921 
(-3.721)** 
λhh
 0.0773 
(1.457) 
0.2548 
(2.687)** 
0.2183 
(3.022)** 
0.0679 
(1.115) 
0.1224 
(1.319) 
-0.0216 
(-0.170) 
0.1032 
(1.832)* 
 
 
 
Model with Zero Constants  
 
 
 
 
 
λmm 0.0111 
(1.698)* 
0.0197 
(1.919)* 
0.0128 
(1.778)* 
0.0177 
(2.726)** 
0.0011 
(0.129) 
0.0158 
(3.131)** 
0.0340 
(3.586)** 
λmh
 
-2.0292 
(-2.856)** 
0.3920 
(0.299) 
-2.5248 
(-1.060) 
0.7955 
(1.968)** 
-3.8034 
(-2.304)** 
1.5052 
(1.966)** 
0.3997 
(0.476) 
λhm -0.2350 
(-2.495)** 
0.1363 
(1.587) 
0.0423 
(0.301) 
-0.0529 
(-1.599) 
0.2136 
(1.681)* 
0.2688 
(2.770)** 
-0.2919 
(-3.844)** 
λhh
 0.0460 
(0.969) 
0.2058 
(2.608)** 
0.1453 
(2.290)** 
0.0542 
(1.094) 
0.1147 
(1.527) 
-0.1701 
(-1.802)* 
0.1036 
(2.088)** 
LM 4.2885 3.1558 7.8051 2.2114 3.9172 5.8980 5.3774 
Note:   (**) and (*) denote significance at the 5% and 10% significance level. 
The variance covariance matrix is estimated using the BEKK model. LM is the likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis that the 
constants are zero. It is distributed as a χ2 with 2 degrees of freedom. The 5% critical value is 5.99. 
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Specifically, we want to see whether the risk premium on market excess returns and 
hedging factor excess returns are functions of their corresponding conditional variances 
and the conditional covariance. The theoretical two-factor model of the Merton (1973) 
assumes that the intercept is zero [see Equation (3.1)].  Scruggs (1998) points out that the 
intercept could be justified if there are market imperfections such as taxes, transactions 
costs, or preferred habitats.  To test for the significance for such imperfections, the 
dynamic bivariate model is estimated with and without intercepts. The estimated 
parameters for the conditional variances are similar to the estimates obtained in the 
univariate models and they are not reported to save space.  Table 3.8 reports the results 
when the hedging instrument used is the excess returns on long term bonds.  Focusing on 
the model with constants, we see that regarding the conditional market premium, the 
market conditional variance is insignificant across all countries.  The conditional 
covariance between excess market returns and excess bond returns is significant for the 
UK (at the 5% level at least) and for the US (at the 10% level).  The covariance term is 
also significant for the UK and the US in the case of the risk premium of the long term 
rate.  Interestingly, the conditional variance of the long term rate is significant in the 
cases of Canada, Germany and the UK even though for Germany the sign is negative.  
When the constants are restricted to be zero, the market conditional variance becomes 
significant for the market premium in the cases of Italy and the UK whereas the 
covariance term is significant for Canada, the UK and the US.  The results are more 
interesting for the conditional risk premium of the long term rate. For example, the 
covariance term becomes significant for all countries with the exception of Germany. 
Similarly, the conditional variance term of the long term rate is significant with the only 
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exception being France.  On the basis of the likelihood ratio test, the restriction that the 
constants are zero cannot be rejected across all countries with the exception of Germany 
and using a 5% level of significance.  
 Contrasting these findings with those of Scruggs and Glabanidis (2003) it can be 
said that the results here are more favorable for the two-factor dynamic model than their 
findings. It should be pointed out that these authors investigated only the US financial 
markets, whereas the evidence presented here covers the G-7 industrialized nations.   
 Table 3.9 reports the empirical findings when the industrial production is used as 
the hedging asset.  The model with the constant shows again that the market conditional 
variance cannot consistently and reliably explain variations in the market premium. When 
the model is estimated with constants restricted to zero, we then begin to see that it can 
better explain variations in investors’ risk premium. In particular, the conditional 
variance parameter becomes significant for France, UK and the US, while intertemporal 
risk exhibits significance for Italy, Japan, UK and the US. Such an empirical observation 
provides support for the theoretical ICAPM of Merton (1973) that markets are in 
equilibrium on aggregate and that model estimation does not require inclusion of a 
constant term. Again, this is corroborated with the results from estimation of the 
likelihood ratio statistic which supports the model without a constant, with only the 
exception of Canada in this case. 
Table 3.10 reports the results when the hedging instrument used is changes in the 
slope of the yield curve. The results with the constants are similar to the earlier findings 
when the long term rate or, industrial production was used. The restricted model however 
shows some intriguing results regarding the market risk premium. As reported here and in 
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numerous other studies, the market variance fails in most cases to explain variation in the 
market premium. The results in Table 3.10 show that in the restricted model, the market 
conditional variance is a significant determinant of the market risk premium in six out of 
the seven markets (the exception being Japan).  This is clearly a one finding and one that 
supports the use of the dynamic two factor model with the hedging factor being the shape 
of the yield curve.  The covariance factor is also significant in four out of the seven cases.  
For the conditional risk premium of the hedging factor, the covariance is significant for 
Canada, Japan, UK and the US, and the variance is significant for France, Germany, UK 
and the US. 
 Overall the results show that the two factor model is doing a good job in 
explaining the risk premium dynamics of the excess market returns and the hedging 
instrument returns. Specifically, the long term rate and the industrial production do a 
better job in explain the risk premium of the hedging factor and the changes in the slope 
of the yield curve does a better job in explaining the market risk premium.     
 The strong message however that this empirical investigation conveys is that it is 
important for researchers to consider the importance of the hedging factor when examining 
the behavior of the dynamic risk premium and the nature of the intertemporal risk-return 
tradeoff. As Cochrane (2001) points out, the ICAPM has been sitting on the shelf and has 
not received rigorous empirical attention, at least not in its two-factor form which postulates 
that the dynamic risk premium is a function of the conditional market variance and its 
covariance with investment opportunities which shift stochastically through time. The 
findings in this chapter suggest a positive risk-return tradeoff as did the findings of the 
second chapter. However, in this case, the methodological exploration in trying to uncover 
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this relationship is different in that this chapter focused on the importance of including 
intertemporal risk in our modelling. 
 
 
3.5. Concluding Remarks 
Merton’s (1973) intertemporal capital asset pricing framework serves as a paradigm for 
our understanding of how investors maximize their utility in a continuous-time economy 
that experiences stochastic changes.  A large body of empirical literature applies some 
variant of this model to explore the intertemporal nature of the risk-return relation; this is, 
after all, one of the cornerstones in modern financial theory. 
 Most empirical work that theorizes on this relation applies some technique to 
either estimate a simple or partial equation expressed in Equation (3.2) and Equation 
(3.3), respectively.  The second chapter of this thesis discusses literature that models the 
simple tradeoff between risk and return.  This literature, as was discussed, tends to 
implement some form of (G)ARCH modeling to estimate the conditional second 
moments of aggregate stock returns.  GARCH-in-mean modeling is particularly popular 
since it simultaneously links the conditional first and second moments of stock returns in 
order to form a simple estimate of investors’ aggregate degree of risk aversion.  Evidence 
from these studies offers conflicting inferences as to the nature of this important tradeoff; 
some find it to be positive, others negative and, still others, find it to be statistically 
indistinguishable from zero.   
Volatility feedback is reputedly responsible for the conflicting results whereby an 
increase in volatility leads to an increase in the required rate of return and, subsequently, 
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a drop in the underlying asset’s price. The second chapter makes the case that the 
earnings-yield is the required rate of return demanded by investors and should be 
regressed against the conditional variance series derived from the asymmetric GJR-
GARCH to form a simple estimate of investors’ aggregate level of risk aversion. 
International evidence from this procedure suggests a positive and significant short- and 
long-run intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. 
This chapter however presents literature and evidence to suggest that, perhaps, the 
reason why empirical tests of this important relation yield contradictory results is because 
they omit the so-called “hedging” component from their analysis. The hedging 
component, as is defined by Merton (1973) reflects the investment opportunities and 
conditions which have some bearing on all investors. As Merton (1973) suggested, the 
long-term government bond yield may be useful in interpreting as a hedging factor and to 
use in order to motivate his two-factor ICAPM. Scruggs (1998) proceeds with this 
premise, yet makes the weak assumption that the conditional correlation between the 
market and long-term government bond yield is time-invariant. Recent research however 
argues that the correlation between market returns and bond returns is not ‘static’ but 
dynamic and time-varying (see for example Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard, 2006). 
This chapter makes a contribution to extant literature by relaxing this assumption 
and exploring the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff on an international level utilizing 
alternative factors as the hedging component. Allowing the covariance parameter 
between the state factor and the market portfolio to be time-varying is more intuitively 
realistic since the interaction between the investment opportunity set and the market 
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portfolio undoubtedly changes through time (especially during changes in the business 
cycle). 
When Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) relax this assumption they are 
unsuccessful in explaining variations in the dynamic market risk premium and in 
detecting a positive intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. As I argue in this chapter, it is 
important to understand that the long-term government bond yield, despite the 
information content it embodies regarding cost of capital, ease of obtaining credit and 
macroeconomic conditions at large, it is a factor which is influenced to a large extent by 
central banks. As such there are alternative factors that merit consideration. However, we 
need to be careful when doing this in order to avoid criticisms made by other researchers 
that the ICAPM may inaccurately be viewed as a “fishing license” (see Fama, 1991) 
whereby researchers “fish” for state factors that may yield empirically desirable results. 
The hedging factors used in this empirical chapter are motivated by theory and on 
the basis of what these factors truly represent. An argument that is made here is that, 
since the long-term government bond yield is to a large extent correlated with central 
banks’ policies regardless of which market you look at, it may be necessary to investigate 
the viability of other hedging factors. So far in the literature we know that volatility 
feedback is reputedly responsible for the conflicting findings in studies investigating the 
simple intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. This is illustrated in the second chapter. In this 
chapter, I cite evidence that perhaps omission of the hedging component is responsible 
for the conflicting findings since it is necessary to account for intertemporal risk. Despite 
this, evidence is still inconclusive. 
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Up until now, there has not been a clear reason why Scruggs (1998) and Scruggs 
and Glabadanidis (2003) find conflicting evidence and whether implementing a two-
factor ICAPM can uncover a positive risk-return tradeoff. This chapter sheds new light 
into this and shows that future research needs to focus on identifying other state factors 
that can proxy for the investment opportunity set and which reflect real conditions in the 
economy that impact all investors. 
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- Chapter Four - 
An Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model with Heterogeneous 
Expectations 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The economic theory of uncertainty and its role on investor behavior is a foundation for 
much of modern empirical finance. A utility-maximizing agent must make decisions and 
constantly adjust their exposure to risk based on the distribution of investment 
opportunities and economic conditions which shift randomly through time. Several 
important asset pricing theories have emerged which attempt to delineate this and to 
explain the dynamics of expected stock returns based on risk.22 A key assumption to such 
models, however, is that investors are rational and carry homogeneous expectations about 
risk, returns and the future distribution of potential outcomes regarding market 
conditions. Such an assumption forms the underpinning for the efficient market 
hypothesis (see Malkiel, 2003). From the previous two chapters, we know that most of 
asset pricing literature makes the assumption that investors are homogeneous in terms of 
their expectations and investment decisions. Now, in this chapter, I investigate the impact 
of heterogeneous traders in the stock market. 
In practice, however, it seems implausible to believe that individuals somehow 
reach identical conclusions regarding risks and expected rewards in the stock market. The 
very essence of uncertainty implies, after all, that rational individuals differ in their 
                                                 
22
 The single-period CAPM, for example, is a milestone in finance and the basis of much empirical work among academics and 
practitioners, who rely on this model for asset valuations (see Bruner et al., 1998; Graham and Harvey, 2001). 
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expectations and preferences. The assumption of rationality is equally dubious. Some of 
the most tragic moments in human history arise from irrationality, greed, and ‘herd-like’ 
behavior; where people move together in herds instead of thinking independently.23 
The stock market booms and busts of 1929 and 1987, respectively, resemble 
history in the sense that during the buildup of each crash, investors (and people at large) 
were in a state of euphoria. The media and other pseudo financial ‘gurus’ all but catered 
to this ecstasy by feeding investors with what they want to hear in order to gain 
popularity in the press. As investors falsely extrapolated their good fortunes linearly into 
the future, more and more investors jumped on the bandwagon and mimicked what the 
‘crowd’ was doing, pushing prices further away from their fundamental value. At the 
peak of this mania, market participants closely watching fundamentals began to withdraw 
from the stock market and prices fell precipitously amid growing fear and hysteria among 
investors and institutions (see Shiller, 2000). 
The burst of the “dot-com bubble” in 2000 tells a quite similar story. Prior to the 
crash, there was much excitement and overly zealous sentiment in the market. Although 
the technology sector constitutes a small fraction of the total market capitalization, it was 
the main driver behind upsurges in stock market prices. Ofek and Richardson (2002, 
2003) estimate an implied P/E ratio of over 600 for internet stocks in 1999; in plain 
language, investors were somehow expecting these stocks to earn supernormal returns in 
the future which far exceed those of any individual stock which may have existed in the 
past. Shiller (2000) argues this crash was the result of frenzied investors who believed 
they can keep earning higher and higher returns, without regard for fundamental value. In 
                                                 
23
 Shleifer (2000) and Sornette (2003) provide interesting discussions of human behavior and its effects on the market, citing infamous 
examples such as the Dutch Tulip mania of the 1620s and South Sea Bubble of 1720, and their present-day implications. 
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particular, he makes reference to how the P/E ratio can be used by participants  to see if 
prices are too high (or low) relative to earnings. As pointed out be Ofek and Richardson 
(2002, 2003), the P/E ratio could predict that prices in the technology sector of the market 
were disproportionately high relative to earnings. Therefore, this class of investors, 
known as ‘fundamental investors’ is important and we want to know how their behavior 
impacts stock price dynamics. We further want to see what types of fundamental factors 
they potentially use to evaluate the stock market. Most recently, Chau, Deesomsak and 
Lau (2011) look at the issue of investor heterogeneity in the context of ETF contracts and 
finds that sentiment is important in driving investment behavior and this is of relevance to 
regulators and investors at large. This view is echoed by the investment community. 
Recently, a New York Times article highlighted the concern that regulators have regarding 
the behavior of various investors, some of which may be short-run high-frequency 
investors.24 
Aforementioned events of this nature are irreconcilable from the viewpoint of the 
efficient markets hypothesis and traditional asset pricing theories mentioned in the 
previous two chapters. In particular, according to the efficient markets hypothesis, any 
asset mispricing induced by market fads or investor sentiment should be immediately 
corrected by a sufficiently large number of rational and well-informed arbitrageurs. This 
view dates back to Friedman (1953b) and has been debated and challenged vigorously in 
the literature; Black (1986) argues that investors trade on noise as if it were information 
and that their impact in the stock market may be long-lasting (see De Long et al., 1991).  
                                                 
24
 See the article by Nancy Folbre which appeared in the August 22, 2011 issue of the New York Times titled “A Sales Tax on Wall 
Street Transactions.” 
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A widely-held view against the efficient market hypothesis is that arbitrageurs are 
constrained in terms of their ability to exploit asset mispricing stemming from noise 
traders. De Long et al. (1990a) and Shleifer and Summers (1990) argue that at least two 
types of risk act to limit their positions; fundamental risk and noise trader, or resale price, 
risk. Fundamental risk is the possibility that news may change regarding fundamentals 
(i.e. dividends and/or earnings) thus affecting the arbitrageur’s initial position. Since the 
arbitrageur is risk-averse to some degree and has a finite investment horizon, this reduces 
their willingness to take a position against noise traders. Figlewski (1979) argues that the 
survival of noise traders persists indefinitely since arbitrageurs bear fundamental risk. 
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) argue that since stocks are imperfect substitutes, it is 
nearly impossible to eliminate fundamental risk. This ultimately constrains arbitrageurs 
and limits their aggressiveness against noise traders. 
The second type of risk entails unpredictability in noise traders’ opinions. For 
example, if an arbitrageur takes a short (long) position when bullish (bearish) noise 
traders have pushed prices too high (low), they must keep in mind that noise traders may 
continue to drive prices further from fundamentals in the future. This poses a threat to 
them especially if they must exit their position before the price recovers (see Black, 
1986). 
 Other authors cite additional constraints facing arbitrageurs. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) illustrate theoretically the limits to arbitrage as a result of limited resources. Abreu 
and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003) argue that arbitrageurs face synchronization risk; since an 
individual arbitrageur is incapable of correcting mispricing in the stock market, they must 
somehow coordinate their efforts and trade as one. This is inherently difficult and can 
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allow bubbles to persist over extended periods because holding costs deter individual 
arbitrageurs from acting alone too soon against noise traders. 
Probably one of the most destabilizing forms of noise trading that is responsible 
for the bubbles and crashes we have experienced throughout history is known as positive 
feedback trading (see De Long et al., 1990b). Agents that engage in this type of trading 
are depicted as trend chasers (i.e. ‘herding investors’) and buy (sell) when prices move 
upwards (downwards). This type of trading may be the result of irrationality, fads, word-
of-mouth enthusiasm, overly zealous extrapolative expectations, portfolio insurance 
strategies such as stop-loss orders, or margin call forced liquidations. Investment 
behavior or strategies that manifest into this type of trading exert a self-reinforcing 
influence on prices; fluctuations in price are augmented and independent of any rational 
valuations placed on fundamentals or mean-variance considerations. This exacerbates 
mispricing and allows it to persist.  
The effect of noise traders on stock market prices is difficult to counter given 
some of the aforementioned risks arbitrageurs face. However, it is quite possible that, in 
addition to such risks, arbitrageurs may be disinclined to attack mispricing right away 
simply because it is not in their best interest to do so. In fact, they may find it optimal to 
‘ride’ bubbles with the rest of the herd in order to reap any short-term gains. This induces 
price instability and only reinforces the impact of positive feedback investors; Hong and 
Stein (1999, p.2167) observe that “…a number of large and presumably sophisticated 
money managers use what are commonly described as momentum approaches…” George 
Soros, the successful investor and author of the controversial book, Alchemy of Finance 
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(1987), argues that the key to success is not to counter herding investors, but instead to 
ride the wave along with them and sell out near the top.  
In light of this research, there is ample evidence to suggest that the trading 
patterns of different investors exert a significant influence on stock market prices. This 
evidence may also dispel the previously dominant notion that markets are efficient and 
that asset mispricing is transitory. Recent chaotic events in financial markets only seem to 
corroborate this view. In fact, policymakers have begun to assess the destabilizing impact 
of noise traders, the causes of market bubbles and crashes and plausible monetary 
policies to protect financial markets (see Bernanke, 2002). 
The intent of this chapter is to model the trading patterns of three types of 
investors in several industrialized markets and to see to what extent their behavior is 
manifested in the time-varying dynamics of stock market returns. Namely, it extends the 
work of Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) and Cutler et al. (1990) and contributes to extant 
studies by producing a feedback trading framework that models the actions of (a) rational 
risk-averse expected utility maximizers (i.e. ‘smart money’ investors, (b) positive 
feedback traders, and (c) fundamental traders. Whereas rational investors trade on the 
basis of mean and variance considerations in the context of the equilibrium CAPM, 
positive feedback traders chase trends or utilize momentum strategies which extrapolate 
past performances.25 Note that the important work of Cutler et al. (1990) considers 
rational investors, fundamental traders and feedback traders, however, there are 
differences between the model here and the model by Cutler et al. (1990). Firstly, the 
                                                 
25
 It is important to note that the term ‘rational’ is used here consistent with the way it is used in extant academic studies. Namely, 
rational investors make decisions only on the basis of mean-variance considerations. In other words, they look at the first and second 
moments of assets’ return distributions in order to form portfolios which maximize mean returns with respect to variance. Such an 
approach is consistent with the early work of Markowitz (1952) which is discussed in the second chapter of this thesis and states that 
only mean and variance matter in investors’ portfolio formation decisions. Any other type of strategy that differs from this has been 
loosely referred to as ‘non-rational’ behavior in the literature. 
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work herein considers different measures of fundamental value to see which measure can 
explain the behavior of fundamental traders. The work by Cutler et al. (1990) assumes 
that the fundamental value evolves the way a random walk would and thus include a 
lagged term (see page 6 of their work). Secondly, Cutler et al. (1990) assume a constant 
required rate of return of zero by investors who form rational forecasts of the market (see 
page 7 of their work). 
Fundamental traders believe in mean reversion of stock prices toward a long-run 
average, or fundamental, value. These traders decrease (increase) their demand for risky 
assets when prices are high (low) relative to fundamentals. In order to gain an understanding 
of the behavior of fundamental traders and to see whether integrating heterogeneous 
investors into the ICAPM of Merton (1980) can better explain the risk-return tradeoff, this 
chapter uses three proxies for fundamental value. The first one is based on the P/E ratio and 
the second on the dividend-yield. The literature behind such proxies was mentioned more 
extensively in the second chapter (see Campbell and Shiller, 2001; Shiller, 2000). The third 
proxy is based on the so-called Fed Model that was also mentioned in the second chapter 
which consists of the spread between the market earnings-yield and the long-term 
government bond yield (see Lander, Orphanides and Douvogiannis, 1997; Shiller, 2000; 
Campbell and Shiller, 1998 and 2001; Thomas and Zhang, 2008). 
The findings from this chapter are of interest to practitioners and academics and 
pave the way for future research into this field. In particular, in terms of explaining the 
intertemporal risk-return tradeoff, the empirical evidence provided here corroborates the 
arguments made in the preceding two chapters; namely, it provides support for the Merton 
(1973) theoretical notion that the conditional variance and intertemporal risk are the sole 
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determining factors of investors’ risk premium. This evidence also suggests that integrating 
the behavior of heterogeneous investors does not help to better explain variations in the 
intertemporal risk premium. Instead, the findings shed new light which has not been 
identified before and raises additional insights which merit further exploration. These 
findings are of interest to practitioners who seek valuation methods for the stock market and 
for academics who further want to explore into this field. 
Firstly, there is empirical evidence here that fundamental traders drive, to some 
extent, movements in stock prices. This shows that valuation ratios, such as the earnings-
yield and dividend-yield, may prove useful to practitioners who want to measure stock 
market performance and predict future market movements. In particular, the evidence here 
shows that fundamental traders increase their demand for stock shares when prices are low 
relative to their fundamental value and vice versa. In terms of gauging fundamental value, 
the ratios proposed here seem to be good indicators of whether stock prices as over- or 
under-valued. These results confirm the arguments made in the second chapter and the 
arguments of other researchers (see Shiller, 1996; Lander, Orphanides and Douvogiannis, 
1997; Shiller, 2000; Campbell and Shiller, 1998 and 2001; Thomas and Zhang, 2008, to 
name a few). 
A second major empirical finding which merits future research is that it appears 
positive feedback trading is not statistically evident when exploring monthly frequency data. 
This result does not imply a rejection of the notion that there exist heterogeneous groups of 
investors in the stock market, it instead suggests that feedback traders are present but only in 
the short run. These results are in contrast to those by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), 
Koutmos (1997), and Antoniou, Koutmos and Pericli (2005). This of course may be due to 
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the fact that these studies are using daily data. In this case an argument can be made in favor 
of the notion that positive feedback trading is present in the short run, but it becomes 
insignificant in the longer run. It is also possible that there are also negative feedback traders 
so that the net result becomes insignificant over the longer-run and when looking at lower 
frequency data such as monthly stock market returns. This suggests that high-frequency 
traders and institutions may drive prices in the short-run but in the longer-run, negative 
feedback traders and fundamental traders push the prices back to their equilibrium values. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents a 
review of relevant literature. Section 4.3 presents the methodology and empirical model. 
Section 4.4 describes the data and procedure for variable construction. Section 4.5 
discusses the major empirical findings and, finally, Section 4.6 concludes this chapter. 
 
4.2. Review of Literature 
What drives asset prices? This is an enduring question in financial economics and, rightly 
so, has received rigorous attention over the years. Although much significant 
advancement in asset pricing theory and econometric modeling has emerged as a result, 
the answer to this question still remains open and is hotly debated. 
  Perhaps the traditional path of asset pricing literature has been to take the 
following approaches; the first is an attempt to link the movements of asset prices to 
shifts in systematic risk and investors’ degree of risk aversion. Such an approach is 
implicit in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as well as its intertemporal variant, 
the ICAPM. The intuitively straightforward prediction of these models is that increases in 
systematic risk ought to lead to an appropriate rise in investors’ expected returns. 
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 The second approach has been to link asset prices to fluctuations in the aggregate 
financial economy. Multifactor models that take on this approach, such as the Arbitrage 
Pricing Theory (APT), attempt to identify these set of risk factors which affect individual 
companies, industries, and even segments of the aggregate economy. This approach is 
carried out using cross-sectional regression techniques in an attempt to find which 
macroeconomic factors, if any, have an impact on stock market returns or the returns of 
certain portfolios and industries. The intuition behind this is that if there are factors which 
have an impact on firms’ operating activities and cash flows, they need to be identified 
since they will also impact stock prices. For example, a certain company may be naturally 
sensitive to fluctuations in a certain macroeconomic factor (such as interest rates). If this 
is the case, then the returns for that company’s stock must reward an appropriate risk 
premium to its investors for being exposed to this non-diversifiable risk (see Chen, Roll 
and Ross, 1986). 
 Taking into consideration these two established approaches, there is a relatively 
new approach which is recently gaining more and more recognition and comes from a 
field in finance known as ‘behavioral finance.’ This relatively new and growing field 
argues that researchers need to also consider investors’ emotions and that perhaps it is 
erroneous to make the strong assumption that they behave rationally all the time. This 
was alluded to in the second chapter; particularly about how seemingly unrelated factors 
can have an impact on investors’ perceptions and their behavior. These factors defy 
rational expectations by any account yet, as will be explored further, play an influential 
role on investors’ decisions and, consequently, movements in stock prices (see De Long, 
Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1990b; Shiller, 2000). 
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This section explores some of the many issues regarding behavioral finance, why 
investors act irrationally and why, contrary to the intuitively appealing assumptions of 
market efficiency, arbitrageurs are constrained and may (un-)willingly allow asset 
mispricing to persist (see De Long et al., 1990a; Shleifer and Summers, 1990; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997; Shiller, 2000; Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002 and 2003). These issues 
are very important not only from a behavioral finance perspective but will help us to 
better explain the dynamics of stock returns as a result of investors’ behavior. Finally, it 
is the intent of this chapter to focus on the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff from a 
behavioral finance perspective, taking into account the actions of three different groups 
of investors; namely, rational, fundamental, and feedback investors (or traders). The 
contribution of this chapter to existing studies is to emphasize the importance of 
incorporating the actions and behavior of these three types of investors in order to explore 
the nature of the intertemporal tradeoff between risk and return. Perhaps, as is argued 
further later on, it is because we are not considering the significant impact of these 
investors that we cannot detect a statistically discernable risk-return tradeoff. 
 To examine some of these issues, this section will begin by providing an overview 
of the much acclaimed Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) and evidence, both historic 
and recent, which seriously challenges this well-established proposition. It further 
examines why is it that investors do not make ‘optimal’ investment decisions on the basis 
of mean-variance considerations and what are some of the other factors, both 
psychological and external, which influences their thinking. One rather notable 
observation is that investors tend to ‘herd’ in the sense that they all move and invest in 
the same direction. This is known as feedback trading. This type of herding behavior has 
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been branded as the culprit (or is at least partially responsible for) the creation of stock 
market bubbles and other empirical anomalies, which are in turn discussed here. If this 
type of behavior exerts a significant impact in markets, as existing literature argues it 
does, then it is important to incorporate these investors’ (miss-)behavior into a framework 
which allows us to explore the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. Contrary to the 
traditional view that financial intermediaries (such as investment banks and money 
management firms) serve to minimize the problem of information asymmetry, this 
section further presents evidence that many of these institutions also engage in feedback 
behavior and herd with one another. I present below some of the many reasons why this 
happens and why it is so important that these factors are examined in order to better 
estimate the risk-return tradeoff. 
 
4.2.1. The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Support for the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) from well-known studies such as 
Fama (1965) and Malkiel (1973) contend that prices are ‘correct’ in the sense that they 
reflect all available information and is accessible to all investors. Thus, no one can 
(persistently) take advantage or ‘time’ the market to earn returns in excess of those that 
can be achieved from passively holding the market portfolio.26 
 If assets were in fact efficient and reflected all available information, there would 
be at least three characteristics reflected in stock market prices; firstly, opportunities and 
abnormal returns would be undetectable and no econometric model would be useful to 
                                                 
26
 A very vivid illustration of the EMH is illustrated in Malkiel (2003) which gives an old proverbial joke among economists and 
academics evocative of the EMH and the notion that assets’ prices are efficient where a student and his finance professor are walking 
together and suddenly the student notices a $100 bill on the ground. When the student goes to pick it up, the professor tells him “Do 
not even bother. If it were a real $100 bill, it wouldn’t be there.” This story is often told in finance classes by professors when 
introducing the EMH to students and is intended to illustrate what economists and academics connote when they say that markets are 
‘efficient;’ namely, asset mispricing does not exist and, if there is any mispricing, it is temporary and will be eliminated by 
arbitrageurs immediately. Thus, there are no free ‘$100 bills’ lying around waiting to be picked. 
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traders. If this is the case, then the investor is better off simply holding the market index. 
Now, if this were true, then the study of historical stock prices to predict movements in 
future prices (i.e. technical analysis) would be fruitless. The only thing that would really 
matter to ‘rational’ investors would be their degree of risk aversion and would make 
portfolio allocation decisions on the basis of mean-variance considerations. This is 
discussed in the second chapter where investors make ‘optimal’ or ‘efficient’ decisions 
on the basis of mean-variance considerations in the context of Markowitz (1952). 
 Secondly, stock market returns are tied to real economic factors which influence 
the macroeconomy at large such as the rate of inflation, unemployment, interest rates, the 
money supply, and the price of natural resources such as oil, to name a few examples. 
This premise formed the basis for the Arbitrage Pricing Theory of Ross (1976), which is 
discussed in greater depth in the second chapter and which is explored further by Chen, 
Roll and Ross (1986). 
 Thirdly, if markets are in fact efficient, then professional money managers and 
traders will not be able to consistently reap abnormal profits. The EMH makes the 
argument that information travels quickly and unrestrictedly and is accessible to all 
market participants at any given point in time. Thus, information is instantaneously 
reflected in stock prices and, therefore, expending time and resources to gather and 
analyze the information will not lead to any payoffs in the future. If an investor does 
happen to reap higher returns relative to his peers, this is only as a result of chance and is 
short-lived and is not the result of their abilities. 
 The EMH is also commonly linked to the idea that stock prices follow a ‘random 
walk.’ This phrase was popularized by Malkiel (1973) in his acclaimed book, A Random 
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Walk Down Wall Street, where he argues that future prices are random and unpredictable 
on the basis of historical prices. He jokingly likens the selection of stocks to a blindfolded 
chimp throwing darts and makes the argument that the chimp is just as likely to select a 
successful portfolio as an ‘expert’ money manager is. Investors are therefore better off 
just holding the market portfolio and not engaging in costly active management strategies 
which can eat up their wealth in the form of transactions fees. 
In light of recent findings and events, however, there is enough evidence which 
seriously challenges the EMH and merits consideration when applying conventional asset 
pricing theories to study the dynamics of stock returns (see Black, 1986; De Long, 
Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1990b; Shiller, 2000).  In particular, we want to know 
why investors make suboptimal investment decisions and the impact this has on stock 
returns. If there are irrational investors present in the market which trade on emotions or 
other (seemingly) ad hoc factors unrelated to mean-variance considerations, then it is 
necessary to see what impact their actions have on stock prices and whether this can shed 
new light on the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. 
 
4.2.2. Investor Irrationality and Noise 
The long-standing belief that investors are rational forms the basis for the EMH and the 
notion that stock prices fully reflect all available information. Thus, capital markets are 
“efficient” in the sense that these prices already incorporate all available information and 
there is no mispricing or opportunities for a ‘free lunch’ by arbitrage investors. The role 
of capital markets is, after all, the efficient allocation of scarce investor resources across 
competing production-investment alternatives by firms. Hence, prices of securities, which 
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represent ownership to firms’ operations, serve as a signal to investors and reflect the 
investment-production possibilities that exist and the risks they entail. 
However, the established paradigm that markets are efficient and that investors 
are rational agents has come under scrutiny, especially in light of recent financial chaotic 
events and the proliferation of Ponzi schemes which have snared investors and have 
undermined public confidence in financial institutions. In his seminal paper, Black (1986) 
observes that investors trade on ‘noise’ as if it were information. In this context, trading 
on so-called ‘noise’ is a meaning given to investors who trade on the basis of emotions, 
instincts, or of the haphazard advice of friends and so-called financial planners. Trading 
on noise ignores fundamental factors related to the firm’s prospects, such as earnings or, 
as Black (1986) indicates, firms’ P/E ratio. 
The observation that investors trade on the basis of noise is not a new phenomena. 
Nearly seventy four years ago, John Maynard Keynes referred to this noise as ‘animal 
spirits’ to refer to a situation where investors trade on whimsical factors instead of relying 
on real economic reasoning in order to evaluate their investment decisions (see Keynes, 
1936). Such whimsical factors may include things such as emotions, ‘gut feelings’ about 
where the market is going, advice from friends or so-called financial gurus, and 
information from other media outlets. 
The media, such as popular investment television shows and other on-line 
investment forums, are an exemplary illustration of a source of noise which seems to 
have a profound influence on investors’ decision-making and may even drive stock 
market volatility – at least in the short-run. For example, Antweiler and Frank (2004) 
study nearly 1.5 million message posts on the popular Yahoo! Finance and Raging Bull 
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sites about forty five companies for which posts were made. They report statistically 
significant evidence of a relationship between the degree of message activity and stock 
market volatility. In a similar vein, DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2001) find that 
investors place strong emphasis on opinions with people they talk to. Such a finding 
suggests it may be profitable to become an influential agent in order to try and move 
stock market prices. The greater the numbers of people who listen to you, the more 
influential you become. Shiller (2000) further highlights the importance of conversations 
in influencing investors’ decision-making when they pick stocks. In one of his previous 
studies, he found direct evidence that many individual investors pick stocks on the basis 
of what friends and acquaintances suggest to them (see Shiller and Pound, 1989). 
More recently, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) provide further support for how 
important word-of-mouth information is. In particular, they examine the portfolio 
holdings of mutual fund managers located in the same city with other mutual fund 
managers to see whether or not their trades are correlated. After looking at the holdings 
of some major funds in major respective cities in the U.S., they find that mutual fund 
managers in the same city tend to execute similar trades and hold similar portfolios. This 
may be the result of word-of-mouth transmission of information, whereby mutual fund 
managers located in the same city with one another are likely to meet with each other – 
for example, either through social events or investor conferences – and communicate 
with one another about what they are doing and where they think markets are going. 
Although we cannot preclude the possibility that they may consult with similar sources 
specific to the city they live in – for example, their local newspaper or a TV station – it is 
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still in spirit with the word-of-mouth transmission mechanism since the fund managers 
receive information from someone that is ‘close’ to them. 
Word-of-mouth, regardless of whether it has any economic basis, also appears to 
have a strong effect in other market settings and circumstances in history. For example, 
Kelly and Grada (2000) examine two prominent banking panics in the 1800s and find that 
bad news of banks’ woes spread by word-of-mouth in neighborhoods. This study is 
interesting because it looks at this phenomenon from an early time period where financial 
institutions were not as intricate and advanced as they are today. However, the findings 
from this study corroborate the observation made by Shiller (1995, p.181) and so many 
other researchers that “People who interact (...) regularly tend to think and behave 
similarly.” This has even been explored in various other contexts unrelated to finance. 
For example, Banerjee (1992) introduces a model whereby he examines people’s 
decision-making as they try to find the best restaurant. All the prospective customers in 
this model have imperfect information regarding the quality of the restaurants. Although 
the first individual may select a restaurant on the basis of their own imperfect 
information, the remaining successive individuals may very well substitute their own 
information and follow their predecessor. Thus, there is what is referred to in behavioral 
finance as ‘herding’ and this has resulted from noise, which agents in this case have 
perceived as information. 
Evidence of this kind of behavior is well-established in studies, and its reasons are 
discussed more in the following sections. However, the observation that individuals make 
decisions on the basis of noise explains why we see this type of herding behavior. 
Oftentimes, individuals place more emphasis on what others do (even if it is noise) 
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instead of relying on their own knowledge and information. The study by Asch (1952) 
demonstrates that when individuals are placed in a group, they place more emphasis and 
credibility in others’ actions instead of relying on their own knowledge. In particular, his 
study asks participants individually a series of basic question involving the length of line 
segments. The questions are obvious in nature and are easily answered by the subjects 
when they are being interview on an individual basis. The subjects were then placed into 
groups and asked the same questions. The members within this group however were 
confederates and, without the knowledge of the subjects, would purposefully give wrong 
answers to the questions. Thus, when a question was being posed, the confederates would 
purposefully give the wrong answer and, as Asch (1952) reports, the participants in the 
group would display signs of anxiety since they had a keen sense that the answer was 
wrong, yet would go along with the rest of the group. In effect, as Black (1986) indicates, 
the subjects were reacting to the ‘noise’ given from the confederates and placing more 
emphasis on its validity instead of relying on their own knowledge and experience. 
The effect of word-of-mouth effects in driving herding behavior is prevalent in 
other fields of research as well. For example, Duflo and Saez (2002) investigate if staff 
members across Universities make decisions regarding their retirement accounts because 
they are being influenced by the decisions of their co-workers. The study finds that a staff 
member’s decision to invest in a particular account is correlated with what others are 
doing within their department. Of course, this may be the result of the fact that University 
Professors may have a higher propensity to save, but it also does not preclude the 
possibility the many of the staff members within the department talk with one another 
and thus influence each others’ decision-making. 
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In a different context, Coval and Shumway (2001) examine, quite literally, the 
impact noise has on stock market volatility. They actually analyzed the ambient noise 
level in the 30-year bond futures trading floor at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). 
They found that the ambient noise levels made by traders contained useful information 
about the future prospects of the market. In particular, after controlling for factors such as 
volume of trade, announcements of news, and lagged changes in price, they find that the 
level of sound in the trading pit was a good forecaster of future volatility and presage 
other important occurrences in the market. For example, an increase in the level of sound, 
which was measured using microphone equipment, presaged increases in subsequent 
stock market volatility. This is because it would be during these periods that traders were 
feeling nervous and were extremely eager to execute their trades. As more and more 
traders begin to feel nervous and shout more in order to quickly execute trades, this will 
undoubtedly have an impact on the rest of the traders in the pit since they now must 
adjust their positions.   
 The studies which look at the impact of ‘noise’ on investors’ behavior are in no 
way perfect depictions of reality. However, these studies do show the importance one’s 
environment and what impact this has on individuals within this environment. As is 
discussed in the next subsection, the effects of noise and herding behavior have profound 
effects in stock markets. The study by Black (1986) goes a long way in describing our 
behavior and how this manifests itself in the stock market. 
One very recent and substantial example of trading on noise via word-of-mouth 
was a case involving a New Jersey teenager in 2000 who was subject to enforcement 
actions by the SEC for conducting “Internet Fraud.” This case featured prominently in the 
 245
press and an analysis of the court document is provided by Walker and Levine (2001). 
According to legal documents, the accused teenager, Jonathan Lebed, would purportedly 
purchase stock in small and thinly-traded tech companies and, afterwards, log in to 
various investment websites via multiple web addresses and usernames, and create a 
‘buzz’ over those stocks and eulogize over how well they will perform in the future. 
According to sources related to the case, Mr. Lebed would consistently execute his 
fraudulent strategy by beginning to post basic (seemingly) accurate information 
pertaining to the company. Then, would create hype over the stock by making overly 
zealous recommendations such as “the next stock to gain 1000%” or “most undervalued 
stock...” (see Walker and Levine, 2001). This irrationally exuberant hype would 
temporarily drive the stock’s price up, at which point Mr. Lebed would sell the stock and 
reap easy profits. Such a strategy would cause the type of positive feedback trading that 
was mentioned earlier as more and more investors buy the stock, without understanding 
what they are doing, in hopes that the price will appreciate more and more in the future. 
After some time, this teenager had amassed hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
trading profits. The SEC stepped in to stop him because he had reputedly earned a strong 
influence in on-line trading forums and investment websites. As part of the settlement 
with the SEC, he was required to pay some fines but was able to retain much of his 
money. However, this case has much to teach us about the role of the media in 
influencing our decisions. What is the advice we are getting and whose interest is it 
serving? This is an important question which tends to be ignored. Today, there is a 
proliferation of so-called investment gurus and investment advisors which are syndicated 
in popular magazines, on the internet, and practically everywhere you look. 
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Why is it that people then continuously rely on this ‘noise’ to make investment 
decisions? As Black (1986) points out, investors may trade on noise for several reasons. 
One reason is that they simply may enjoy doing so. Another is that there is so much noise 
around that they are no longer capable of distinguishing it from real information. 
 
4.2.3. Positive Feedback Trading, Irrational Exuberance and Market Bubbles 
Trading on the basis of noise can manifest itself into what is known in the literature as 
‘positive feedback trading.’ This type of trading is essentially a “trend chasing” or 
“momentum” type of strategy which entails buying (selling) a risky asset if during the 
last trading intervals it exhibited positive (negative) returns (see De Long, Shleifer, 
Summers  and Waldmann, 1990b). This type of trading may be the result of portfolio 
insurance strategies such as stop-loss orders, or margin call forced liquidations, or it may 
be the result of herding and irrational exuberance caused by fads, word-of-mouth 
enthusiasm, and the media which may tout certain types of investing or certain asset 
classes (see Shiller, 2000). 
 Positive feedback trading is a destabilizing form of noise trading since it is 
independent of any rational valuations placed on fundamentals and is driven by fads and 
bandwagon effects, whereby investors copy each other and play along because everyone 
else seems to be doing the same. This form of trading is destabilizing in the sense that it 
pushes assets’ prices further from their true fundamental value since investors are 
essentially buying overpriced stocks and selling underpriced stocks. This type of trading, 
as is described in the following section, is also prevalent among ‘sophisticated’ investors 
such as money managers and institutions. For example, the popular strategy of “window 
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dressing,” which involves selling the embarrassing losers from the portfolio and replacing 
them with winners, is common among portfolio managers to coax investors that they are 
picking stocks which have done historically well. However, this strategy, despite the fact 
that it may on the surface appear clever, is merely a form of positive feedback trading. As 
is discussed further, with time, such a strategy is bound to fail at some point and may 
pose a significant risk to all parties involved. 
It is important to understand that positive feedback trading can arise from 
investors’ false presumptions that past trends are likely to persist. Therefore, if an asset 
has done well in the past, investors falsely perceive that it will continue to do so in the 
future (see Andreassen and Kraus, 1990). Thus, future movements in stock price as a 
result of this positive feedback trading become a self-reinforcing process which is 
independent of rational valuations or considerations of the firm’s fundamental value. As 
this process continues indefinitely, investors who have been eyeing fundamentals start to 
withdraw from the market, future upswings in price cease, and expected returns on any 
future success of the stock quickly deteriorate and diminish, resulting in a burst of an 
inflated bubble or some form of a market crash. 
Positive feedback trading can also arise from other psychological factors that 
influence investors and are discussed more elaborately and in turn in Section 4.2.5, 
“Investor Psychology and Finance.” The three prominent factors however widely cited in 
behavioral finance literature are “overoptimism,” “overconfidence,” and a so-called 
“availability bias.” Overoptimism, as its name suggests, describes investors that are in a 
state of euphoria whereby they assign unrealistically high probabilities that a certain 
event (or investment) will be successful. These overly optimistic emotions are 
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undoubtedly amplified by word-of-mouth effects where investors share their unrealistic 
optimism with other investors, thereby creating a (fragile) investment environment which 
is sharply driven by enthusiastic emotions instead of reasoning or a much warranted 
fundamental valuation (see De Long and Shleifer, 1991). 
Overconfidence is yet another behavioral factor which can lead to positive 
feedback trading and describes a situation where (noise) traders essentially overestimate 
their abilities in the stock market and attribute past successes to their talents and dismiss 
the possibility that their past successes were the result of sheer luck. The seminal study 
by De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1991) presents a theoretical model 
which shows that noise traders may persist indefinitely and may not lose immediately to 
arbitrageurs and rational investors as previously thought. In fact, they may even dominate 
the market for some time and will attribute their past successes to their talents and 
abilities instead of considering the possibility that they were just lucky and trading on 
noise. 
The premise that individual human beings credit their past success to their ‘skills’ 
and dismiss the possibility that there may have been some luck at play is not a new 
concept in social sciences. For example, Langer (1975) finds that humans possess an 
“illusion of control” over events that are otherwise fortuitous in nature and uncontrollable 
regardless of the skill set possessed by the subject in question. Such findings corroborate 
those of previous psychologists in earlier works. Most notably, Henslin (1967) studied 
the dice playing behavior of subjects and found that these players behave as if they are in 
control of the outcome that the toss would bring. In particular, they exercised care and 
were gentle when throwing the dice in hopes of getting low numbers yet would be more 
 249
aggressive and throw the dice harder in hopes of high numbers. As Langer (1975) points 
out, all these seemingly irrational behaviors may seem quite rational if one believes that 
skill is at play and not luck. Thus, subjects who participate in betting games may also bet 
with others who exude the most confidence. Noise traders persist in the market for these 
very same reasons. They will ‘bet’ where the markets are going based on past 
performance and what others are doing as well. Despite the predictions of the EMH that 
forecasting market performance is a fruitless endeavor, noise traders will use word-of-
mouth methods to derive information from their social circles and acquaintances. Positive 
feedback trading is also linked to the findings of Langer (1975) in the sense that feedback 
traders copycat one another and if they see that other investors appear confident in their 
investment decisions and they have earned strong returns, they will quickly mimic them 
and copy their investment portfolio (i.e. add winners and drop losers). This only 
exacerbates stock prices’ deviations from their fundamental value and may lead to stock 
market bubbles and subsequent crashes, as is discussed further. 
Finally, the so-called availability bias argues that more recent events have a 
greater bearing on investors’ decision-making and on their risk calculations (see Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974). Therefore, market booms and the excess returns of other investors 
entice noise traders to jump in on the bandwagon and to overestimate the prospects for 
these investments. Likewise, if a stock market correction or crash happened in the distant 
past and is not fresh in the minds of investors, it tends to be forgotten and may lead to 
complacency among investors, and they will discount the likelihood that they might very 
well lose on their investments in the future (see Herring and Wachter, 1999). 
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Thus, these three types of behavior, when aggregated together, can lead to severe 
volatility in the stock market and deviations of stock prices from their fundamental 
values. In fact, Soros (1987), arguably one of the most effective investors in the world, 
describes his strategy of taking advantage of these psychological factors in order to reap 
profits. In particular, Soros describes that his strategy is not to trade on the basis of 
fundamental valuations, but instead on the future behavior of the crowd. For example, he 
describes how he took advantage of conditions during the 1960s conglomerate boom and 
the 1970s real estate investment trust (REIT) booms, respectively. According to Soros 
(1987), during the 1960s he saw that many noise traders were becoming excited over the 
apparent rise in earnings by conglomerates and were investing their money in this 
growing market. Whereas fundamental traders may have seen, as did George Soros, that 
this market may become overvalued, they probably would have taken short positions and 
wait until prices in this market corrected. However, as Soros argues, the trick is to know 
where the crowd is going and to trade in anticipation of their future behavior. For 
example, instead of shorting and waiting for a market correction, Soros invested in this 
booming market, anticipating that more positive feedback traders will do the same. The 
initial upswings in price therefore stimulated the enthusiasm of other investors because it 
generated a trend of rises in stock prices and high returns. This created further 
overoptimism among investors that this trend will continue and overconfidence for 
existing investors who believed that their skills were the reason for their (temporary) 
fortunes. The availability bias is also at play here since investors were myopically seeing 
current returns and downplaying risks in their estimations for future movements in the 
market. 
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Whereas it is quite possible that fundamental traders brought prices back down to 
appropriate levels warranted by fundamentals, Soros made money as prices appreciated 
by selling out at the peak of this mania, when conglomerates’ earnings could not keep 
pace with noise traders’ unrealistically high expectations. Therefore, Soros’ strategy is 
one that involves ‘timing’ the behavior of crowds and trading (initially) along with noise 
traders and then exiting right before the bubble bursts. 
This view is in accordance with what was mentioned before in section 4.1 that 
market bubbles are a self-reinforcing process and are fed by the irrational exuberance of 
investors. This view is well-rooted in academic literature and dates back to at least the 
work of Bagehot (1872) who observed that savers would “rush” into any investment that 
promised to deliver a high return (regardless of whether this investment was able to really 
provide such a return). After these savers realized that such investments can be sold at a 
higher profit, this stimulated their appetite to invest even more. The first taste (for a high 
promised return) then became dwarfed by the prospects that these investments can be 
sold for gains. This “mania” continued as irrational investors fed the bubble and falsely 
believed that these unsustainably high returns will persist into the indefinite future. 
The prominent work of Kindleberger (1978) is written a century after that of 
Bagehot (1872) yet embodies similar themes and lessons. In particular, he sheds light into 
some of the tricks that are played by an elite group of investors who bet their money 
based on where the crowds are going. Initially, there is a group of “insiders” who 
destabilize prices by driving them upwards, thus stimulating the appetites of other 
investors who are unaware of the agenda of the “insiders,” and they also go in and invest 
in hope of reaping similar rewards. When enough noise traders have jumped in on the 
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bandwagon and have over-inflated prices, the insiders then withdraw from the market and 
take positions which force prices back to fundamentals. While the insiders reap huge 
rewards, the amateur noise traders suffer from the hangover effects of the bubble. In the 
words of Kindleberger (1978), “[...] insiders initially destabilize by exaggerating the 
upswings and the falls, while the outsider amateurs who buy high and sell low are [...] the 
victims of euphoria, which infects them late in the day.” 
 
4.2.3.1 The Dutch Tulip Mania 
In addition to the aforementioned 1960s conglomerate boom and the REIT boom of the 
1970s, there are now numerous examples throughout the course of human history of 
when irrational exuberance, fueled by noise traders, led to the creation and bursting of 
stock market bubbles. Although these examples take place in different settings, they all 
share striking similarities in terms of how they start and how they end. Arguably the 
earliest documented case of a stock market bubble and crash is the so-called “Dutch Tulip 
Mania,” which has since then been an exemplar of the devastating impact feedback 
trading and irrational exuberance has in the economy. 
The Dutch Tulip Mania is often cited by researchers examining the importance of 
behavioral finance and how it applies in stock markets today (see Sornette, 2003). This 
mania began with a fascination for tulips among the upper class elitists of the time. Tulips 
were considered a rare and highly sought after flower which was originally brought over 
from Turkey to the Dutch in 1593. After some time, the tulips contracted a peculiar 
harmless virus which altered their color and gave them an exotic kind of look. This 
increased the rarity of the tulips and increased the premium that people were willing to 
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pay to buy these types of flowers. Tulips then became considered an investment vehicle 
among businessmen instead of a luxury item as was previously considered before. Thus 
the real money was being made through speculation instead of the actual cultivation of 
the tulips. The word-of-mouth effects only amplified the overconfidence and 
overoptimism that investors felt and there was no doubt in their mind that the price would 
ever fall. Thus, investors began to pour all their money and savings (and even sold off 
their property) to buy more and more. Prices soured to the equivalent of tens of thousands 
of dollars in today’s present value terms (see Sornette, 2003) and many investors 
dismissed the possibility that such gains will be short-lived. 
On February of 1637 negative news emerged that the tulips were too expensive 
and possibly difficult to sell and investors tried to cash out all at once. From then until 
May of the same year, major suppliers and businessmen tried desperately to coordinate 
their efforts to keep prices propped high, yet, by the end of the month, the prices for 
tulips collapsed and so did the wealth of all these noise traders who had invested 
everything in this market. At the peak of the mania, a bulb of tulip could buy an estate. 
After the bubble burst, it could only buy what it was really worth – a bulb of onion. 
 
4.2.3.2 The English Stock Market Boom of the 1690s 
The 1690s is an interesting period in England because it was at this time that markets 
were being established to permit the trading of shares in joint stock companies (see 
Chancellor, 1999). Given that these types of markets were new, there was a large class of 
uninformed and inexperienced investors who were willing to try their luck to earn quick 
riches. This class soon became easy quarry to insiders who were in cahoots with one 
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another and implemented some of the shady aforementioned tactics, such as those of 
Jonathan Lebed who would make baseless claims about the future prospects of stocks he 
would buy in order to entice other investors and spread a false sense of overoptimism in 
the market. 
In particular, given that the stock market in England was at its nascent stages in 
the 1690s with really no regulation there were many “sham” companies which emerged 
to suck up investors’ funds and the systematic manipulation of stock prices was rampant 
in order to benefit a select group of insiders (see Banner, 1998). Another strategy which 
was used extensively to prey on these amateur investors is known today as “pump and 
dump” whereby confederates spread false rumors about stocks which they have 
purchased and, after pumping up the stocks’ prices, they sell off and reap rewards while 
others eventually lose their investments.27 This type of strategy can be explained from the 
perspective of behavioral finance because it plays off investors’ irrational behavior and, 
as is described more elaborately in Section 4.2.5, can be explained by the systematic 
psychological biases which individuals make and which materialize in their investment 
decisions. 
Such a strategy, coupled with investors’ irrationality, is also the source of positive 
feedback trading in markets, whereby investors falsely presume that just because stock 
prices have experienced recent appreciation they will continue to do so in the future. This 
type of feedback leads to the herding behavior previously mentioned and bandwagon 
effects, whereby investors copy others instead of conducting rational valuations and 
having a healthy sense of skepticism about what is really going on. 
                                                 
27
 The “pump and dump” scheme is also referred to by the SEC as a “hype and dump manipulation” whereby investors are misled into 
buying stock falsely believing the fraudsters who create this mania either via internet messages and newsletters or other word-of-
mouth means of communication (see SEC: http://www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm). When the price is “pumped up” the 
fraudsters exit their positions reaping easy rewards while others absorb the downfall. 
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The years before the summer of 1696 – when the bubble eventually burst and an 
economic crisis emerged – many of the powerful insiders had managed to artificially 
pump up prices and amass fortunes by feeding on the unsophisticated noise traders (see 
Chancellor, 1999). In response to the chaos and the strong outcries for regulation, 
Parliament passed regulations in 1697 to limit the number of brokers, all of whom had to 
be licensed by the City of London (see Banner, 1998). 
 
4.2.3.3 The 1920s Boom and Bust 
The years leading to the ultimate crash of 1929 were referred to by economic historians 
as the “roaring twenties” for the unprecedented industrial growth and overoptimism in the 
stock market. It was a time in America when the First World War had been declared a 
victory and the industrial sector was producing luxury items that had never been seen 
before or so readily available to the public (see Fraser, 2005). Thus, it was a time rampant 
with overoptimism and overconfidence and these emotions undoubtedly played out in the 
stock market. Namely, there was a large class of unsophisticated investors who believed 
that this trend will indefinitely continue and that there were no risks associated with 
investing in the stock market (see Shiller, 2000). They became overly trusting that 
favorable conditions would persist and, as in England’s case, insiders were quick to 
capitalize off peoples’ exuberance and irrationality. 
Lax regulation and a Wall Street-friendly political environment only exacerbated 
matters and paved the way for insiders to commit financial deceit and to play on peoples’ 
irrational emotions to realize huge gains (see Fraser, 2005). In particular, big players on 
Wall Street conjured up fraudulent strategies which enticed positive feedback trading 
among unsophisticated and uninformed investors. Such strategies consisted of methods to 
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manipulate stock prices in order to promote positive feedback trading among investors. 
To achieve this, insiders held pools of investment capital and would buy and sell stocks 
among each other. For example, one confederate would buy shares from their accomplice 
and then sell them back to their accomplice for a slightly higher price. This strategy 
would persist until investors would falsely believe that the prices of stocks were rising 
and they too would irrationally jump on the bandwagon and purchase these stocks in 
hopes of reaping high and easy returns. 
When the bubble burst, as it has in the past, the effects were so devastating and 
long-lived that Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission to serve as a 
watchdog and protect the public from fraudulent and deceptive practices. It also passed 
several measures of regulation, such as the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 which serve to provide the public with more information and make 
it considerably more difficult for insiders to engage in some of the deceitful tactics 
mentioned here.28 
 
4.2.3.4 The Stock Market Crash of 1987 
The stock market crash of October 1987 is strikingly similar in terms of the events and 
psychological factors culminating to this massive financial calamity. In the vivid words 
of Shleifer and Summers (1990, p.19) “[...] stock in the efficient markets hypothesis [...] 
crashed along with the rest of the market on October 19, 1987.” This event is oftentimes 
cited by proponents of behavioral finance as a strong case against stock market efficiency 
given that there were many “insiders” who profited from the downfalls of the plethora of 
investors who exhibited the type of irrational herding behavior that leads to bubbles (see 
Shiller, 2000). 
                                                 
28
 For more information refer to http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml at the SEC’s website. 
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 The years prior to the crash, equity markets had experienced strong gains and 
large appreciations in prices, which had outpaced the growth in earnings and raise the P/E 
ratio to above-average levels. Some market commentators were cautious in their appraisal 
of the market and even warned of the possibility that it may be overvalued (see Anders 
and Garcia, 1987). These steady and unprecedented appreciations in price lured many 
investors such as large pension funds and this helped to boost prices (see Shiller, 2000). 
 Although equity prices were also supported by favorable tax treatments given to 
companies which buyout other companies, such as permitting them to deduct interest 
expenses incurred by issuing debt to finance the buyout (see Presidential Task Force on 
Market Mechanisms in the Brady Report, 1988), much of what happened was also the 
direct result of positive feedback trading, which was alluded to the Introduction of this 
chapter. In particular, financial markets during this period saw a popularization of a 
method involving programmed trading whereby computers would trade a block of stocks 
based on a set of predetermined conditions (see Shiller, 2000). Generally speaking, these 
so-called strategies would produce “optimal” portfolio allocations between stocks and 
other instruments whereby they increase the weight of the allocation in stocks during 
market upswings and pull out of stocks during market downturns.  
 As was mentioned in the Introduction briefly, portfolio insurance strategies were 
also at play during this stock market bubble whereby investors would try to protect 
themselves from downside risk. This strategy entails buying stock market index futures 
when the market is faring well and selling during downturns. Such a strategy, albeit 
avoids direct trading of stock, is essentially a positive feedback trading strategy which 
exacerbates price movements in either direction and drives them farther from their 
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fundamental value. As a matter of fact, there were anticipatory concerns just days before 
the crash that such positive feedback strategies can lead to a large number of investors 
selling their stocks and futures all at once (see Garcia, 1987). The October 12th article by 
the Wall Street Journal mentioned that the use of these strategies can result in a 
considerable “[...] rout for stocks” (see Garcia, 1987). 
 The few days preceding the crash were marked by a series of unfavorable pieces 
of news concerning financial markets; firstly, the U.S. House of Representatives filed for 
legislative measures to erase any tax benefits and interest rates were beginning to rise 
(see Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Report, 1988). This began to put 
downward pressure on stocks’ prices since when interest rates rise, so does the discount 
factor (or required rate of return) investors assign to discount future expected dividends 
(see Koutmos, 2010 and references therein). 
 By Thursday the 15th, the investment environment became saturated with anxiety 
and many of the large institutional investors were pulling out of the stock market and into 
safer instruments such as bonds. By Friday the 16th, anxiety worsened as positive 
feedback traders continued to sell stocks given that their computer models were signaling 
them to continue to decrease their portfolio weights in the stock market. By the end of the 
trading day on that Friday, the S&P 500 index had fallen around 9% for that week amid 
investors’ positive feedback behavior to continue to sell (see SEC Report, 1988). 
 On Monday the 19th, events had reached an irreversible state where there was 
very little policymakers could do to lessen the impact of the positive feedback traders. 
The unprecedented trading volume had besieged computers at the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) that the Exchanged was forced to delay its opening (see SEC Report, 
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1988). While many of the specialists of the NYSE tried to lessen the impact of the 
positive feedback traders by buying stocks, they were unable to do so given the large 
quantity of investors (small and large) all selling at the same time (see SEC Report, 1988; 
Shiller, 2000). On that day alone, the DJIA, NYSE and Wilshire 5000 had fallen between 
approximately 19% and 23% (see Katzenbach, 1987; SEC Report, 1988). 
 
4.2.3.5 The Bursting of the Tech Bubble in the Late 1990s 
The bursting of the tech bubble tells a similar story whereby its creation and demise were 
brought forth by irrational herding and positive feedback investors. During the buildup 
prior to this crash, the availability bias had already taken effect in the sense that investors 
had, to some extent, forgotten the crash of October 1987. Furthermore, there was a lax 
feeling on Wall Street given that it had pressured Congress and lawmakers at Washington 
D.C. to make it more difficult to pursue lawsuits against financial intermediaries and 
issuers of securities (see Coffee, 2002). One such reform passed by policymakers was the 
much debated Private Securities and Litigation Reform Act of 1995 which made it 
increasingly difficult to file class action lawsuits against financial firms (see Coffee, 
2002). Another landmark ruling was in 1999 when Congress and policymakers at 
Washington, D.C. decided to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act, which was originally enacted 
after the Crash of 1929 to separate investment banking from depository banking. 
 These events started to set the stage for overoptimism and overconfidence that 
Wall Street later experienced which led to the bubble and subsequent crash of the tech 
bubble in 2000. In particular, as in the case of the other aforementioned bubbles and 
crashes, upward trends in the market during the years preceding the crash enticed many 
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investors to engage in “trend chasing” (i.e. positive feedback) strategies in Nasdaq 100 
stocks (see Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu, 2003) which kept pushing prices of tech stocks 
further from their fundamental value. In fact, Ofek and Richardson (2002) estimate an 
implied P/E ratio of over 600 for internet stocks in 1999; in plain language, investors 
were somehow expecting these stocks to earn supernormal returns in the future which far 
exceed those of any individual stock which may have existed in the past. Shiller (2000) 
corroborates this point and argues that this crash was the result of frenzied investors who 
believed they can keep earning higher and higher returns, without regard for fundamental 
value. Shiller (2000) also blames an emphatic media seeking to maximize their 
viewership and ratings by constantly feeding investors with pseudo-news and investment 
advice which contributed to much of the hype. 
 Finally, as in the aforementioned market crashes, when investors with an eye on 
fundamentals began to withdraw from the market, prices fell precipitously and, as Ofek 
and Richardson (2002) report, the required return on these tech stocks remained at 0% for 
the next few years. 
 
4.2.3.6 Ponzi Schemes and Herding Behavior 
Now more than ever, we hear in the financial press of so-called Ponzi schemes; a 
fabricated story about how returns are made for investors whereby, in actuality, these 
returns are made by taking money from one investor and giving it to money invested by 
successive investors. This fraudulent formation of returns is essentially a pyramid scheme 
(or a money circulation scheme) which persists as long as there are future investors 
interested in investing with the fraudster and as long as the scheme goes undetected. 
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Real-world cases of this show that the problem of finding new investors is not a daunting 
task for the fraudster given some of the irrational behavior which investors display such 
as herding and positive feedback trading. For example, initially when investors hear of 
high returns, instead of considering the means by which the portfolio manager earned 
these returns, they immediately become very excited and it generates enthusiasm and 
overoptimism among investors. Thus, more and more investors want to partake in this 
and entrust the fraudster with their hard-earned money. As Shiller (2003) describes, these 
schemes persist as a result of the word-of-mouth effects, the media, and the social 
networks which people rely on for information, and the “envy” they get by seeing others’ 
successes and fortunes. 
            Ponzi schemes are an example of positive feedback trading since more and more 
investors want to invest their money with the fraudster just because they presently see 
high returns, yet, when the scheme is uncovered and investors are losing money, they all 
want to withdraw out of this game immediately. Famous contemporary cases of Ponzi 
schemes abound in the news today. One most notable case was that of Bernard Madoff 
who is accused of running a $50 billion Ponzi scheme.29 Given that Ponzi schemes exist 
(and can persist for some time) in countries with industrialized economies and established 
legal frameworks, it is no surprise that such schemes are widespread in other parts of the 
world which lack proper legal checks and balances. For example, from 1996 through 
1997 there were many Ponzi schemes in Albania which collectively were so large in 
magnitude that amounted to a half of a year’s GDP and even led to civil war (see Jarvis, 
2000). 
                                                 
29
 The litigation document which outlines the charges and facts against Bernard Madoff is publicly available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp-madoff121108.pdf  
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As Shiller (2000) argues, Ponzi schemes are akin to market bubbles fueled by 
irrational exuberance in the sense that high current returns incite overconfidence and 
overoptimism and, spreading via word-of-mouth enthusiasm and the media, entice more 
and more investors. Thus, the bubble (or Ponzi scheme) persists until it is uncovered and 
investors begin to ask questions or they suspect that something is awry. In this case, as in 
the other aforementioned cases, this type of investor behavior leads to positive feedback 
trading and it is therefore of interest to see if this kind of feedback trading is evident in 
the behavior of stock prices (see De Long et al., 1990a; Shleifer and Summers, 1990; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Shiller, 2000). 
 
4.2.4 Financial Institutions and Herding Behavior 
The examples of stock market bubbles and irrational investor behavior just cited here are 
in no way comprehensive. For there are many more examples which have not been cited 
here yet the above examples are sufficient in terms of illustrating what happens when 
investors allow their greed and overconfidence to cloud their decision-making abilities. It 
also shows that these factors can lead to positive feedback behavior which, although in 
the short-run may lead to substantial gains, will almost always fail in the long-run. 
A good question to ask however is why financial institutions do not prevent these 
events from happening and why they do not attack bubbles before it is too late. 
Economics textbooks often talk about financial institutions’ role in financial markets and, 
one such role, is to limit the information asymmetry among the various class of investors 
and to ensure that markets are an equal playing field for everyone (see Mishkin, 2005). 
Given the examples cited above, along with casual observation of financial markets, there 
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is ample evidence to suggest that such institutions may also very well engage in the types 
of irrational investing just described. In particular, they may be as prone to positive 
feedback trading and irrational exuberance just like individual investors are. 
Academic literature has identified this problem and it is cited frequently as a 
grave concern and something that policymakers should be aware of as well. For example, 
hedge funds, which are viewed as being a sophisticated class of investors, have been 
found to engage in the types of positive feedback investment strategies mentioned here. 
For example, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) find that hedge fund managers did not 
trade in order to correct prices during the technology bubble, which was described in 
section 4.2.3.5 of this chapter. Instead, many of them captured much of the upturn by 
being heavily invested in tech stocks while reducing their weight considerably when the 
market bubble burst. The perceptive reader may ask, why do financial institutions herd 
and that they do not trade in order to correct mispricing? 
There are several reasons why institutions and large “sophisticated” investors 
engage in positive feedback strategies and herding. Firstly, the simplest reason they do 
not correct mispricing is because it is not in their interest to do so. They may benefit from 
the irrational upswings in price and therefore see no reason to take opposing positions 
and wait until the market corrects in order for them to reap rewards. This is certainly the 
case for many of the hedge funds that Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) were talking about 
in their study. 
Secondly, investment managers are oftentimes evaluated based on their relative 
performance to some benchmark. This benchmark may consist of the market index or it 
may consist of the performance of the manager’s peers. This has been referred to as 
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“compensation-based herding” in the literature and arises when financial institutions 
mimic each other and disregard their own information and intuition for fear that if they 
make a mistake, they will look bad relative to their peers and it will be shameful in the 
eyes of the investors and senior management. However, if everyone does poorly, then this 
can be blamed on other factors such as a weak economy which negatively impacts all 
investments (even the good ones). This premise is embodied in a famous quote by 
Keynes (1936) who makes the observation that “it is better […] to fail conventionally 
than to succeed unconventionally.” 
Maug and Naik (1996) introduce a theoretical model of an agent whereby their 
compensation is determined by the relative performance of their peers. Specifically, the 
agent’s compensation increases (decreases) if they perform well (poorly) relative to their 
benchmark. Given this, it is important to note that the agent, as well as other agents who 
serve as the benchmark, have imperfect information regarding the market and may rely 
on their own unique data sources. They find that when benchmark investors make their 
investment decisions, an agent will observe these actions and make investment decisions 
which imitate the benchmark investors. Thus, in effect, the agent’s investment portfolio 
moves closer to the portfolio of the benchmark. Given the compensation system in place, 
this provides the incentive to copy what the benchmark is doing. 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) extend this logic and argue that when a money 
manager invests in a poor investment decision, this outcome comes to light ex ante and if 
other managers did not invest in the same project or asset. If many other managers had 
also done the same and the investment turned sour, then this can be blamed on 
macroeconomic factors which affect everyone and not on managers’ decision-making 
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capacity. As a result, even very good managers can resort to following the herd instead of 
taking the risk and investing in something unique for fear that it may be a wrong decision 
and it will reflect negatively on them in relation to what their peers are doing. This 
corroborates the statement by Keynes (1936) that it is better to fail along with everyone 
else than to take the risk of trying to succeed in isolation. 
Graham (1999) argues that the principle of herding applies not only to financial 
institutions but even to investment newsletters. In particular, investment newsletters, and 
especially ones with lower reputations, are more likely to follow relatively more 
established newsletters in terms of investment advice and content. Thus, they herd on 
investment advice and follow the leaders in order to show that they too are producing 
high quality advice and research just like the leaders are. This is very similar to a strategy 
known as “window dressing” which is essentially a positive feedback strategy whereby 
investment managers remove losing stocks from their portfolios and replace them with 
winning stocks to make their portfolio “look better.” 
It is important to mention however that more research in this area is called for in 
order to see the true effects of financial institutions’ influence on the market. The reason 
for this is there are mixed views in the literature concerning the role of financial 
institutions and if their herding is rational or irrational. For example, Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) present at least three competing views on the behavior of 
institutions. The first such view is that institutions exert a destabilizing effect on the 
prices of stocks, pushing prices further from their fundamental value and inducing long-
term volatility. This view rests on the premise that financial institutional holdings in the 
stock market far exceed those of individual investors and, therefore, when their buying 
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and selling activity is correlated this can have a large impact on prices. In light of the 
stock market crash of 1987, one fund manager described financial institutions as follows: 
“Institutions are herding animals [...] we watch the same indicators and prognostics [...] 
like lemmings, we tend to move in the same direction at the same time” [see Wall Street 
Journal, (October 17, 1989)]. This view also rests on many of the arguments made earlier 
by other researchers that managers’ compensation is linked to their performance relative 
to that of their peers. Thus, there is a tendency for them to herd. 
The second (and opposing) view is that institutions are cool and level-headed and 
only will herd together if they receive the same information and construe it in the same 
way. They may also exhibit herding behavior if they attack the same kind of mispricing 
or investor biases at the same time. This view, in contrary to what many of the other 
aforementioned studies argue, suggests a negative feedback strategy of selling overpriced 
assets and buying ones that are underpriced. 
 Finally, the last view is more neutral than the other two viewpoints and affords a 
more open-ended answer to this question. It argues that financial institutions are 
heterogeneous agents and utilize a broad range of portfolio strategies and indicators. 
Thus, their trades are uncorrelated and, in the long-run, cancel each other out. 
 
4.2.5 Investor Psychology and Finance 
What are some of the behavioral theories which seek to explain herding behavior and 
feedback-type investment strategies? To answer this question, we turn to some 
experimental evidence done by researchers in the field of psychology. In addition to some 
of the aforementioned theories such as overoptimism, overconfidence, and the 
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availability bias, there are several prominent psychology experiments and theories which 
have direct application here in behavioral finance and have gained credence over the 
years. 
 The notion that investors act on the basis of emotions and ways which are 
irrational is not new in finance or social psychology; for example, Keynes (1935) likens 
the stock selection process of investors as a mere “newspaper beauty contest” whereby 
they select stocks on the basis of which one they think will get the most votes. Since then, 
there has been much experimental evidence and theories which suggest investor 
psychology plays a large role in the stock market and may even lead to suboptimal 
decision-making and feedback trading. In particular, Andreassen and Kraus (1988) find 
that when they give subjects a sequence of historical stock prices (which the subjects 
knew were real) and asked to trade, they behaved in a fashion that is consistent with 
positive feedback trading. More specifically, despite the fact that there was no 
fundamental information available, they would pick out trends they thought existed and 
would buy more when prices appeared to be rising. This evidence is corroborated by later 
studies that look at investor behavior and try to link it with the rise of stock market 
bubbles (see Marimon, Spear and Sunder, 1993). 
 Feedback trading is also supported by evidence in the field of cognitive 
psychology which argues that investors (and human beings in general) make decisions on 
the basis of the “representativeness heuristic” which lead to systematic biases in their 
assessment of future possible events (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1974). In particular, 
they seek to find patters and associations in things and observations without regard for 
realistic probabilities. In their experiment, Kahneman and Tversky (1974) asked 
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participants to guess what occupation an unknown person had on the basis of their 
description, personality and interests. In general, participants in the experiment would 
guess occupations not considering the likelihood of the occupation and how often you 
come across someone with this type of occupation. A rational individual taking this 
experiment would guess unexceptional occupations since most people are in these 
occupations regardless of their interests or hobbies. Extending this logic further, investors 
may have a tendency to classify stocks into various categories based on their historical 
trends. They may, for example, classify stocks that have done well previously as “hot 
stocks” regardless of fundamentals or underlying factors of market risk. 
 Bem (1965) and Daniel, Hirschleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) postulate that a 
so-called “self-attribution bias” may exacerbate the effects of feedback trading. This bias 
results from a common observation embedded in human behavior whereby individuals 
attribute fortunes to their skill (without considering the element of chance may be at play) 
and attributing their misfortunes to factors such as bad luck or factors beyond their 
control. Many readers at this point can probably call to mind situations in social circles 
where they have been in conversations where individuals boastfully talk about their 
investment successes and attribute it on the basis of their skills. In a similar fashion, other 
individuals may be inclined to attribute their misfortunes to exogenous bad conditions 
that everyone faces and may make the argument that “everyone is in the same boat.” 
 It is important to see that this type of mindset is what leads to feedback-type 
trading patterns in stock prices. In particular, the conjectures set forth by Bem (1965) and 
Hirschleifer and Subramanyam (1999) lead to the overconfidence and overoptimism that 
was discussed previously. This kind of unrealistic and wishful thinking is prevalent not 
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only in the finance profession but in everyday life; for example, most participants believe 
they have above average abilities in everyday life such as driving a car or having good 
relationships with others (see Weinstein, 1980). In a more recent study, Buehler, Griffin 
and Ross (1994) find that participants were overconfident in their abilities and mentally 
planned that they could complete projects sooner than they were actually able to. 
 Finally, it is worth noting that much of the findings reported here in this section 
also explain why many investors lack sufficient diversification in their portfolios. For 
example, as was mentioned in detail in section 2.2.4.2 of this thesis, some investors 
simply invest in the company they work for or local companies near them because this is 
what they are familiar with (see Huberman, 2001). Overconfidence can manifest itself 
into poor diversification since investors feel unrealistic confidence about what they are 
familiar with instead of taking into account the fact that there are many possible 
aggregate stock market risks that cannot be hedged through investing myopically. A good 
example of this is individuals who invest in local companies despite the fact that the 
value of their real estate is tied to the success of the company. 
 
4.2.6 Limits to Arbitrage 
The EMH holds true when arbitrage opportunities are riskless and traders are willing to 
take chances to reap excess profits. In reality however, and in light of some of the 
arguments made before, markets are not entirely ‘complete’ in the sense that there are 
perfect substitutes for mispriced assets. They may not also be as efficient as the EMH 
suggests. Therefore, arbitrageurs almost certainly face many risks when trying to execute 
trades and these risks may constrain them severely in terms of their ability to correct 
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mispricing. Despite the standard view, which dates back to Friedman (1953), that 
arbitrageurs stabilize prices, there are arguments which claim that arbitrageurs are 
possibly constrained in terms of their ability to execute trades and stabilize prices. In fact, 
as is argued previously, there may even be an incentive for arbitrageurs to ride waves and 
follow herding investors in order to reap profits before attacking the bubble. 
 However, conventional literature in this field generally takes the position that 
arbitrageurs intend to take corrective roles in the market and to attack mispricing which is 
developed through the actions of noise traders. In general, the literature cites three types 
of risks which limit the corrective actions of arbitrageurs. The first two are known as 
fundamental risk and noise trader risk and are initially discussed in the seminal studies by 
Figlewski (1979) and De Long et al. (1990a, 1990b, 1991). The former of these two risks 
can be illustrated by this simple example: Suppose an arbitrageur buys undervalued 
stocks of a hypothetical company whose fundamental value is $30 but has been pushed 
down to $25 by pessimistic noise traders. The obvious imminent threat to arbitrageurs is 
that a bad piece of news may arrive regarding this company and it may push the price 
even further down. A natural way to hedge this risk is to buy shares from substitute 
companies (i.e. companies in the same industry perhaps). However, this sort of strategy 
may provide protection if there is bad news relating to the entire industry but still leaves 
open the possibility that bad news can arrive regarding the specific company’s shares. 
Thus, it is not possible to eliminate fundamental risk in its entirety. 
 The second type of risk their study mentions is known as noise trader risk and is 
different from fundamental risk in the sense that arbitrageurs may attack mispricing but 
may do so somewhere at the midpoint of the feedback wave and, as such, mispricing may 
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persist and exacerbate in the near future. Thus, arbitrageurs may be forced to liquidate 
their positions and suffer losses as feedback traders continue to push prices further from 
their fundamental value. 
 A third type of risk is known as synchronization risk and is perhaps the reason 
arbitrageurs face the two aforementioned risks (see Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2002 and 
2003). This risk results from the inability of arbitrageurs to successfully coordinate their 
actions to attach mispricing. For example, arbitrageurs may be aware of mispricing at an 
individual level but may not act for fear that they are acting alone. Therefore, there is a 
synchronization problem in the sense that they cannot coordinate to attack mispricing as a 
whole. If they cannot time their actions, then arbitrageurs who act alone may face the two 
aforementioned risks and suffer losses to their portfolio. 
 Of course there are other types of risks arbitrageurs face that stem from these 
three risks and which limit their abilities. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002), for instance, 
argue that arbitrageurs face holding costs in their attempt to exploit mispricing. Consider 
for example a hypothetical arbitrageur who sells short an overpriced stock. Short-selling 
incurs several holding costs; they must hold the proceeds from the short sale in a low- or 
zero-bearing interest margin account. In addition, given the conditions of the margin 
account, it may be necessary for them to put more money in into this account and this 
presents an opportunity cost for alternative investments opportunities that are missed.  
 Therefore, the implication of these events is that there exist feedback traders and 
fundamental traders who may have a significant impact on the behavior of stock prices 
and who drive the direction of the aggregate market. It is the intent of this chapter to 
model the behavior of these types of investors and to see whether their actions are 
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manifested in the movements of stock prices. Although some of the aforementioned 
instances are rather extreme in terms of their nature and improbable in terms of their 
frequency, they do illustrate some rather important aspects of investor behavior and 
emphasize the arguments of Black (1986), De Long et al. (1990a), Shleifer and Summers 
(1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Shiller (2000) that there are heterogeneous 
investors in the marketplace and it is therefore of interest to investigate the intertemporal 
risk-return tradeoff by incorporating their behavior in our empirical models. 
 
4.3. The Model 
In light of the aforementioned arguments, there is evidence to suggest the presence of 
investors with heterogeneous trading patterns which influence the movement of stock 
prices. As mentioned, stock price dynamics may be driven by emotions in the stock 
market and also by investors who base their decisions on fundamental factors. Thus, it is 
important to consider these groups of investors when trying to uncover the forces which 
drive stock prices. The ICAPM of Merton (1973) provides an intuitive formulization yet 
is based on the premise that investors are utility maximizers which make decisions on the 
basis of mean-variance considerations when selecting optimal portfolios. Such a 
generalization is consistent with the groundwork theory laid forth by Markowitz (1952) 
which was discussed more in-depth in the second chapter of this thesis. However, as is 
argued by other researchers and as is discussed in the previous section, perhaps it is 
important that we consider the fact that there exist heterogeneous investors which, 
through their trading behaviors, influence the movements in stock prices. 
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 The model used to describe the presence of heterogeneous trading patterns is based 
on the works of Shiller (1984), Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), and Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers (1990). The model postulates three types of traders: (a) rational risk-averse 
investors who make decisions on the basis of mean-variance considerations; (b) positive 
feedback, or, momentum traders, who are trend-chasers and buy (sell) when market prices 
rise (fall); and finally, (c) fundamental traders, who base their expectations on prices relative 
to fundamentals.  
 The demand for shares by rational risk-averse investors is consistent with the 
axioms which govern utility maximization theory. These investors are holding a greater 
fraction of shares when they forecast higher expected returns relative to the required 
returns. The demand function for this group can be written as: 
S1,t-1 = 
t
ftt rRE
2
1 ])([
θσ
−
−
 ;  θ > 0       (4.1) 
where, S1,t-1, is the fraction of shares held by group 1, at time t-1. Et-1(Rt) is the 
conditional expectation of the return as of time t-1, rf, is the risk-free rate, θ is the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion and σ2t is the conditional variance as of time t-1. This 
demand function is identical to the one used by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) and it can 
be reduced to the one used by Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990) with suitable parameter 
restrictions. 
Fundamental traders form expectations of future returns of the basis of 
fundamental values. When prices are low relative to fundamental values, they increase 
their demand and vice versa. Their demand function is given by: 
S2,t-1 = ( )11 −− − tt Pfβ ;  β > 0        (4.2) 
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where, S2,t-1 is the demand for shares held by group 2 at t-1, and ft-1 and Pt-1 are the 
fundamental value and the price respectively.   
 Finally, feedback traders base their demand on past returns (i.e., they raise their 
demand following price increases and lower it following price decreases).  This may be due 
to the use of stop-loss orders, technical analysis, overconfidence and overoptimism, trading 
on the basis of noise, or even portfolio insurance strategies. The demand function that 
captures this behavior is given by,     
S3,t-1 = ( )ft rR −−1δ ; δ > 0        (4.3) 
where, S3,t-1 is the fraction of shares held by group 3 and δ is the feedback parameter, 
expected to be positive assuming that positive feedback trading far outweighs any 
negative feedback trading. This is similar to the model presented by Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) in the sense that investor demand for shares at time t is a function of 
what prices are in time t-1. The notation I use here is different from that of Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) in the sense that demand at time t is a function of returns on the stock 
market in excess of the risk free rate, i.e., Rt-1 – rf. It is important also to note that the 
main distinction between the model used here in this chapter and the model by Sentana 
and Wadhwani (1992) is that the latter looks at the behavior of only rational investors and 
feedback investors. 
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In equilibrium, all shares will be held, so that we can write: 
S1,t-1+S2,t-1+S3,t-1 = 1.      (4.4A) 
or, alternatively, 
t
ftt rRE
2
1 ])([
θσ
−
−
  +  ( )ft rR −−1δ   +  ( )11 −− − tt Pfβ   =  1   (4.4B) 
Setting Rt – rf = rt , and Et-1(Rt) – rf = rt + εt  we get: 
rt  =  θσt2 – ( )12 )( −tt rθσδ  – ( )112 )( −− − ttt Pfθσβ  + εt       (4.5) 
 
Equation (4.5) can be recast in a simplified form as follows: 
rt  =  b0 +  b1σt2  +b2 ( )][ 112 −− − ttt Pfσ  + b3  ( )][ 12 −tt rσ   + εt      (4.6) 
where, b0=0, b1=θ, b2=-βθ, and b3=-δ. Based on this model, the presence of fundamental 
traders implies that b2 is negative and statistically significant. Similarly, if there is 
positive feedback trading it implies that b3 is also negative and statistically significant.  
 Finally, the conditional variance is modeled as an EGARCH(1,1) process as 
follows: 
   ln(σ2t) = α0 + α1(│zt-1│ - E│zt-1│ + λzt-1) + α2ln(σ2t-1)      (4.7) 
where, ln(.) are natural logarithms and  zt = εt/σt   are standardized residuals. The EGARCH 
specification is advantageous in that it allows the conditional variance to behave 
asymmetrically in response to positive and negative innovations of equal magnitude. In 
other words, this is consistent with Campbel and Hentschel (1992) which argues that ‘bad’ 
news leads to more volatility than ‘good’ news. Furthermore, a first order lag structure is 
adopted since, consistent with existing evidence, lower-order GARCH models have 
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proven sufficient in terms of effectively modeling the time-series properties of stock 
returns (see Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner, 1992).30 
 The model described by Equations (4.1) through (4.7) nests both the Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992) and Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990) models. For example, if the 
conditional variance is constant over time, the model reduces to that of Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers (1990). When we assume that the conditional variance is time-varying but the 
fundamental traders are not present, (i.e. δ=0) then the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) 
model holds. 
 There is no general agreement on what is an appropriate proxy for the fundamental 
value. Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990) find that a constant multiple of dividends works 
well for stocks. Jiang and Lee (2009) use both dividends and earnings. Furthermore, there is 
a large body of academic and practitioner literature that use the so-called Fed model, 
whereby the fundamental value is equal to earnings discounted by the long-term government 
bond rate.  This model was described in greater depth in the second chapter and now will be 
used again here. 
To assure robustness of the results this chapter use three different measures for 
fundamental value; the first is based on earnings, the second is based on dividends and, 
finally, the third is based on the Fed model. These three measures are calculated using 
current earnings and dividends as well as normalized earnings and dividends based on two-
year moving averages. 
 
                                                 
30
 For robustness, the heterogeneous model was also estimated using, instead of the EGARCH model in Equation (4.7), a GJR-
GARCH model as was described in the second chapter in Equation (2.24b). The findings (not reported here for the sake for brevity) 
find qualitatively analogous results as those reported in Tables 4.2 through 4.8. Consistent with diagnostic tests performed, this 
suggests that both the GARCH-based models here provide a similar estimate for volatility since they both account for the asymmetric 
impact of news. Since the results are qualitatively similar, this then highlights the need for focusing more research on considering 
other proxies for fundamental value, as this may help to better explain the behavior of such fundamental investors. 
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4.4. Data and Variable Construction 
 The data used to test the model refer the stock markets of the group of seven 
industrialized nations, G-7. By examining international stock markets, useful information 
can be gained as to their respective risk-return characteristics and whether heterogeneous 
investors are present in such markets. The frequency of the data is monthly since 
fundamental factors such as the price-earnings ratio are available on a lower frequency 
basis. The sample ranges and descriptive statistics are identified in Table 4.1. 
 In particular, the data used in this study include the monthly observations for the 
stock price indices of the Group of Seven nations (G-7); namely, those of Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US. These countries are chosen to 
examine the presence of heterogeneous investors and to see to what extent their actions 
possibly drive stock prices. In examining these markets, the following indices are used: 
Toronto 300 Composite (Canada), CAC industrial price index (France), DAX price index 
(Germany), Milano price index (Italy), Nikkei 225 (Japan), FT All Share Index (UK), and 
the S&P 500 (USA). The starting dates for each market are reported in Table 4.1 and are 
1/1973 (for Canada), 1/1989 (for France), 1/1983 (for Germany), 1/1987 (for Italy), 
1/1985 (for Japan), 1/1976 (for the UK), and 1/1968 (for the US). The ending date for all 
markets is 6/2009. The choice for the data ranges is determined by the availability of all 
data necessary to complete this investigation at the time this study was undertaken. It is 
important that the data came from a single source and I avoided splicing together data 
from different sources such as, for example, adjoining data from DataStream with data 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER), or other research divisions within various Central Banks. Thus, the data used for 
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this purpose are thus solely collected from DataStream, a well-respected source of 
financial and economic data used by practitioners and academicians alike. The sample 
ranges are dictated by data availability and contingent on the requirement that there be 
uninterrupted data, since I avoid splicing with other sources. 
In contrast to studies that focus on the autocorrelation dynamics of higher 
frequency data to test for the presence of feedback traders, this chapter uses monthly 
observations to see in the longer-run whether such feedback trading is evident. In 
addition to this, fundamental traders use fundamental factors, such as the P/E ratio, which 
are generally available on a lower frequency basis. 
 The unconditional return series, Rt, for each market index is calculated in 
continuously compounded terms as Rt  = 100*ln(Pi,t / Pi,t-1). Dividends are factored into 
each index’s return series by adding in the appropriate market’s monthly dividend-yield. 
Descriptive statistics for each stock market’s monthly returns that are provided in Table 
4.1 include the mean (µ) and standard deviation (σ), measures for skewness (S) and 
kurtosis (K). The monthly return series for all stock market indexes are negatively 
skewed and highly leptokurtic. This is consistent with asset pricing literature and the so-
called ‘volatility feedback’ hypothesis of Campbell and Hentschel (1992) which argues 
that large negative shocks in market returns lead to more volatility than positive shocks of 
equal magnitude, as is mentioned in the previous chapters of the thesis. 
Furthermore, these statistics show, as is described in the second and third 
chapters, evidence of so-called ‘ARCH effects’ in the volatility of the return series for 
each market and that negative innovations lead to more volatility than positive 
innovations of equal magnitude (see Engle and Ng, 1993). This is a reason for the 
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empirical observation that volatility tends to cluster together, as is illustrated in Figure 
2.1 in the second chapter. 
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Table 4.1: Sample Ranges & Descriptive Statistics 
  Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK USA 
Sample start date: (01/1973) (01/1989) (01/1983) (01/1987) (01/1985) (01/1976) (01/1968) 
Sample end date: (06/2009) (06/2009) (06/2009) (06/2009) (06/2009) (06/2009) (06/2009) 
         
(A) Monthly stock market returns     
µ  0.8140 0.5115 0.8567 0.3188 0.0840 0.9981 0.7275 
σ  4.6630 5.6493 6.4487 6.2832 5.7588 4.9082 4.5079 
S  -0.9296 -0.5284 -0.8562 0.1360 -0.3836 -1.0134 -0.6929 
K  6.7175 3.4286 5.4387 3.6457 4.3500 7.4994 5.6112 
         
(B) Monthly stock market P/E ratio      
µ  15.3000 14.5715 17.1610 17.5019 43.1289 14.5557 18.3181 
σ  4.9671 4.0321 3.6753 4.8044 13.4805 5.1737 10.1326 
S  0.2086 0.9333 -0.0020 0.6984 0.0887 0.5427 4.9849 
K  2.7132 3.4962 2.4445 4.3257 2.1392 2.5136 49.9134 
         
(C) Monthly dividend-yield      
µ  3.0597 2.9972 2.1179 2.9133 0.9353 4.1559 3.1784 
σ  1.0682 0.7833 0.5910 1.2900 0.3974 1.1895 1.2932 
S  0.4401 1.4638 1.9143 2.3991 2.5230 0.3074 0.3319 
K  2.4534 7.4498 9.2083 11.7000 11.5002 2.5035 2.2600 
         
(D) Monthly stock market earnings-yield     
µ  7.4239 7.3524 6.1627 6.1871 2.5996 7.8769 6.6815 
σ  2.8199 1.8069 1.4280 1.9602 0.9887 2.9404 2.9477 
S  1.0670 0.2659 0.8560 2.2532 1.6742 0.8237 0.8712 
K  3.1606 2.8868 3.0556 10.8992 7.1103 3.2768 3.0458 
         
(E) Monthly long-term govt. bond yield     
µ  8.3807 5.8337 5.8299 7.6738 3.2157 8.5848 7.2934 
σ  2.9178 1.9862 1.6105 3.9183 1.9156 3.3762 2.5355 
S  0.4110 0.6949 0.1595 0.3663 0.5157 0.2456 0.8862 
K  2.8012 2.1921 1.9198 1.4624 1.9003 1.9261 3.5745 
         
(F) Monthly short-term govt. bond yield      
µ  6.9575 5.0188 5.2210 9.8739 1.3135 8.1842 5.7444 
σ  4.1654 2.9587 2.4735 5.4882 2.0588 3.5799 2.9000 
S  0.8222 0.8381 1.0538 0.0221 2.1186 0.3986 0.8019 
K  3.1680 2.3513 3.7224 1.8814 6.6245 2.2691 4.3733 
Note: This table reports the sample statistics for each of the markets; µ − mean; σ − standard deviation; S – 
skewness; K – excess kurtosis. The descriptive statistics indicate non-normality in the unconditional return 
series, as is observed in the second and third chapters of the thesis.  
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For each country the primary variables used are the stock price index, the 
dividend yield, the price-to-earnings  ratio (P/E ratio), the short term (3-month) rate on 
Treasury Bills and the long-term (10-year) rate on government bonds. The dividend yield 
and the P/E ratio are used to calculate dividend payments (Dt)  and earnings  (Et).  As 
mentioned, the continuously compounded unconditional stock rate of return is calculated 
as Rt=ln[(Pt+Dt)/Pt-1].   
 The three different proxies for fundamental value are calculated as follows and 
discussed in turn. The first proxy, f1, is the long average earnings multiple: 
f1 =(long-term average earnings multiple)  x  Et. It is calculated as the sample average of 
the P/E ratio. This type of fundamental is used rather routinely by researchers (see Fama 
and French, 2002). The second proxy, f2, is based on a constant multiple of dividends. 
Even though dividends and earnings are highly correlated, especially for the aggregate 
market, the correlation is far from perfect. Thus, using a proxy based on dividends could 
produce additional insights. The calculation of the second proxy is done as follows: 
f2= constant multiple x Dt.  On the basis of the constant growth model, the constant will 
be approximately equal to 1/(k-g) where k is the required rate of return and g is the 
growth rate. It is also equal to the inverse of the long-term dividend yield. In constructing 
this proxy, I use the sample average of the inverse of the dividend yield. A justification 
for the use of this type of fundamental proxy can be found in Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers (1990) and is useful in comparing a fundamental factor, such as dividends, to 
the price of the asset. 
 Finally, the third fundamental proxy, f3, is based on the Fed model that was 
discussed in the second chapter and which predicts that the earnings yield (E/P) should be 
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approximately equal to the long-term yield to maturity on government bonds. Thus, the 
calculation of the third fundamental proxy is done as follows:  f3 = Et / YTMt. 
To make sure the results are not biased by short-run fluctuations in earnings and 
dividends, I recalculate the three proxies using two-year (24 month) moving averages for 
earnings and dividends. The proxies based on two year moving averages are denoted 
respectively as f1*, f2* and f3*.  The moving averages provide a more “smoothed” indicator 
of the fundamental value. 
 
4.5. Empirical Evidence 
The empirical findings of the feedback model with the three types of investors described 
above are reported for each respective G-7 market in Tables 4.2 through 4.8, which are 
located at the end of this section. The estimation is based on nonlinear maximum 
likelihood techniques assuming that the error term is normally distributed. 
Table 4.2 reports the results for Canada. The constant (i.e., parameter b0) is 
insignificant across all models. The parameter b1 is positive in most cases but statistically 
insignificant. As mentioned earlier, the presence of fundamental traders is captured by 
parameter b2 and the model predicts that it should be negative. Interestingly, b2 is 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level of significance at least. This result 
holds irrespective of the way the fundamental proxy is defined, implying that the result is 
quite robust. There is no evidence of positive feedback trading as the relevant parameter 
b3 is insignificant. These results are in contrast to those by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), 
Koutmos (1997), and Antoniou, Koutmos and Pericli (2005). This may be due to the fact 
that these studies are using daily data. In this case an argument can be made in favor of the 
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notion that positive feedback trading is present in the short run, but it becomes insignificant 
in the longer run. It is also possible that there are also negative feedback traders so that the 
net result becomes insignificant.  The parameters that describe the conditional variance are 
always significant proving that the conditional variance is indeed time-varying. More 
specifically, the estimate for conditional variance is a function of past standardized residuals 
and the past conditional variance itself. Moreover, in the case of Canada, the variance 
responds asymmetrically to past residuals (i.e., it rises faster when the residuals are negative 
compared to when the residuals are positive). This can be seen by the sign and significance 
of parameter λ.  
 I use the likelihood ratio statistic (LR) to test the significance of this extended model 
compared to that of Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990). Since the latter model is nested, 
the LR statistic is appropriate. It is calculated as LR = -2*(L0-L1) where L0 is the value of 
the likelihood function under the null hypothesis, in this case, the Cutler, Poterba and 
Summers (1990) model, and L1 is the value of the alternative hypothesis. The alternative 
hypothesis is the full model here. It follows chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of parameter restrictions required under the null hypothesis. In this case, 
the number of restrictions is 3 meaning that the critical values are 7.31 and 9.35 at the 5% 
and 1% levels. The estimated values of LR are well above the critical values at 1% 
suggesting that the extended model may provide further advantages. It is again important to 
note that the restricted model by Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990) assumes a constant 
required rate of return of zero by investors who form rational forecasts of the market. 
If we now turn to the findings from France (reported in Table 4.3) we find no 
evidence of positive feedback trading but convincing evidence of fundamental trading. The 
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strongest case for fundamental trading is made when the proxies used are f1 and f1*.  There is 
strong evidence that the conditional variance in France is asymmetric (i.e., parameter λ is 
negative and significant). Furthermore, the LR test rejects the null hypothesis and suggests 
that the full model used here may have some additional advantages in describing investor 
behavior. 
The results for Germany (Table 4.4) are similar in the sense that the positive 
feedback parameter is insignificant but the fundamental trading parameter b2 is negative and 
significant in most cases. The strongest case for fundamental trading can be made when the 
proxy for fundamental value used is based on the P/E multiple (i.e., f1).  The conditional 
variance is also time-varying since the relevant parameters are significant and there is 
evidence of some asymmetry in the variance. Again, the LR statistic rejects the restricted 
model in favor of the full model that is used here. 
 The findings for the remaining four markets are qualitatively similar as those of the 
preceding aforementioned markets. Specifically, there is evidence of fundamental trading 
but not enough evidence to support the view that feedback trading is present. An exception 
appears to be the U.S. market, where there is some evidence of positive feedback trading 
when the proxy used is f1. In the majority of cases the conditional variance is asymmetric, 
supporting the use of the EGARCH model. Furthermore, the LR test shows that the 
extended model performs better than the model by Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990). 
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Table 4.2: Presence of Heterogeneous Traders in Canada’s Stock Market 
Coeff. f1 f2 f3 f1* f2* f3* 
b0 -0.1757 
(-0.165) 
0.1655 
(0.221) 
0.3140 
(0.389) 
1.2578 
(1.167) 
0.7271 
(0.790) 
0.5635 
(0.636) 
b1 0.0310 
(0.559) 
0.0297 
(0.763) 
0.0015 
(0.038) 
-0.0513 
(-0.847) 
0.0061 
(0.125) 
-0.0071 
(-0.159) 
b2 * 104 -1.7214 
(-2.660)** 
-0.6475 
(-2.130)** 
-0.3957 
(-2.288)** 
1.4035 
(-2.738)** 
-0.7174 
(-2.085)** 
-0.4638 
(-2.330)** 
b3 0.0014 
(0.471) 
-0.0015 
(0.984) 
0.0009 
(0.516) 
-0.0053 
(-0.136) 
0.0068 
(0.383) 
0.0008 
(0.452) 
α0 1.0863 
(3.014)** 
1.0880 
(3.034)** 
1.0144 
(2.941)** 
0.7761 
(2.641)** 
0.9410 
(2.823)** 
0.9277 
(2.788)** 
α1 0.2048 
(1.888)* 
0.2117 
(1.639)* 
0.2235 
(1.808)* 
0.2780 
(2.567)** 
0.2528 
(2.054)** 
0.2617 
(2.164)** 
α2 0.5767 
(4.647)** 
0.5281 
(4.812)** 
0.5996 
(5.141)** 
0.6602 
(6.357)** 
0.6110 
(5.410)** 
0.6131 
(5.422)** 
λ -0.2482 
(-5.003)** 
-0.2620 
(-4.811)** 
-0.2545 
(-4.809)** 
-0.2182 
(-4.203)** 
-0.2662 
(-4.901)** 
-0.2594 
(-4.826)** 
LR 19.92* 20.76* 22.42** 20.72* 21.30** 22.14** 
Note: This table presents findings for the Canadian stock market whereby (*) and (**) denote significance at the 10% 
and 5% levels, respectively. It estimates the following feedback model: rt  =  b0 +  b1σt2  +b2 ( )][ 112 −− − ttt Pfσ  + b3  
( )][ 12 −tt rσ   + εt whereby the parameters b0, b1, b2, and b3 are parameters to be estimated. This model is estimated with 
each of the respective fundamental proxies, f1, f2, and f3, as well as the 2-year moving average in the earnings and 
dividends for these proxies, denoted as f1*, f2*, and f3*, respectively. The parameter b1 measures investors’ risk 
aversion and whether there is a risk-return tradeoff. Consistent with theory, this parameter should be positive and 
statistically significant. The parameter b2 measures the presence of fundamental traders for each of the respective 
fundamental proxies and, if fundamental traders are present, the sign of this parameter should be negative and 
statistically significant. The parameter b3 measures to what extent feedback traders exist in this market. If there are 
positive feedback traders, b3 is expected to be negative and statistically significant. The conditional variance, σt2, is 
estimated using an EGARCH(1,1) specification: ln(σ2t) = α0 + α1(│zt-1│ - E│zt-1│ + λzt-1) + α2ln(σ2t-1), whereby ln(.) are 
natural logarithms and  zt = εt/σt   are standardized residuals. Finally, the likelihood ratio statistic (LR) is estimated to test the 
significance of this extended model compared to that of Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990). 
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Table 4.3: Presence of Heterogeneous Traders in France’s Stock Market 
Coeff. f1 f2 f3 f1* f2* f3* 
b0 -0.0469 
(-0.048) 
-0.3885 
(-0.443) 
0.4424 
(0.455) 
0.8280 
(0.783) 
1.2574 
(0.642) 
0.2848 
(0.243) 
b1 0.0215 
(0.608) 
0.0518 
(1.706)* 
0.0341 
(0.109) 
-0.0139 
(-0.335) 
0.0097 
(0.160) 
0.0145 
(0.318) 
b2 * 104 -0.3845 
(-3.301)** 
-0.0973 
(-1.475) 
-0.0710 
(-0.872) 
-0.2299 
(-3.193)** 
-0.0081 
(-1.148) 
-0.0010 
(-0.116) 
b3 0.0001 
(0.084) 
0.0009 
(0.835) 
-0.0003 
(-0.246) 
0.0002 
(0.086) 
0.0009 
(0.403) 
0.0009 
(0.338) 
α0 0.4896 
(1.488) 
5.4712 
(7.619)** 
0.5977 
(1.343) 
0.2056 
(1.036) 
0.2617 
(1.131) 
0.3308 
(0.386) 
α1 0.2290 
(1.764)* 
0.8217 
(0.677) 
0.3482 
(2.083)** 
0.2431 
(1.932)* 
0.2545 
(1.909)* 
0.3373 
(2.021)** 
α2 0.7936 
(7.125)** 
0.6246 
(3.048)** 
0.7335 
(5.090)** 
0.8781 
(12.286)** 
0.8605 
(10.231)** 
0.8157 
(6.234)** 
λ -0.1833 
(-2.492)** 
-0.2194 
(2.334)** 
-0.1814 
(-2.162)** 
-0.1430 
(-2.343)** 
-0.1547 
(-2.516)** 
-0.1292 
(-1.742)* 
LR 22.08** 19.04* 24.47** 20.98** 22.12** 19.28* 
Note: This table presents findings for the French stock market whereby (*) and (**) denote significance at the 10% and 
5% levels, respectively. It estimates the following feedback model: rt  =  b0 +  b1σt2  +b2 ( )][ 112 −− − ttt Pfσ  + b3  
( )][ 12 −tt rσ   + εt whereby the parameters b0, b1, b2, and b3 are parameters to be estimated. This model is estimated with 
each of the respective fundamental proxies, f1, f2, and f3, as well as the 2-year moving average in the earnings and 
dividends for these proxies, denoted as f1*, f2*, and f3*, respectively. The parameter b1 measures investors’ risk 
aversion and whether there is a risk-return tradeoff. Consistent with theory, this parameter should be positive and 
statistically significant. The parameter b2 measures the presence of fundamental traders for each of the respective 
fundamental proxies and, if fundamental traders are present, the sign of this parameter should be negative and 
statistically significant. The parameter b3 measures to what extent feedback traders exist in this market. If there are 
positive feedback traders, b3 is expected to be negative and statistically significant. The conditional variance, σt2, is 
estimated using an EGARCH(1,1) specification: ln(σ2t) = α0 + α1(│zt-1│ - E│zt-1│ + λzt-1) + α2ln(σ2t-1), whereby ln(.) are 
natural logarithms and  zt = εt/σt   are standardized residuals. Finally, the likelihood ratio statistic (LR) is estimated to test the 
significance of this extended model compared to that of Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990). 
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Table 4.4: Presence of Heterogeneous Traders in Germany’s Stock Market 
Coeff. f1 f2 f3 f1* f2* f3* 
b0 0.1246 
(0.2413) 
0.1647 
(0.303) 
0.1884 
(0.355) 
0.1298 
(0.231) 
0.1055 
(0.193) 
0.2665 
(0.482) 
b1 0.0894 
(0.548) 
0.0154 
(0.777) 
0.0523 
(0.305) 
0.0590 
(0.322) 
0.0205 
(0.976) 
0.0340 
(0.179) 
b2 * 104 -0.1557 
(-2.336)** 
0.0959 
(1.744)* 
-0.0192 
(-0.711) 
-0.1014 
(-1.892)* 
0.1107 
(1.749)* 
-0.0156 
(-0.662) 
b3 0.0005 
(0.490) 
0.0006 
(0.587) 
0.0006 
(0.581) 
0.0005 
(0.509) 
0.0006 
(0.587) 
0.0007 
(0.594) 
α0 -0.0217 
(-0.283) 
-0.0324 
(-0.437) 
-0.0163 
(-0.209) 
-0.0062 
(-0.072) 
-0.0213 
(-0.242) 
-0.0056 
(-0.063) 
α1 0.2569 
(4.472)** 
0.2709 
(4.467)** 
0.2704 
(4.446)** 
0.2918 
(4.384)** 
0.3048 
(4.414)** 
-0.3021 
(-4.306)** 
α2 0.9204 
(42.033)** 
0.9507 
(42.221)** 
0.9460 
(39.572)** 
0.9391 
(36.455)** 
0.9407 
(35.651)** 
0.9368 
(34.256)** 
λ -0.0459 
(0.164) 
0.0145 
(0.529) 
0.0041 
(0.151) 
-0.0024 
(-0.006) 
0.0119 
(0.366) 
0.0256 
(0.081) 
LR 52.58** 55.94** 54.64** 52.60** 55.32** 55.76** 
Note: This table presents findings for the German stock market whereby (*) and (**) denote significance at the 10% 
and 5% levels, respectively. It estimates the following feedback model: rt  =  b0 +  b1σt2  +b2 ( )][ 112 −− − ttt Pfσ  + b3  
( )][ 12 −tt rσ   + εt whereby the parameters b0, b1, b2, and b3 are parameters to be estimated. This model is estimated with 
each of the respective fundamental proxies, f1, f2, and f3, as well as the 2-year moving average in the earnings and 
dividends for these proxies, denoted as f1*, f2*, and f3*, respectively. The parameter b1 measures investors’ risk 
aversion and whether there is a risk-return tradeoff. Consistent with theory, this parameter should be positive and 
statistically significant. The parameter b2 measures the presence of fundamental traders for each of the respective 
fundamental proxies and, if fundamental traders are present, the sign of this parameter should be negative and 
statistically significant. The parameter b3 measures to what extent feedback traders exist in this market. If there are 
positive feedback traders, b3 is expected to be negative and statistically significant. The conditional variance, σt2, is 
estimated using an EGARCH(1,1) specification: ln(σ2t) = α0 + α1(│zt-1│ - E│zt-1│ + λzt-1) + α2ln(σ2t-1), whereby ln(.) are 
natural logarithms and  zt = εt/σt   are standardized residuals. Finally, the likelihood ratio statistic (LR) is estimated to test the 
significance of this extended model compared to that of Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990). 
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Table 4.5: Presence of Heterogeneous Traders in Italy’s Stock Market 
Coeff. f1 f2 f3 f1* f2* f3* 
b0 0.9809 
(1.274) 
1.6048 
(2.451)** 
-0.0715 
(-0.735) 
0.8534 
(1.148) 
1.4061 
(1.791)* 
0.0862 
(1.193) 
b1 -0.0152 
(-0.825) 
-0.0137 
(-1.018) 
0.0017 
(0.052) 
-0.0179 
(-0.867) 
-0.0155 
(-0.790) 
-0.0175 
(-0.897) 
b2 * 104 -0.3463 
(-3.162)** 
-0.1609 
(-1.806)* 
-0.0949 
(-1.657)* 
-0.1907 
(-2.285)** 
-0.0001 
(-1.292) 
-0.0385 
(-0.671) 
b3 0.0001 
(0.129) 
0.0006 
(0.653) 
0.0004 
(0.527) 
0.0004 
(0.369) 
0.0013 
(0.989) 
0.0007 
(0.589) 
α0 -0.0043 
(-0.026) 
0.0628 
(0.389) 
0.0094 
(0.052) 
-0.0221 
(-0.142) 
0.1358 
(0.644) 
-0.0683 
(-0.409) 
α1 0.3672 
(2.724)** 
0.3797 
(3.621)** 
0.3700 
(2.808)** 
0.3329 
(2.326)** 
0.3355 
(3.053)** 
0.3378 
(2.383)** 
α2 0.9193 
(17.833)** 
0.9047 
(19.112)** 
0.9154 
(16.833)** 
0.9308 
(18.663)** 
0.8906 
(13.802)** 
0.9254 
(17.310)** 
λ -0.0533 
(-1.041) 
0.0001 
(0.003) 
-0.0771 
(-1.559) 
-0.0961 
(-1.880)* 
-0.0542 
(-1.332) 
-0.1025 
(-2.023)** 
LR 23.02** 33.40** 23.36** 24.06** 17.28* 24.80** 
Note: This table presents findings for the Italian stock market whereby (*) and (**) denote significance at the 10% and 
5% levels, respectively. It estimates the following feedback model: rt  =  b0 +  b1σt2  +b2 ( )][ 112 −− − ttt Pfσ  + b3  
( )][ 12 −tt rσ   + εt whereby the parameters b0, b1, b2, and b3 are parameters to be estimated. This model is estimated with 
each of the respective fundamental proxies, f1, f2, and f3, as well as the 2-year moving average in the earnings and 
dividends for these proxies, denoted as f1*, f2*, and f3*, respectively. The parameter b1 measures investors’ risk 
aversion and whether there is a risk-return tradeoff. Consistent with theory, this parameter should be positive and 
statistically significant. The parameter b2 measures the presence of fundamental traders for each of the respective 
fundamental proxies and, if fundamental traders are present, the sign of this parameter should be negative and 
statistically significant. The parameter b3 measures to what extent feedback traders exist in this market. If there are 
positive feedback traders, b3 is expected to be negative and statistically significant. The conditional variance, σt2, is 
estimated using an EGARCH(1,1) specification: ln(σ2t) = α0 + α1(│zt-1│ - E│zt-1│ + λzt-1) + α2ln(σ2t-1), whereby ln(.) are 
natural logarithms and  zt = εt/σt   are standardized residuals. Finally, the likelihood ratio statistic (LR) is estimated to test the 
significance of this extended model compared to that of Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990). 
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Table 4.6: Presence of Heterogeneous Traders in Japan’s Stock Market 
Coeff. f1 f2 f3 f1* f2* f3* 
b0 0.8266 
(1.711)* 
1.0542 
(1.967)** 
0.5391 
(1.211) 
0.8557 
(1.819)* 
1.0747 
(2.048)** 
0.4367 
(0.996) 
b1 -0.0312 
(-1.365) 
-0.0297 
(-1.632)* 
-0.0171 
(-0.821) 
-0.0307 
(-1.353) 
-0.0291 
(-1.614) 
-0.0038 
(-0.178) 
b2 * 104 -0.6369 
(-2.239)** 
-0.5432 
(-2.396)** 
-0.0410 
(-0.379) 
-0.6427 
(-2.713)** 
-0.0048 
(-2.003)** 
-0.0506 
(-0.469) 
b3 0.0005 
(0.375) 
-0.0014 
(-1.280) 
0.0006 
(0.467) 
-0.0015 
(-1.423) 
0.0013 
(-1.242) 
0.0009 
(0.618) 
α0 -0.0180 
(-0.291) 
-0.0253 
(-0.458) 
-0.0368 
(-0.632) 
-0.0395 
(-0.725) 
-0.0363 
(-0.664) 
-0.0465 
(-0.768) 
α1 0.1972 
(4.059)** 
0.1952 
(4.099)** 
0.2187 
(4.634)** 
0.2035 
(4.087)** 
0.2015 
(4.112)** 
0.2321 
(4.747)** 
α2 0.9561 
(52.245)** 
0.9592 
(60.305)** 
0.9573 
(57.109)** 
0.9620 
(69.191)** 
0.9614 
(62.773)** 
0.9570 
(56.009)** 
λ -0.0393 
(-1.453) 
-0.0381 
(-1.500) 
-0.0295 
(-1.065) 
-0.0325 
(-1.234) 
-0.0359 
(-1.377) 
-0.0277 
(-0.945) 
LR 48.38* 50.56** 34.36** 50.14** 53.48** 55.40** 
Note: This table presents findings for the Japanese stock market whereby (*) and (**) denote significance at the 10% 
and 5% levels, respectively. It estimates the following feedback model: rt  =  b0 +  b1σt2  +b2 ( )][ 112 −− − ttt Pfσ  + b3  
( )][ 12 −tt rσ   + εt whereby the parameters b0, b1, b2, and b3 are parameters to be estimated. This model is estimated with 
each of the respective fundamental proxies, f1, f2, and f3, as well as the 2-year moving average in the earnings and 
dividends for these proxies, denoted as f1*, f2*, and f3*, respectively. The parameter b1 measures investors’ risk 
aversion and whether there is a risk-return tradeoff. Consistent with theory, this parameter should be positive and 
statistically significant. The parameter b2 measures the presence of fundamental traders for each of the respective 
fundamental proxies and, if fundamental traders are present, the sign of this parameter should be negative and 
statistically significant. The parameter b3 measures to what extent feedback traders exist in this market. If there are 
positive feedback traders, b3 is expected to be negative and statistically significant. The conditional variance, σt2, is 
estimated using an EGARCH(1,1) specification: ln(σ2t) = α0 + α1(│zt-1│ - E│zt-1│ + λzt-1) + α2ln(σ2t-1), whereby ln(.) are 
natural logarithms and  zt = εt/σt   are standardized residuals. Finally, the likelihood ratio statistic (LR) is estimated to test the 
significance of this extended model compared to that of Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990). 
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Table 4.7: Presence of Heterogeneous Traders in the UK Stock Market 
Coeff. f1 f2 f3 f1* f2* f3* 
b0 0.0545 
(0.135) 
0.2139 
(0.506) 
0.0704 
(0.177) 
0.2312 
(0.566) 
0.0223 
(0.050) 
-0.0773 
(-0.192) 
b1 0.0088 
(0.877) 
0.0109 
(1.091) 
0.0094 
(0.956) 
0.0153 
(1.502) 
0.0013 
(1.074) 
0.0109 
(1.118) 
b2 * 104 -0.8312 
(-3.892)** 
-0.0516 
(-0.894) 
-0.0105 
(-1.209) 
-0.2643 
(-2.650)** 
-0.0324 
(-0.533) 
-0.0177 
(-1.479) 
b3 0.0014 
(3.109)** 
0.0018 
(2.902)** 
0.0012 
(3.084)** 
0.0012 
(2.896)** 
0.0012 
(3.023)** 
0.0012 
(2.995)** 
α0 -0.0361 
(-0.529) 
-0.0125 
(-0.179) 
-0.0309 
(-0.425) 
-0.0500 
(-0.782) 
-0.0249 
(-0.364) 
-0.0341 
(-0.481) 
α1 0.2992 
(5.014)** 
0.2823 
(4.811)** 
0.2979 
(4.986)** 
0.2931 
(4.891)** 
0.2856 
(4.825)** 
0.2903 
(4.878)** 
α2 0.9423 
(39.974)** 
0.9389 
(38.368)** 
0.9411 
(37.818)** 
0.9482 
(43.777)** 
0.9421 
(39.743)** 
0.9437 
(39.075)** 
λ -0.0401 
(-1.434) 
-0.0567 
(-1.857)* 
-0.0423 
(-1.374) 
-0.0324 
(-1.205) 
-0.0492 
(-1.689)* 
-0.0423 
(-1.372) 
LR 98.54** 97.66** 96.84** 96.26** 95.14** 94.26** 
Note: This table presents findings for the U.K. stock market whereby (*) and (**) denote significance at the 10% and 
5% levels, respectively. It estimates the following feedback model: rt  =  b0 +  b1σt2  +b2 ( )][ 112 −− − ttt Pfσ  + b3  
( )][ 12 −tt rσ   + εt whereby the parameters b0, b1, b2, and b3 are parameters to be estimated. This model is estimated with 
each of the respective fundamental proxies, f1, f2, and f3, as well as the 2-year moving average in the earnings and 
dividends for these proxies, denoted as f1*, f2*, and f3*, respectively. The parameter b1 measures investors’ risk 
aversion and whether there is a risk-return tradeoff. Consistent with theory, this parameter should be positive and 
statistically significant. The parameter b2 measures the presence of fundamental traders for each of the respective 
fundamental proxies and, if fundamental traders are present, the sign of this parameter should be negative and 
statistically significant. The parameter b3 measures to what extent feedback traders exist in this market. If there are 
positive feedback traders, b3 is expected to be negative and statistically significant. The conditional variance, σt2, is 
estimated using an EGARCH(1,1) specification: ln(σ2t) = α0 + α1(│zt-1│ - E│zt-1│ + λzt-1) + α2ln(σ2t-1), whereby ln(.) are 
natural logarithms and  zt = εt/σt   are standardized residuals. Finally, the likelihood ratio statistic (LR) is estimated to test the 
significance of this extended model compared to that of Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990). 
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Table 4.8: Presence of Heterogeneous Traders in the US Stock Market 
Coeff. f1 f2 f3 f1* f2* f3* 
b0 -0.5100 
(-1.090) 
-0.4491 
(-0.941) 
-0.5123 
(-1.117) 
0.2789 
(0.314) 
0.1300 
(0.198) 
0.5382 
(0.604) 
b1 0.0442 
(-1.972)** 
0.0475 
(1.697)* 
0.0408 
(1.923)* 
0.0553 
(1.614) 
0.0123 
(0.357) 
-0.0148 
(-0.302) 
b2 * 104 -0.1217 
(-0.327) 
-0.0235 
(-0.456) 
-0.3948 
(-1.327) 
-0.6898 
(-1.890)* 
-0.0095 
(-0.283) 
-0.2989 
(-1.832)* 
b3 0.0027 
(2.264)** 
0.0023 
(2.019)** 
0.0021 
(1.810)* 
0.0013 
(0.386) 
0.0025 
(1.169) 
0.0007 
(0.213) 
α0 1.4157 
(5.362)** 
1.3189 
(5.136)** 
1.5888 
(5.553)** 
0.0701 
(0.671) 
0.0909 
(0.799) 
0.0784 
(0.727) 
α1 0.0965 
(1.081) 
0.1026 
(1.145) 
0.0767 
(0.836) 
0.2087 
(2.744)** 
0.2046 
(2.678)** 
0.2085 
(2.738)** 
α2 0.4865 
(5.529)** 
0.5182 
(6.071)** 
0.4319 
(4.527)** 
0.9214 
(22.654)** 
0.9156 
(21.214)** 
0.9187 
(22.035)** 
λ -0.3338 
(-5.813)** 
-0.3243 
(-5.574)** 
-0.3512 
(-6.342)** 
-0.0872 
(-3.098)** 
-0.1018 
(-3.245)** 
-0.1002 
(-3.225)** 
LR 44.26** 43.40** 43.50** 44.58** 45.54** 45.74** 
Note: This table presents findings for the U.S. stock market whereby (*) and (**) denote significance at the 10% and 
5% levels, respectively. It estimates the following feedback model: rt  =  b0 +  b1σt2  +b2 ( )][ 112 −− − ttt Pfσ  + b3  
( )][ 12 −tt rσ   + εt whereby the parameters b0, b1, b2, and b3 are parameters to be estimated. This model is estimated with 
each of the respective fundamental proxies, f1, f2, and f3, as well as the 2-year moving average in the earnings and 
dividends for these proxies, denoted as f1*, f2*, and f3*, respectively. The parameter b1 measures investors’ risk 
aversion and whether there is a risk-return tradeoff. Consistent with theory, this parameter should be positive and 
statistically significant. The parameter b2 measures the presence of fundamental traders for each of the respective 
fundamental proxies and, if fundamental traders are present, the sign of this parameter should be negative and 
statistically significant. The parameter b3 measures to what extent feedback traders exist in this market. If there are 
positive feedback traders, b3 is expected to be negative and statistically significant. The conditional variance, σt2, is 
estimated using an EGARCH(1,1) specification: ln(σ2t) = α0 + α1(│zt-1│ - E│zt-1│ + λzt-1) + α2ln(σ2t-1), whereby ln(.) are 
natural logarithms and  zt = εt/σt   are standardized residuals. Finally, the likelihood ratio statistic (LR) is estimated to test the 
significance of this extended model compared to that of Cutler, Poterba and Summers (1990). 
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Overall, the findings herein are of interest to practitioners and academics. Firstly, in 
the context of explaining the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff, the empirical evidence 
provided here corroborates the arguments made in the preceding two chapters; namely, it 
provides support for the Merton (1973) theoretical notion that the conditional variance and 
intertemporal risk are the sole determining factors of investors’ risk premium. The findings 
herein provide support for this conclusion in the sense that, despite integrating the behavior 
of heterogeneous investors, this does not help in explaining variations in the intertemporal 
risk premium. However, in addition to this insight, the findings here identify new insights 
which merit further exploration. These findings are of interest to practitioners who seek 
valuation methods for the stock market and for academics who further want to explore into 
this field. 
Firstly, the empirical evidence here suggests that fundamental traders drive, to some 
extent, movements in stock prices. Given this finding, it is perhaps of use for practitioners 
and policymakers to monitor ratios such as the price-earnings ratio, as this fundamental 
factor, among others, can give cues as to weather the stock market is over- or under-priced. 
Given the empirical findings and the demand that fundamental traders exhibit in 
each respective countries’ stock market, the evidence here shows that fundamental traders 
increase their demand for stock shares when prices are low relative to their fundamental 
value and vice versa. These results confirm the arguments made in the second chapter and 
the arguments of other researchers (see Shiller, 1996; Lander, Orphanides and 
Douvogiannis, 1997; Shiller, 2000; Campbell and Shiller, 1998 and 2001; Thomas and 
Zhang, 2008, to name a few). 
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A second major finding of this chapter is that it appears positive feedback trading is 
not statistically evident when exploring monthly frequency data, as is indicated by the 
parameter b3 in Tables 4.2 through 4.8. This result does not imply a rejection of the notion 
that there different types of investors with different strategies and expectations, it instead 
suggests that feedback traders are present but it seems their actions exert an impact on stock 
prices only in the short run. These results are in contrast to those by Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992), Koutmos (1997), and Antoniou, Koutmos and Pericli (2005). This of 
course may be due to the fact that these studies are using daily data. In this case, the 
argument can be made in favor of the empirical observation that positive feedback trading is 
present in the short-run, but it becomes insignificant in the longer-run. It is also possible that 
there are also negative feedback traders so that the net result becomes insignificant over the 
longer-run and when looking at lower frequency data such as monthly stock market returns. 
This empirical finding is evocative of the notion that high-frequency traders and institutions 
may drive prices in the short-run but in the longer-run, negative feedback traders and 
fundamental traders push the prices back to their equilibrium values. 
 
4.6. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter estimates a dynamic capital asset pricing model (CAPM) which 
characterizes the trading behavior of three types of market participants; namely, rational 
risk-averse investors, positive feedback traders and fundamental traders. Rational risk-
averse investors’ demand for risky assets is dictated solely by mean-variance 
considerations in the context of the equilibrium CAPM. Positive feedback (i.e. 
momentum) traders follow trends in the marketplace and buy (sell) stocks when prices 
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rise (fall). Such behavior is the result of irrationality, trading on noise or incomplete 
information, bandwagon effects, portfolio insurance strategies, or other extrapolative 
expectations, such as stop-loss orders. Fundamental traders believe in mean reversion of 
stock prices toward a long-run average, or fundamental, value. Their demand for risky 
assets is governed by the degree to which prices diverge from their fundamental value. 
 This chapter makes a unique contribution in the sense that it explores the nature of 
the intertemporal nature in a model that integrates the behavior of different types of 
investors. As mentioned, there is ample evidence to suggest that investors trade on other 
factors other than mean-variance considerations, which classical capital asset pricing 
theory suggests. In addition to incorporating the behavior of feedback traders, there are 
several fundamental proxies used here to capture the behavior of fundamental traders. 
One of the factors is based on the so-called “Fed model” which was discussed also in the 
second chapter of the thesis. 
Furthermore, there are some key findings which merit attention. Firstly, despite 
the fact that this chapter integrates the trading behavior of fundamental and feedback 
traders, there is statistically unsubstantiated evidence of a positive risk-return tradeoff 
when estimating Equation (4.6). This finding may possibly be the result of the intrinsic 
shortcomings associated with using historical realized returns as an unbiased estimate of 
investors’ expected returns, as is argued in the second chapter of this thesis and in 
Koutmos (2010, 2011 and references therein). If it is the case that historical returns are 
fundamentally inaccurate in describing expected returns, then a model such as Equation 
(4.6) which incorporates the behavior of heterogeneous investors may not alone be able 
to detect a positive risk-return tradeoff. It does however shed new light into how the 
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heterogeneous behavior of investors drives stock prices and to what extent this is 
statistically observable. 
A second key finding in this chapter which merits attention and offers a 
contribution to literature is that it appears that feedback trading is not as evident using 
monthly data as it is when using higher frequency data (such as daily data). In this case, 
an argument can be made in favor of the notion that positive feedback trading is present in 
the short run, but it becomes insignificant in the longer run. It is also possible that there are 
negative feedback traders so that the net result becomes insignificant over the longer run. 
In a contribution to the research literature, despite the fact that it seems that 
integrating heterogeneous investors into our model does not explain variations in the 
intertemporal risk premium, the inherent usefulness of fundamental factors – such as the 
price-earnings ratio – cannot be ignored. It is no surprise that during times leading to stock 
market bubbles, such as the build up and burst of the Tech Bubble in the late 1990s, there 
was excessive positive feedback and, as a result, the price-earnings ratio had deviated 
significantly from its long-run trend (see Griffin, Harris and Topaloglu, 2003; Ofek and 
Richardson, 2002). Therefore, it is worthwhile for policymakers and investors to consider 
such factors given that they may give an accurate picture of whether stock markets are 
over- or under-valued. This argument also supports the arguments made by Shiller (2000) 
of using this ratio as a gauge to see whether there is “irrational exuberance” in the market 
and where prices are relative to fundamentals. 
A plausible direction that I am exploring is to apply the model in Equation (4.6) to 
test whether it can explain variations in investors’ risk premium in industry portfolios. 
Koutmos (2011) finds that different portfolios have unique time-varying risk 
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characteristics and respond differently to shocks in the aggregate stock market. It will be 
useful to see to what extent feedback trading is prevalent in various industries, given each 
industries’ unique characteristics, consumer demand, and risk exposure to the overall 
market. It will also be beneficial to evaluate whether fundamental proxies – such as the 
price-earnings ratio – can be used to explain variations in investors’ risk premium when 
applying the model in Equation (4.6) which examines stock price dynamics in the context 
of heterogeneous traders. 
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Chapter Five 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
5.1. Overview of the Study 
The motivation for this thesis stems for the inconsistent empirical findings regarding the 
intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. Despite the theoretical notion that investors are risk-
averse agents and demand higher returns per unit of risk that they take, the conflicting 
evidence is overwhelming and prompts further debate and investigation into this 
important relationship. As mentioned, the risk-return tradeoff is important from a 
theoretical standpoint since it provides insights into investors’ behavior and the behavior 
of stock prices. It seeks to answer the question of whether investors are risk-averse agents 
as is the classically held view in financial economics and which underpins much of asset 
pricing theory. From the perspective of practitioners, this relationship is also important as 
they consider various asset classes and investment possibilities and attempt to gauge their 
clients’ degree of risk aversion and what investment vehicles are appropriate for them. In 
a different context, practitioners also need estimates of expected returns when conducting 
cost of capital approximations (see Graham and Harvey, 2001). 
 This thesis provides compelling evidence in favor of an intertemporal risk-return 
tradeoff and provides reasons as to why existing studies provide contradictory evidence. 
In addition to exploring variants of the Merton (1973) ICAPM, this thesis also explores 
relevant peripheral issues within asset pricing and econometrics; such as time-series 
modelling, the identification of macroeconomic factors which can proxy for investors’ 
intertemporal risk, and feedback trading, to name only a few. Altogether, the chapters 
provide a contribution and foundation for future research into this issue. 
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 The second chapter introduces some of the foundations of asset pricing theory and 
time-series modelling and the Merton (1973) ICAPM. It argues that the reason for 
existing conflicting findings is because studies are erroneously using ex post historical 
realized returns as an unbiased proxy for investors’ forward-looking expectations of their 
expected returns. It thus provides arguments which highlight the limitations with using ex 
post historical realized returns as a proxy for investors’ forward-looking expectation of 
returns. It contributes to existing literature by providing a forward-looking proxy of 
expected returns which is derived theoretically from the Gordon (1962) dividend constant 
growth model, something which, to my knowledge, has not been considered before. 
 The chapter is motivated by the ‘volatility feedback hypothesis’ of French, 
Schwert and Stambaugh (1987) and Campbell and Hentschel (1992) to motivate the 
argument that historical realized returns are unjustifiably used as a proxy for investors’ 
forward-looking expectations of their expected returns. More specifically, the volatility 
feedback argument argues that negative shocks in stock returns lead to higher future 
volatility than positive shocks of equal magnitude. This proposition is consistent with the 
empirical observation that volatility is persistent and, as is described in Mandelbrot 
(1963) and Fama (1965), an increase in current volatility leads to more volatility in the 
future. The reason for this is, as Campbell and Hentschel (1992) argue, is because the 
negative effects associated with bad news in the stock market are more pronounced than 
good news and have a larger bearing on investors’ investment decisions. 
 This argument can also be used to explain why extant studies find a negative or 
statistically insignificant risk-return relation; in particular, as Mandelbrot (1963) 
describes, since volatility is persistent, an increase in volatility today ‘signals’ that 
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volatility will be higher in the future. This raises investors’ required rate of return and the 
discount factor they use to discount expected future streams of income. If we assume that 
corporate earnings and dividends are not rising while volatility rises, prices will 
obviously fall since investors sell off their positions and wait until expected returns rise 
again to the appropriate level. A graphical illustration of this is shown in Koutmos (2010) 
which illustrates the movements of implied volatility relative to the market price of the 
S&P 500 Index. 
Whereas the second chapter considers a single-factor variant of the Merton (1973) 
ICAPM, which posits that expected returns are solely a function of conditional volatility, 
the third chapter introduces the two-factor ICAPM. This model posits that expected 
returns are, in addition to volatility, a function of their conditional covariance with 
investment opportunities that shift stochastically through time (see Scruggs, 1998; 
Scruggs and Glabadanidis, 2003). It proposes to use, in addition to the long-term 
government bond yield, the industrial production index and twists in the yield curve to 
proxy for shifts in the investment opportunity which shifts stochastically through time. 
The fourth chapter contributes to literature by examining the intertemporal risk-
return tradeoff but takes an innovative approach relative to existing studies in the sense 
that it integrates the trading behavior of heterogeneous types of traders; namely, the 
behavior of positive feedback traders and fundamental traders. The motivation for this 
chapter stems from the fact that, until now, empirical literature applies variations of the 
Merton (1973) ICAPM assuming that investors make decisions on the basis of mean-
variance considerations in the context of Markowitz (1952) and that there is no 
mispricing of assets. A relatively new body of research however finds that, contrary to 
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the equilibrium notion that mispricing is transitory and that markets are efficient (see 
Malkiel, 2003), there is evidence that identifies many constraints which arbitrageurs face 
which limit their ability to attack mispricing and, therefore, stock market prices may 
deviate for some time from their equilibrium value (see De Long et al., 1990a; Shleifer 
and Summers, 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Shiller, 2000; Abreu and Brunnermeier, 
2002 and 2003). 
In an innovation to extant literature, the fourth chapter, given the extant findings 
which suggest the presence of heterogeneous investors, explores whether we should 
integrate this behavior in our models when estimating the intertemporal risk-return 
tradeoff. So far in the literature, existing studies only have only looked at variants of the 
Merton (1973) ICAPM using predominantly GARCH-type frameworks. There has not 
been an attempt yet to see whether we can better explain the risk-return tradeoff by 
incorporating the behavior of these heterogeneous investors in our model. 
 
5.2. Summary of the Empirical Findings 
This thesis makes its unique contributions by exploring the intertemporal risk-return 
tradeoff from different angles and affording explanations as to why extant findings are 
mixed. As already mentioned in the second chapter, the empirical findings lend credible 
support to the notion that we as investors are risk averse and therefore demand higher 
returns in order to take on higher risks. More specifically, the market earnings-yield, 
which serves as a proxy for investors’ required rate of return in the stock market, varies 
positively with market volatility both in the short- and long-run when looking at 
international stock markets. There is also evidence of a positive long-run relation 
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between the earnings-yield and the long-term government bond yield. This relationship 
can be justified on grounds that as interest rates rise, the cost of firms’ debt also rises and 
their ability to raise capital is impinged. Thus, the future prospects of the firm become 
relatively riskier and investors may assign a higher discount rate to its future cash flows 
(i.e. their required rate of return rises). Secondly, the stock market may simply become a 
less attractive investment as investors’ opportunity cost rises and they move into more 
“risk-free” investments such as Treasury bills and bonds. Therefore, their required rate of 
return in the stock market rises commensurate to this risk. Such a relation is also 
consistent with extant literature which also documents a positive association between the 
market earnings-yield and the long-term government bond yield (see Gordon, 1962; 
Bleiberg, 1989; Fairfield, 1994; Greenspan, 1997; White, 2000). 
 The third chapter explores a two-factor version of the Merton (1973) ICAPM 
using, in addition to the long-term government bond yield, industrial production and 
twists in the yield curve as proxies for intertemporal risk. A major finding of the chapter 
is the empirical observation that intertemporal risk is important and this can consistently 
be seen to play a significant role across most of the G-7 markets here in the sample. This 
finding sheds new light on existing studies. Namely, up until now, studies have not made 
it clear whether conflicting findings are the result of econometric (miss-)specifications or 
because of omission of the second factor which serves to proxy for the investment 
opportunity state. Whereas Scruggs (1998) argues in favor of the two-factor ICAPM, 
Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) report empirical evidence to the contrary. The findings 
in the chapter, however, provide strong evidence in favor of the notion that intertemporal 
risk is an important ingredient in determining investors’ risk premium in the stock market 
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and may be a possibly strong reason for extant conflicting findings in the literature. It is 
important to mention here that, given that industrial production shifts asymmetrically 
through time and, although relatively less pronounced, there is some evidence of the 
other proxies exhibiting asymmetric behavior, the model used to test the two-factor 
ICAPM is the BEKK model of Engle and Kroner (1995). This model is advantageous in 
that it allows the conditional variance and the covariance within the context of the 
ICAPM to respond asymmetrically to past innovations. Such a model, therefore, can 
accommodate the asymmetric time-series movements in factors and may provide a better 
description of intertemporal risk and investors’ risk premium in the stock market. 
Furthermore, consistent with the tests conducted in the chapter, the empirical 
evidence here supports the Merton (1973) theoretical view of the ICAPM without a 
constant term. This is conducted in the chapter via a likelihood ratio test to see whether 
restricting the constant to zero is supported. The findings here lend support to the 
theoretical ICAPM of Merton (1973) and to the second assumption in his seminal paper 
regarding capital market structure which is the foundation for intertemporal asset pricing; 
namely, transactions costs do not exist and there are no taxes or other constraints (see 
Merton, 1973, p.868). Before this thesis, the literature does not give a clear distinction as 
to whether the Merton (1973) theoretical two-factor model holds with or without a 
constant term. The findings here support the notion of the theoretical ICAPM and the 
empirical findings show that if we accept the assumptions that Merton (1973) establishes, 
the proposed state factors do a comparatively better job in explaining variations in 
investors’ intertemporal risk premium relative to the model if we account for a constant 
term which attempts to capture such market inefficiencies. 
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 Finally, consistent with the arguments made herein, another major finding in the 
chapter is that it appears that the long-term government bond yield may not be an 
appropriate proxy for investment opportunities, given that it does not exhibit consistently 
reliable empirical significance in terms of explaining intertemporal variations in 
investors’ risk premium. This provides support to the argument made in the thesis that the 
long-term bond yield is a financial variable that is, to a large extent, controlled by the 
actions of central banks (see Mishkin, 2005) and may not accurately reflect investment 
opportunities. This may be a contributing reason why Scruggs and Glabadanidis (2003) 
do not find a positive risk-return relation when focusing on the U.S. market. However, 
the international evidence here corroborates the view of Guo and Whitelaw (2006, 
p.1435) that this does not “imply a rejection...” of the ICAPM, and contributes to 
literature by empirically showing the behavior of the intertemporal risk premium using 
proposed factors rooted in theory. 
The fourth chapter explores whether integrating the behavior of different types of 
investors can help in explaining the intertemporal risk-return tradeoff. Namely, the 
evidence here corroborates the arguments made in the preceding chapters which provide 
support for the Merton (1973) theoretical notion that the conditional variance and 
intertemporal risk are the sole determining factors of investors’ risk premium. The evidence 
from the fourth chapter suggests that integrating the behavior of heterogeneous investors 
does not help to better explain variations in the intertemporal risk premium. Instead, the 
findings shed new light which has not been identified before and raises additional insights 
which merit further exploration. These findings are of interest to practitioners who seek 
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valuation methods for the stock market and for academics who further want to explore into 
this field. 
In particular, it is of interest to see that the empirical evidence suggests that positive 
feedback trading is not statistically evident when exploring monthly frequency data. This 
result does not imply a rejection of the notion that there exist heterogeneous groups of 
investors in the stock market. It instead suggests that feedback traders are present but only in 
the short run. These results are in contrast to those by Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), 
Koutmos (1997), and Antoniou, Koutmos and Pericli (2005). This of course may be due to 
the fact that these studies are using daily data. In this case an argument can be made in favor 
of the notion that positive feedback trading is present in the short run, but it becomes 
insignificant in the longer run. It is also possible that there are also negative feedback traders 
so that the net result becomes insignificant over the longer-run and when looking at lower 
frequency data such as monthly stock market returns. This suggests that high-frequency 
traders and institutions may drive prices in the short-run but in the longer-run, negative 
feedback traders and fundamental traders push the prices back to their equilibrium values. 
 
5.3. Implications 
This thesis provides academic researchers and practitioners many implications about the 
behavior of stock prices and the economy. For example, from the perspective of an 
investor, it is important to understand the nature of the risk-return relation because it 
directly impacts their decision-making and their willingness to bear more risk. If we have 
a better understanding of the nature of the risk-return tradeoff, then this will help 
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investors make better decisions and we can better understand whether the volatility of an 
asset plays a role in the expected returns of this very asset. 
Some of the major implications of the second chapter have to do with the 
limitations with using ex post historical returns as a proxy for investors’ forward-looking 
expected returns. Namely, it argues that there are at least three intrinsic shortcomings to 
using historical realized returns; firstly, current research indicates that the risk premium is 
time-varying and, therefore, any inferences drawn concerning expected returns using ex 
post returns may be highly sensitive to the sampling period under consideration (see 
Merton, 1973; Lundblad, 2007). Secondly, we as investors are forward-looking and thus 
form expectations of the required rate of return on the basis of current volatility, as well 
as news regarding future volatility in the stock market. This is consistent with the 
arguments made by Campbell and Hentschel (1992) that future volatility is a function of 
past news as well as any future news that may disseminate to investors. Finally, as 
Lundblad (2007) duly indicates, the belief that a long enough sample of historical returns 
will ‘converge,’ eventually, to expected returns is misplaced and inaccurate. More 
specifically, his study finds that nearly two hundred years worth of data is needed in 
order for us to see historical realized returns converge to investors’ expected rate of 
return. This means that practitioners should possibly consider ex ante factors which can 
forecast future states of the economy and can proxy for expected returns. 
When the market earnings-yield is used as a proxy for the required rate of return 
in the stock market, there are many implications which can be derived and can be of use 
to market participants. Namely, the research here provides information about the market 
earnings-yield and shows how this can shift as market volatility varies through time. In 
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particular, periods of heightened stock market volatility are associated with higher market 
earnings-yields. This empirical observation is consistent with the findings of Campbell 
and Shiller (1998, 2001) and Shiller (2000). Namely, the market earnings-yield, as well 
as its reciprocal – the price-earnings ratio – can serve as an indicator of future market 
conditions. In particular, when the market earnings-yield is relatively high, it generally 
corresponds to higher market volatility and that investors’ required rate of return has 
risen. As a result, and consistent with the volatility feedback hypothesis of Campbell and 
Hentschel (1992), this will lead to a drop in stock prices as investors sell off their 
positions in the stock market and wait for expected returns to rise to the appropriate level 
(see Koutmos, 2010 and 2011). Thus, a relatively high earnings-yield serves to signal that 
returns will be higher in the future because investors’ required rate of return has risen and 
thus future returns must rise to compensate them for increases in market volatility. 
These findings are also consistent with the arguments made by Shiller (2000), 
who argues that a high price-earnings ratio (i.e. low earnings-yield) may be a signal of 
“irrational exuberance” in the stock market whereby investors are heavily invested in the 
stock market with an expectation that stock prices will continue to rise in the future. 
Under a scenario such as this one, investors do not foresee any imminent risks and feel 
comfortable with their investing and, thus, their required rate of return is low. In a 
scenario where the market price-earnings ratio is low (i.e. the earnings-yield is high), this 
may signal that many investors avoid investing in the stock market and stock prices are 
undervalued (see Shiller, 2000), possibly because of increased risks and market volatility. 
In such a scenario, their required rate of return (i.e. the market earnings-yield) is high and 
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they demand higher returns to compensate them and in order to invest in the stock 
market. 
 The implications of the findings of the third chapter are of interest to both market 
participants and academicians. Namely, from the perspective of academic theory, the 
findings herein lend credible support to a positive intertemporal risk-return tradeoff in the 
context of the Merton (1973) ICAPM. These findings hold in international markets and 
suggest that perhaps conflicting extant findings are an artifact of omitting the second 
factor in the ICAPM which serves as a proxy for the investment opportunity set. In 
particular, the following important findings emerge from this chapter. 
 From the perspective of market participants the empirical findings illustrate a 
great deal about the properties of intertemporal risk which faces all investors and how 
this risk shifts through time. In particular, when examining the time-series dynamics of 
each of the proposed proxies for the investment opportunity set, it is interesting to see 
that their respective conditional variance estimates are a function of past volatility and 
innovations. Namely, for the long-term government bond yield, its conditional mean is 
positively linked with its conditional variance. This suggests a positive relation between 
its returns and its volatility. Furthermore, when examining the time-series properties of 
industrial production, it is interesting to see that, alike the other two proposed factors, it 
appears to respond asymmetrically to innovations across many of the market indices in 
the sample. In other words, negative shocks (declines in industrial production) lead to 
more volatility than positive shocks (increases in industrial production) of equal 
magnitude. Such an empirical observation can be supported by existing studies which 
examine the economic behavior of markets and what implications policy-making has on 
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output and economic performance. In this regard, Neftci (1984), Hamilton (1989) and 
Artis, Kontolemis and Osborn (1997) argue that industrial production reflects states in the 
business cycle and, namely, economic ups and downs exhibit asymmetry; whereby 
industrial production declines more in absolute terms during recessions than it rises 
during periods of economic prosperity. Such a finding is of interest to academics and 
practitioners and suggests that there is something similar to the so-called ‘volatility 
feedback hypothesis’ of Campbell and Hentschel (1992) which is present in economic 
cycles in our market. 
In addition to these empirical findings, the chapter, apart from investigating the 
intertemporal risk-return relation, sheds light on what kind of factors investors ought to 
consider when assessing economic conditions and when trying to explain variations in 
expected stock market returns. In particular, the empirical findings reported here show 
strongest evidence for suggesting that shifts in the yield curve describe states in the 
economy. This finding provides some basis for using the yield curve in order to track 
market and economic performance and predict future states of the economy. These 
empirical findings thus provide further support to studies which argue of the economic 
information content embodied in the yield curve (see Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; 
Campbell, 1995; Estrella and Mishkin, 1998; Hamilton and Kim, 2002, to name only a 
few). 
Finally, the fourth chapter provides some insights as to which types of investors 
tend to drive stock prices on a more long-term basis. In particular, the empirical evidence 
here shows that fundamental traders drive, to some extent, movements in stock prices. This 
shows that valuation ratios, such as the earnings-yield and dividend-yield proposed in this 
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thesis, may prove useful to practitioners who want to measure stock market performance 
and possibly predict future market movements. The evidence here shows that fundamental 
traders increase their demand for stock shares when prices are low relative to their 
fundamental value and vice versa. In terms of gauging fundamental value, the ratios 
proposed here seem to be good indicators of whether stock prices as over- or under-valued. 
These results confirm the arguments made in the second chapter and the arguments of other 
researchers (see Shiller, 1996; Lander, Orphanides and Douvogiannis, 1997; Shiller, 
2000; Campbell and Shiller, 1998 and 2001; Thomas and Zhang, 2008,  to name a few). 
Furthermore, the findings show that in the short-run, as some of the aforementioned 
studies indicate, although there may be extant evidence of feedback trading this tends to 
disappear over the longer-run as negative feedback traders and fundamental traders enter 
the stock market.  
 
5.4. Future Research 
As already mentioned, there are several important avenues that can be considered in order 
to expand on the findings and arguments made herein in order to better understand the 
risk-return tradeoff. Namely, this relationship is so important that it has been described as 
the “first fundamental law in finance...” (see Ghysels, Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2005). 
This relation is important given that it is the cornerstone of financial economic theory and 
has many applications to market participants. 
 As such, there are several enhancements and extensions that can be undertaken in 
order for us to better understand the nature of this important relation. In particular, 
Koutmos (2011) investigates the time-varying nature of volatility in industries within the 
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NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX, and find that some industries exhibit higher systematic 
risk for investors relative to others. Thus, instead of focusing strictly on the intertemporal 
risk-return tradeoff in the stock market, future research can also investigate the nature of 
this important relation across various industries. The reason why this is important is 
because different industries have unique risk characteristics given that they produce 
respective goods and services and consumers exhibit varying degrees of elasticity in 
terms of their demands towards these goods and services. Thus, investors considering to 
invest in various industry sectors need to be aware of the risk-return characteristics and 
how they shift relative to shocks in the aggregate stock market. 
 In terms of the methodologies and techniques employed in the third chapter, as a 
suggestion for future research, there are many possible extensions that can be taken using 
the knowledge here in order to better our understanding of the financial world. These 
extensions need not necessarily pertain to asset pricing or the intertemporal risk-return 
relation per se. For example, we can use the tools here to investigate the dynamics of 
other asset classes such as fixed income securities. In particular, what is the interaction 
between various fixed income asset classes and the stock market? How does this 
interaction change in the presence of market shocks and is there an asymmetric response 
in terms of what happens to volatility in the presence of positive and negative shocks? 
Finally, are there any relevant state factors that can be considered when examining the 
expected returns of other asset classes such as bonds or derivatives? 
 Finally, given the methodology and findings of the fourth chapter, a plausible path 
for future research is to apply the model in Equation (4.6) to other investment 
environments other than stock market indexes to see how the model behaves and whether 
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feedback trading and a positive risk-return relation is evident. For example, there is work 
that has been done in the mutual fund industry by Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) which 
finds that fund managers in the same geographical location have a tendency to copy one 
another and this leads to herding. A good extension is to examine whether there is a 
positive risk-return tradeoff in this industry and how do investors respond when mutual 
fund returns become more or less volatile through time. This also raises the question of 
how this model behaves during up and down markets and what this tells us about investor 
behavior. 
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